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Prmted m Germany Introduction 
Introduction 
The  agrimonetary system zs,  wzthout doubt,  one of the  most compltcated aspects of the  common agrzcultural 
poltcy 
Over the years, thzs subject has been a matter of  concern both to experts and to those m the field, havmg become 
mseparable from the Counczl's annual decision on prices and related measures 
Thzs  study revzews the entzre system of  agnmonetary measures of  the Commumty at present m force.  It seeks to 
combme  theory  and practzce.  The  various  concepts  conszdered are  zllustrated by  worked examples,  real  or 
hypothetical. 
The purpose of  thzs study zs to gzve the reader a better awareness of  the Commumty agrzmonetary system and to 
factlztate a deeper understandmg of  the arguments put forward by some and rejected by others concemmg the 
need for the reform of the  system and the elzmmatwn of  monetary compensatory amounts m the run-up to  the 
smgle European market envzsagedfor 1993. 
Note 
This study reflects the agnmonetary sttuatwn followmg the Council· DecisiOns of 24 May 1991  on farm pnces 
and related measures for 1991/92. Most recent developments, namely the new agnmonetary system proposed by 
the CommissiOn (COM(92) 275 final, 8.7.1992), will be published separately as an  'addendum' at a later stage 
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8 I -·  Origin of the agrimonetary system 
A - Principles 
1.  Prices  and  other  amounts  determined  under  the 
common  agricultural  policy  (CAP)  were  always 
expressed  in  agricultural  units  of  account  (AUA). 
Therefore, it was necessary to define that unit and lay 
down  rules  for  its  conversion  into  the  national 
currencies  of the  Member States.  This  was  done  in 
1962 by Regulation No 129.
1 In 1968, additional rules 
were  adopted  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No' 653/68
2  and 
Regulation (EEC) No  1134/68.
3  The· idea underlying 
those three regulations  was  that any  readjustment of 
monetary  parities  should . lead  to  an  immediate 
adjustment, in national currencies, of prices and other 
amounts  determined  in  units  of account  in  order to 
restore the balance between price levels in the various 
Member States. 
2.  During  the  currency  fluctuations  that  occurred  in 
1969  and  1971,  it became clear that,  because  of its 
inflexibility,  the  system  did  not  meet  the  economic 
needs of the  Member States.  Both falls  and  rises  in 
prices  in  national  currency  resulting  from  monetary 
developments could lead to problems affecting areas of 
great political significance, namely the safeguarding of 
agricultural income and the fight against inflation. In 
those circumstances, it was necessary to make excep-
tions to the provisions then in force. Those exceptions, 
initially  regarded  as  temporary,  became  permanent 
measures. 
3.  The  monetary  compensation  system,  which  was 
originally intended to  apply for a limited period (see 
Article  8  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  974171),
4  sub-
sequently  became  an  integral  part of the  CAP.  That 
system has existed for 20 years. Its general principles 
remain intact,  although numerous modifications have 
been  made,  particularly  with  respect  to  calculation 
methods. 
4.  The basic ideas remain the same: 
(a)  Prices  and  other  amounts  determined  under  the 
CAP at Community level are expressed in agricultural 
units  of account;  to  ensure  that  the  Member  States 
apply the amounts laid down, those amounts must, in 
principle,  be converted  into  national  currency  using 
conversion  rates  which  reflect  the  true  monetary 
position. 
1  OJ, English Special Edition  1959-62, p  274 
2  OJ, English Special Edition  1968 (I),  p,  121 
3  OJ, English Special Edition  1968 (II), p  396. 
4
• OJ, English Special' Edition 1971  (I),  p. 257 
Ongin of the agnmonetary system 
(b)  However,  the  common  market  organizations 
(CMOs),  particularly  where  they  involve  the  appli-
cation of an intervention system having a direct impact 
on the  market,  are  incapable of coping immediately 
with· the  consequences - a  rise or fall  in  prices in 
national  currency  - of a  change  in  the, monetary 
situation, particularly where the change is far-reaching 
(devaluation or revaluation) or frequent (flotation); on 
the contrary, price stability is required.  · 
(c)  The principle of price stability can be implemented 
only  by  applying  stable  and  specific  agricultural 
conversion  rates  which,  by  reason  of their  stability, 
can be dissociated from economic reality (the creation 
of 'green rates'). 
(d)  However,  recourse  to  such  specific  green  rates 
means  that price levels  differ in  the  Member States; 
when  those  price  differences  exceed  certain  limits, 
compensation is called for in commercial transactions: 
monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs). In the case 
of oilseeds and field beans, peas and sweet lupins, the 
system  of  'differential  amounts'  is  applied,  in  fact 
comprising MCAs which are adapted to certain CMOs 
using an aid system based on  'deficiency payments'. 
B- Background 
1.  Under the agrimonetary scheme developed after the 
introduction of the common market organizations, the 
agricultural unit of account and agricultural conversion 
rates  already  existed  in  rudimentary  form.  However, 
the Community legislature had still not clearly defined 
them as part of an independent system. The legislation 
then  in  force  (Regulation  No  129  and  Regulation 
(EEC) No 653/68) merely defined the agricultural unit 
of account - like the other units of account then in 
use- by reference to a fine gold weight equivalent to 
the United States dollar (for which  reason  the  AUA 
was  known  as  the  'green  dollar').  No  mention 
whatsoever was made of agricultura1 conversion rates 
to translate units of account into national currency. The 
Community  legislature  considered  that  such  rates 
clearly  derived  from  the  system  of parities  for  the 
various Community currencies which were all - like 
the  AUA  - based  on  gold  weight.  That  approach, 
which  was  fully  in  line  with  the  Bretton  Woods 
inJemational  monetary  agreement  then  in force,  was 
based on the philosophy according to which changes in 
monetary  relationships  gave  rise  to  -immediate 
repercussions  both  for  agriculture  and  for  other 
economic sectors. 
2.  That view  overlooked the  special character of the 
agricultural sector. The Treaty had provided in respect 
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of that sector - which  was  characterized by  a wide 
range  of differing  factors  of pr9duction  and,  cons-
equently,  national  protectionist  measures  - that  the 
free  movement of products should operate within the 
common  market organizations,  which  would  provide 
price guarantee mechanisms. Although the Community 
market organization system is not the same for all the 
agricultural  products  involved,  the  main  sectors 
subject to  a regulated system have certain fundamen-
tal elements in common such as, for example, support 
prices  for  domestic  production  and  prices  which 
discourage  Imports.  However,  a  distinction  must  be 
drawn between the price system within the Community 
and the system of prices applicable to  trade with non-
member countries,  since,  in  principle,  intra-Commu-
nity  trade  is  unrestricted  by  virtue  of the  basic  CAP 
principle of unity of the market. 
3.  In  general  terms,  the  price  system  is  based  on  a 
target price to be obtained by the producer (the term 
used for that price may vary  according  to. the sector: 
target  price,  guide  price,  norm price or basic  price). 
That  price  is  not  binding - it  merely  indicates  the 
level  which  must  be  reached  in  order  to  attain  the 
Treaty of Rome objective of fair income. However, in 
order  to  attam  that  objective,  that  institutional  price 
determined by the Council must influence the market 
price. In trade with non-member countries, that result 
is  achieved by the levying of a compensatory charge 
on imports  (generally  known  as  a  'regulatory levy') 
which covers the difference between the world market 
price and the Community price. An  'export refund' is 
also  granted  for  the  same  purpose.  Both  the  import 
levy and the export refund are variable, reflecting the 
often  very  considerable fluctuations  in  world  market 
prices.  As  far  as  trade  within  the  Community  is 
concerned, compensatory mechanisms are unnecessary 
since  the  price  level  IS  the  same  in  all  the  Member 
States  (except  where  there  is  a  transitional  regime 
provided for in an act of accession and in  the case of 
regionalization,  although  the  price  differences  in  the 
latter case merely reflect the transport costs recognized 
by the Community). Nevertheless, the common market 
organization  provides  for  an  intervention  system  to 
ensure that the market price within the Community is 
stable  as  far  as  possible,  thus  guaranteeing  a  fair 
income  for  the  active  agricultural  population  (in 
accordance with Article  39  of the  EEC Treaty).  The 
intervention system operates above all by means of the 
temporary or permanent withdrawal of surpluses from 
the  market.  Surpluses  may  be  offered  to  an  inter-
vention agency,  which is  obliged to purchase them at 
an  'intervention price' or else they may be the subject 
of 'private storage aid'  for  storage by  private  under-
takings. 
10 
4.  Both measures ensure that the Community market 
price does not fall  below a specified level. In general, 
the intervention price has a greater impact than private 
storage  aid,  since  it  provides  a  guideline  for  the 
market.  However,  the  intervention  system  is  not 
available  for  all  agricultural  products.  In  the  first 
place,  certain  products  are  subject  to  a  much  more 
flexible system or are even not covered by intervention 
arrangements. In addition, even in the case of products 
covered by  intervention arrangements,  only the  basic 
products  qualify.  Other  products  - basically  pro-
cessed products obtained from the basic products, and 
also  products  economically  dependent  on  basic 
products,  known  as  'derived  products'  - benefit 
from  the  effect  on  the  market  of  the  intervention 
measures  taken  in  respect  of  basic  products.  The 
import levy  and  export refund  applied  to  trade  with 
non-member  countries  are  usually  based  on  those 
applied to a basic product. 
5.  Thus,  the  common  market  organization  seeks  to 
establish,  by  means  of  the  varrous  instruments 
mentioned  above,  a  relatively  stable  level  of prices 
for products in  the  same sector.  The system involves 
determination of the amounts in question: institutional 
prices, regulatory levies, refunds and other grants. The 
amounts  are  set (in  accordance  with the  Community 
rules) in  units of account and must be converted into 
national  currencies  to  enable  the  Member  States  to 
apply them within their territories. The unit of account 
was chosen for a number of reasons: it avoids the need 
to  choose  a  national  currency  as  a  denominator;  it 
emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  price  or  amount  in 
question is the same throughout the Community; and, 
finally,  it  implies,  within  the  original  concept,  that 
adjustment  is  necessary  in  line  with  monetary 
developments,  in  order to  maintain  the  unity  of the 
market. 
6.  Where a system, as  originally conceived,  involves 
agricultural  conversion  rates  which  reflect  the  real 
value  of the  currencies  in  question,  both  revaluation 
and devaluation of currencies have immediate conse-
quences for the domestic price level. An amount fixed 
in units of account does not undergo any change, even 
if  the  value  of  the  unit  of  account  is  altered. 
Nevertheless,  at  national level,  the  prices  determined 
in the currencies of the Member States concerned rise 
when their currencies are devalued against the unit of 
account  and  fall  where  the  value  of  a  currency 
appreciates against the unit of account. 
7.  Those  consequences  were  clearly  foreseen  and 
accepted when the first agrimonetary provisions were 
adopted. However, after the monetary developments of 
1969 and  1971, the Member States concerned (France 
and Germany) and, to a degree, the Community itself, considered that, at national level, the consequences for 
the  agri-foodstuffs  sector  were  unacceptable.  The 
reasons  are  fairly  simple.  If the  devaluation  of the 
French franc in  1969 had had its full impact on French 
agriculture, it would have produced an immediate rise 
of the  same  percentage  in  the  prices  of agricultural 
products,  jeopardizing  the  success  of the  measures 
taken  by  France  to  defeat  inflation,  and  it  would 
therefore have negated the very aim of the devaluation. 
And if the revaluation of the German mark in the same 
year had had its full  impact on German agriculture, it 
would  have  produced  such  a  fall  in  the  prices  of 
products  that  'agricultural  income  would  have  been 
seriously affected. 
8.  In  that  year,  1969,  the  original  approach  was 
abandoned for  the  two  reasons  mentioned above  and 
the  Member  States  concerned  were  allowed,  for 
limited periods,  to  maintain  their former price levels 
in  national currency. That decision  had  the following 
consequences: 
(a)  unity of prices, which had just been achieved by an 
approximation  of national  prices  secured  after  great 
efforts and a long intra-Community transitional period 
(1962/67), was abandoned; 
(b)  specific  'agricultural  conversion  rates'  (green 
rates)  were  created,  which  departed  from  the  'real 
rates'  which  reflected  the  market  values  of  the 
currencies in  question; 
(c)  monetary compensatory amounts were introduced 
in  trade  in  order to  compensate for  price  differences 
arising between the Member States. 
9.  In  1971,  the  point  of  departure  was  different, 
although  the result was  the  same.  In  1971, pressures 
which  made  themselves  felt  in  the  currency  markets 
prompted  several  Member  States  to  allow  their 
currencies  to  float,  but  without  changing  official 
parities.  The  official  parities  remained  legally  in 
force even though in practice they  were not observed 
since the Member States concerned failed to  intervene 
in  the  exchange  markets  to  support  their  respective 
currencies.  Since the parities  were  not  changed from 
the  legal  point of view,  agricultural  prices  and  other 
amounts determined in units  of account continued to 
be converted into national currency using rates  based 
on  those parities. The official parity was  exceeded  in 
the  market-place  so  that  a  monetary  gap  emerged, 
reflecting the difference between the rate derived from 
the  real  economic  situation  and  the  rate  used  in  the 
framework of the common market organization. Thus, 
the problem was  fundamentally  the same as  in  1969. 
The  difference  lay  in  the  fact  that  in  1971  the  real 
value of the currencies was  variable, whilst in  1969 it 
was stable, since France and Germany had respectively 
Ongm of the agnrnonetary system 
devalued and revalued their currencies in  accordance 
with  the .  rules  laid  down  by  the  Bretton  Woods 
international monetary agreement then in force. 
C - The need for compensation 
1.  The  situations  described  above ·involved  a  diff-
erence between the conversion rate applied under the 
CAP and the rate reflecting the true monetary position, 
·leading to a price difference, first between the level in 
the Member ·state concerned and  the Community as a 
whole and, secondly, as  between the Member State in 
question  and  the  other  Member  States.  The  second 
consequence  is  of  greater  importance  from  the 
practical point of view.  The national price level rises 
excessively  in  a  Member  State  whose  currency has 
appreciated  (as  a  result  of  revaluation  or  floating 
upwards),  since the fall  in terms of national currency 
which should result from an increase in value does not 
take  place.  By  contrast,  the  national  price ·level  falls 
excessively  in  a  Member  State  whose  currency  has 
depreciated  (as  a  result  of devaluation  or  floating 
downwards), since the rise which ought to follow from 
the depreciation does not come about. 
2.  In  the  absence  of compensation,  such  a  situation 
would  cause private individuals  to  react in  a manner 
which  would  endanger the proper functioning  of the 
common  market  organization,  unless  proper counter-
measures  were  adopted.  In  view  of  the  higher 
intervention price in  a Member State whose currency 
had appreciated to an extent exceeding the Community 
level and particularly the level prevailing in a Member 
State  with  depreciated  currency,  Community  produc-
tion, to the extent to which it was placed on the market, 
would - again,  in  the  absence  of compensation  -
gravitate  towards  the  Member  State  whose  currency 
had  appreciated  to  the  greatest  extent.  Without  any 
doubt  whatsoever,  the  persons  concerned  would  be 
certain to  secure profits since the  intervention agency 
would be under an obligation to purchase the quantities 
offered to it in  accordance with the Community rules. 
Even if intervention were limited  to  national  produc-
tion,  there  would  be  a considerable risk  that  a large 
proportion of national  products would go  to  interven-
tion  and be replaced in the  market by  products from 
the  other  Member  States.  That  is  precisely  what 
happened  in  1969,  when  there  were massive exports 
of cereals from France to  Germany during the period 
prior to  the  introduction of MCAs,  as  a result of the 
devaluation of French currency. 
3.  Furthermore,  in  trade  with  non-member countries, 
the  export  refunds  rise  to  the  highest  level  in  the 
11 Research and documentation papers 
Member  State  with  the  strongest  currency.  On  the 
other hand,  the  regulatory  levies  charged  on imports 
fall  to  the  lowest level  in  the  Member  State  whose 
currency is weakest. Consequently -in  the absence of 
compensation - Community exports would be made 
from the Member States with the strongest currencies 
and  imports  would be made  into  the Member States 
with  the  weakest  currencies.  Obviously,  such  a 
situation  could  lead  to  distortions  in  trade  which 
might rapidly degenerate to  a point where irreparable 
damage was done. The intervention system would fail 
and  the  entire  common  market  organization  system 
would  cease  to  function.  These  dangers  still  exist 
today.  The  only  difference  between  the  present  and 
previous  situations  consists  in  the  introduction  of 
specific and clearly defined green rates.  Nevertheless, 
agricultural  conversion  rates  already  existed  in  that 
earlier period, although their legal definition was  less 
clear. 
4.  At  the  present  time,  some  Member  States  have 
'stable currencies'  for which there are,  in  addition to 
the  green  rates  of earlier  times,  stable  central  rates 
which  reflect  economic  reality.  There  are  other 
Member  States  which  have  'floating  currencies'  for 
various  reasons,  such  as,  for  example,  because  the 
central rate is  not supported in the exchange markets 
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(as in the case of Greece and Portugal) or because the 
central  rate  is  supported,  but  with  a  margin  of 
fluctuation  which  is  too  wide  to  ensure  the  proper 
functioning of the common market organization (as in 
the case ofthe United Kingdom and Spain: 6%). Thus, 
the problems are basically the same: there are stable or 
variable  monetary  gaps  between the  green  rates  and 
the  rates  which  reflect  economic  reality.  It  is  those 
monetary  gaps  that  give  rise  to  price  differences 
between the Member States. 
5.  The  difficulties  arising  from  automatic  price 
adjustment have  been described above.  For the  same 
reasons as  before, it has not been possible, within the 
Community  agrimonetary  system,  to  undertake  rapid 
adjustment  of agricultural  prices  to  bring  them  into 
line  with  economic  reality.  On  the  contrary,  by 
departing from  the guidelines  initially laid down,  the 
agrimonetary system at present in force is based on the 
view  that  monetary  developments  should  not  have 
immediate  repercussions  for  the  domestic  level  of 
agricultural prices. The green rate is maintained intact 
and  price differences are  offset by  the  application  of 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  in  trade  both 
between  the  Member  States  and  between  them  and 
non-member countries. II  - The traditional system 
1.  The  current  provisions  for  calculating  monetary 
compensatory amounts and differential amounts make 
up the  'traditional' system·- which is not applied for 
the time being- and the 'green ecu' system ('switch-
. over'),  which  was  introduced  in  March  1984. 
However,  it  is  appropriate  to  begin  with  a  brief 
description of the traditional  system  (provided for  in 
Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No  1677/85,
1 which-
under  the  current  provisions  - continues  to  be  the 
basic system (see Figure 1). 
2.  In principle, both systems envisage the same price 
differences between the Member States, resulting from 
the  green  rates.  In  fact,  depending  on  the  products 
concerned, the price differences betwe_en two Member 
States: 
(i)  are not compensated for at all (as usually occurs in 
most agricultural sectors covered by a common market 
organization); or  · 
(ii)  are compensated for  only  for  the  most important 
products by means of monetary compensatory amounts 
(these are  applied  at present in  the following  sectors: 
cereals,  beef  and  veal,  pigmeat,  poultrymeat,  milk, 
sugar,  table  wine,  olive  oil,  certain  processed 
vegetables  and  fruit,  and  certain  other  products  not 
included in Annex II to the Treaty); or else 
(iii)  they are compensated for by means of differential 
amounts in the case of oilseeds, field beans, peas and 
sweet lupins. 
3.  It  should  be  noted  that  monetary  compensatory 
amounts differ from differential amounts in that MCAs 
are  applied  in  trade  and  differential  amounts  are 
applied  either  upon  award  of the  premium  granted 
during the crushing of certain oilseeds or upon award 
of the aid given for the production of field beans, peas 
and sweet lupins or at the  time of export.  Essentially, 
the  two  systems  are  fairly  similar  in  so  far  as  they 
comprise a portion calculated on the basis of the price 
and  a  coefficient  which  modifies  the  levy  - the 
premium equivalent to  the levy  under the deficiency 
payment system - and the export refund.  In  view of 
these  similarities,  the  two  systems  are  regarded  as 
equivalent and are treated in the same way. 
4:  The  bases  for  calculating  MCAs  and  differential 
amounts have always been the same, i.e. 
(a)  the monetary gap, 
(b)  the institutional price. 
1  OJ L  164, 24.6.1985, p.  6. 
The traditional system 
The  agrimonetary  factor  is  the  monetary  gap  (ecart 
monetaire)  which,  in  principle,  expresses  the  diff-
erence between the green rate and the real value of a 
currer,tcy in relation to the agricultural unit of account. 
5.  The  unit  of account used  for  the  purposes  of the 
CAP before 9 April  1969 was  the agricultural unit of 
account  (AUA),  provided for  in  Regulation  No  129, 
whose value was the same as the United States dollar 
which,  in  turn,  was  defined  by  reference  to  the  gold 
standard  under  the  Bretton  Woods  international 
monetary  agreement.  The  Council  proceeded  to 
determine  the  rates  applied  under  the  CAP  for 
conversion  into  national  currency  of  prices  and 
amounts  fixed  in  AUA.  It will  be  remembered  that, 
after  definitive  abandonment  of the  system  of fixed 
parities introduced by the Bretton Woods international 
monetary  agreement  and  the  flotation  of currencies 
which became widespread in the 1970s, the AUA was 
still applied  in agriculture,  although its. value was  no 
longer based on the dollar but on the central rates  of 
the  Community  currencies  making  up  the  'currency 
snake'. 
6.  The  introduction  of the  ecu  as  the  sole  unit  of 
account for  the whole Community  resulted  from  the 
adoption of the European Monetary System (EMS) on 
13 March 1979. However, in the agricultural sector, the 
ecu was initially used only on a ~rovisional basis under 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  6,52179.  The  transition  from 
prices expressed in AUA to prices in ecus was effected 
by  multiplying all the amounts fixed  in  AUA - and 
all  the  green  rates  - by  a coefficient  of 1.208953, 
since the value of the ecu was  lower than  that of the 
earlier AU  A. The decision definitively to introduce the 
ecu in the CAP was taken on 9 June 1.987? 
7.  The agrimonetary  provisions were codified on  the 
basis of the EMS, and of the significant change in the 
calculation of MCAs made in  March 1984 (establish-
ment of the green  ecu or switch-over system)  which 
came  into  operation  on  1  January  1986.  These 
provisions - which  are  summarized in  Annex  I -
define the monetary gap  as  the percentage difference 
between the green rate and the real value of a currency 
in relation to the agricultural unit of account which, in 
this case, is the ecu (Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 
1676/85
4
). In order to determine the real value, Article 
5 of Regulation (EEC)  No  1677/85  does  not provide 
for  use  of the  rate fixed  daily  according to  the  rates 
quoted  on  the  exchange  markets  for  each  of  the 
Community currencies against the ecu, but relates to: 
2  OJ L 84, 4.4.1979, p.  1. 
3  RegulatiOn  (EEC)  No 1636/87 (OJ L  153,  13.6.1987, p.  1),  see 
also  Arucle  15(2) of RegulatiOn  (EEC)  No 1676/85  (OJ  L  164, 
24.6.1985, p.  1) 
4  OJ L  164, 24.6 1985, p.  1. 
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(i)  the central  rates for  the currencies which observe 
the narrow margin of fluctuation under the EMS; 
(ii)  the average of the spot exchange rates against the 
currencies with a narrow margin of fluctuation for each 
of the other Community currencies. 
NB:  In  February  1990,  the  Commission submitted  a 
proposal (COM(90) 73  final of 20 February 1990) for 
adaptation  of the  current agrimonetary  rules  (Article 
5(2)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85),  to  authorize 
recourse  to  the  ecu  directly  as  a  reference  basis 
(instead of the EMS currencies) in order to  determine 
the market rates of exchange of the floating currencies 
and to fix the MCAs for the calculation of which they 
are  used.  That  proposal  was  finally  adopted  by  the 
Council in  July  1990 (Regulation (EEC) No 2205/90, 
OJ L 201, 31. 7.  1990, p. 9), the amendments proposed 
by  the  European  Parliament  being  rejected  (PE 
141.422). 
8.  One of the reasons which prompted that choice was, 
without doubt, not only the evolution of the calculation 
rules over a period but also the desire for a relatively 
stable  reference  basis.  The  central  rates  of  the 
currencies  of the  Member  States  which  are  in  the 
EMS and observe a maximum difference at any time of 
+1- 2.25%,  constitute  that  reference  basis.  Since the 
logic of the system required a single reference basis, 
the  possibility  of  using  it  in  all  instances  was 
considered appropriate. 
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9.  This brief summary of the traditional system shows 
that, in reality, the calculation of MCAs 1s not based on 
the  ecu  but  on  an  approximate  value  (which,  to 
simplify  matters,  we  shall  call  the  'real  ecu').  It  is 
important  to  note  that  this  value  represents  the 
agricultural  unit of account.  Since the green rates are 
fixed  in  accordance  with  the  agricultural  unit  of 
account  (regardless  of the  term  used  to  describe  it), 
the real value used to compare them must only be that 
of the agricultural  unit of account.  It is  therefore the 
system  of  calculatmg  the  MCAs  which  in  fact 
determines  the  value  of  the  agricultural  unit  of 
account.  It  has  undergone  changes  on  various 
occasions  since  1971.  Originally,  MCAs  were  calcu-
lated in  relation  to  the  United States dollar.  In  1973, 
the dollar was  replaced by  the average of the central 
rates of the currencies of the Member States making up 
the 'currency snake'. In turn, that average was replaced 
in  1979 by the average of the central rates of the ecu 
currencies  which  observe  the  narrow  fluctuation 
margin (+/- 2.25%) embodied in the EMS. 
10.  Since,  by  definition,  the  agricultural  unit  of 
account  (whatever  the  term  used  to  describe  it) 
applies  exclusively  to  agriculture,  the  method  of 
calculating  MCAs  has  an  impact  on  the  CAP  as  a 
whole, including the products not subject to MCAs and 
the  sectors  which are  not  yet covered  by  a common 
market organization. III- The  'green ecu' system 
The  'green ecu' system 
4.  The  technical  consequence  of  the  March  1984 
decision, brought about by the concern to introduce a 
method  for  calculating  MCAs  which  avoided  the 
creation  of new  positive MCAs, is  the linking of the 
ecu used in the agrimonetary system with the strongest 
currency  (German  mark).  Thus,  in  the  event  of a 
monetary  realignment,  revaluation  of  the  strongest 
currency  (German mark) must have an  impact on the 
ecu, so that the e~u  ~s revalued by the same percentage. 
Thus,  the  correcting  factor  is  the  expression,  it1  the 
form of a coefficient, of the percentage revaluation· of 
the strongest currency as against the real ecu. Since the 
ecu is  a  'basket' -type currency and is  defined by ¢e 
central  rates  of  the  participating  currencies,  any 
revaluation of the green ecu (as a result of rev-aluation 
of the German mark) is  expressed by a corresponding 
devaluation of those central rates (except the German 
mark), to which the correcting factor is applied. Since 
this operation is limited to the application of the ecu to 
agnculture, it has been described as  the creation of a 
'-green  ecu' and of 'green central rates'. 
1.  Council Regulation (EEC) No 855/84 of 31  March 
1984
1  on  the  calculation  and  dismantlement  of the 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  applying  to  certain 
agricultural products introduced into the agrimonetary 
system the method -of calculating MCAs known as the 
'green ecu' or 'switch-over' system (see Figures 2 and 
3). The corresponding provisions are at present set out 
in Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1677/85 
on  monetary  compensatory  amounts  in  agriculture 
which - being a codified version of Regulation (EEC) 
No  974171  - replaced  the  latter  with  effect from  1 
January  1986. It should  be noted  that,  following  the 
Council  Decisions  of  30  June  1987,  that  system 
continues  to  apply.  The  future  agrimonetary  system 
would have had to be re-examined before 1 July  1988 
in  the  light of a joint report  from  the  Ministers  for 
Finance and the Ministers for Agriculture (see Chapter 
XIV,  Section A - 5).  There  was  a postponement sine 
die when the Council concluded on 9 June 1988 that it 
was  impossible  to  review  the  agrimonetary  system 
before 1 July 1988 (see Chapter XVI, paragraph 6).  5.  Against that background, since the agricultural unit 
.  .  of account is  dete~rnined by the m,ethod of calculating 
2.  At the inception of this system, the Member States  MCAs, the green ecu  system is  no more than a fresh 
found it politically difficult to accept the principle that,  - definitwn of that unit of account. Instead of the ecu -
in  all  circumstances,  a  change  in  the  value  of  a  or the central rates which it replaces -the  green ecu is 
currency  must  have  immediate consequences for  the  used,  being equivalent to  the real  ecu  to  which there 
price  levels  of  agricultural  products,  as  occurs,  for  has  been  applied  a  correcting  factor,  or  the  central 
example,  in  the  case  of  the  prices  of.  industrial  green  rates,  which  derive  from  the  central  rates  to 
products.  That  difficulty  was  experienced  above  all  which the same correcting factor has been applied. The 
by the Member States with positive MCAs; in fact, the  latter  may  also  be  seen  as  representing  the  ·gap 
elimination  of MCAs  implied  an  immediate  fall  in  separating the real ecu from the'-green ecu. 
production prices as a result of revaluation of the green 
rate.  Under  pressure  from  those  Member  States,  the 
Council  adopted  (by  a  majority)  the  so-called 
'gentlemen's agreement'  of March 1979, under which 
a  reduction  of the  positive  MCAs  must  not  m  any 
circumstances  lead  to  a  reduction  of the  common 
prices in national currency (see Chapter XIII). 
3.  For  that  reason,  since  1984  the  method  of 
calculating  MCAs  has  been  based  on  the  strongest 
currency (i.e. the German mark (DM)) and implies that 
the consequences of every monetary realignment are to 
affect only negative MCAs. It was considered that the 
dismantlement  of the  latter  was  easier  to  undertake 
since  it  led  to  an  increase  in  the  price  in  national 
currency,  a  politically  desirable  consequence  for 
Member  States  with  weak  currency,  above  all  in 
cases  where  the  common  prices  fixed  in  ecus  were 
frozen or reduced. 
I  OJ L 90.  1.41984, p.  I 
6.  Once the ecu,  on the one hand, has been revalued 
by  application  of the  correcting  factor,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  prices  have  been  defined  in  ecus,  the 
introduction of that factor in 1984 and the successive 
modifications  of it  following  the  various  monetary 
realignments occurring subsequently in fact increased 
the common level of agricultural prices. Added to this, 
there  was  also  the  dismantlement  of  the  existing 
positive MCAs (switch-over without monetary realign-
ment) undertaken on two occasions, in 1984 and 1987, 
which  also  contributed - through adjustment of the 
correcting  coefficient - to  the  increase  in  common 
prices expressed in ecus. 
7.  In addition, that is the reason why the green ecu is 
applicable not only to the agricultural products subject 
to  MCAs but in fact to all  agricultural products. This 
increase does not affect the prices in national currency, 
whose  level  continues  to  be  determined  by  the 
unchanged  green  rates.  Nevertheless,  since  the 
difference  between  the  price  levels  in  two  Member 
States (one with a strong currency and another with a 
weak  currency  - remains  divided  into  positive  and 
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negative  MCAs  by  the  common  price  - which 
represents  a  sort  of demarcation  line  between  the 
two - the change in  this  common price following  a 
revaluation of the green ecu is reflected by a decrease 
in the positive MCAs and a corresponding increase in 
the negative MCAs. 
8.  There is also an adjustment of the regulatory levies 
on  imports  and  export  refunds  proportional  to  the 
revaluation of the green ecu. In calculating the levies 
and  refunds,  the  rate  which  must  be  used  for 
conversion  into  ecus  of  the  relevant  world  market 
data is subjected (on the basis of the reciprocal value) 
to the correcting factor,  thus increasing the difference 
between th.e common price and the world market price. 
9.  Since the green ecu system does not affect the green 
rates,  the  national  price  levels  are  maintained 
unchanged,  as  indicated  earlier.  Nevertheless,  the 
differences  between  price  levels  in  two  Member 
States take a different form,  since new positive MCAs 
are  not  now  created,  with  the  result  that  every 
monetary  development  involves  only  negative 
MCAs. In  other words, the sum of the MCAs applied 
to trade between two Member States is the same under 
the traditional system as  under the green ecu  system; 
nevertheless,  the  latter  is  intended  to  avoid  any 
increase  in  positive  MCAs  and  indeed  to  eliminate 
them. 
10.  The  essential  aspect  in  which  the  two  systems 
diverge is, therefore, the level of common prices which 
they  arrive  at.  Total  dismantlement  of  the  MCAs 
through adjustment <of the green rates would lead: 
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(a)  under  the  traditional  system,  to  a  price  level 
determined by the exchange value of the real ecu in the 
currencies of the Member States; 
(b)  under  the  green  ecu  system,  to  a  price  level 
determined by the exchange value of the green ecu in 
the  currency  of the  Member  States.  The  green  ecu 
represents a higher price level than that of the real ecu. 
At  present,  the  correction  coefficient  is  1.145109, 
representing  a green  ecu  value  higher  by  more  than 
14.5% than that of the real ecu. 
1 
In both cases, since the MCAs would have been totally 
dismantled, the price level attained would be the same 
throughout  the  Community  - thus,  a  return  to  the 
'common  price'  - but  the  level  would  clearly  be 
higher in the event of an alignment based on the green 
ecu. 
11.  Since the aim of the green ecu system is to convert 
positive  monetary  gaps  into  negative  MCAs  in 
anticipation  of  easier  dismantlement  of  negative 
MCAs, the inevitable consequence of the switch-over 
is  a  permanent  increase  in  negative  MCAs,  the 
dismantlement of which becomes ever more uncertain 
in  the context of the restrictive price policy followed 
since 1983/84, uninterruptedly, by the 'reformed' CAP. 
1  The  correction  coefficient  rose  from  1.137282  to  1.145109  (m 
other  words,  It  was  mcreased  by  0 69%)  as  a  result  of  the 
monetary realignment of 5 January 1990, carried out as a result of 
the  devaluation  of the  Itahan  lira  by  3.01%  agamst  the  ecu, 
accompamed by a reduction m the fluctuation  margm of Its  spot 
rate  of exchange  from  +1- 6%  to  +1- 2.25%  m  relatiOn  to  Its 
central rate. IV - Financial mechanisms 
A - Legal basis 
1.  The present agricultural system is  based on Article 
43  of  the  EEC  Treaty;  it  thus  originates  from 
secondary  agricultural  law  and  is  governed  by 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1676/85  of  11  June 
1'985  on  the  value  of the  unit  of account  and  the 
conversion rates to be applied for the purposes of the 
common  agncultural  policy,  and  by  Council  Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1677/85 of 11  June 1985 on monetary 
compensatory amounts in agriculture.  There are other 
agrimonetary  regulations  which  are  concerned· solely 
with  the  procedures  for  applying  the  two  basic 
regulations  mentioned.  One of the  matters  dealt with 
is  the  fixing  of agricultural  conversion  rates  (green 
rates),  this  being  the  subject  of Council  Regulation 
(EEC) No  1678/85 of 11  June 1985,
1 which has been 
amended on several occasions, in particular by Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1179/90  of  7  May  1990 
(following  the  agreement  on  1990/91  agricultural 
prices)? 
2.  Those provisions codify the system as  now applied 
(see  Annex·  I).  This  is  distinguished  from  other 
codifications  of agricultural  regulations  by  the  fact 
that not only have provisions dispersed among various 
regulations been brought together in a comprehensive 
text but also by  the fact that significant changes have 
been  made  on  various  points.  With  respect  to  the 
dismantlement of MCAs, for example,  two principles 
were  laid  down  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1676/85 
(Articles  1 and 2): 
(i)  the  existence  of a  specific  agricultural  unit  of 
account and specific agricultural conversion rates; 
(ii)  the use of the ecu as a unit of account and of green 
central rates as agricultural conversion rates, reflecting 
the view that both the agricultural unit of account and 
the  gree~ rates  must be defined in  the context of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and that they must 
reflect economic reality. 
B - Definitions 
1.  Underlying the agrimonetary system are the green 
rates.  They  are  special  rates  for  the  conversion  of 
agricultural prices fixed in ecus into national currency. 
They  are  used  to  ensure  that  monetary  realignment 
! OJ  L 164,246.1985, p  II. 
•  OJ  L 119,  11.5.1990, p.  I. 
Fmancial mechamsms 
does  not  have  an  immediate  impact on  the  prices  of 
agricultural products in  national currency. 
2.  If  it were not possible to use a conversion rate other 
than  the  central  rate  for  agricultural  purposes,  the 
revaluation  of  a_  national  currency  against  the  ecu 
would lead to  im  immediate fall in agricultural prices 
m  national  currency  in  the  country  concerned  and, 
conversely,  the  devaluation  of  a  national  currency 
against  the  ecu  would  result  in  an  increase  in 
agricultural prices in terms of that currency. 
3.  The  result  would  be  a  gap  between  the  actual 
agricultural  prices and those which should have been 
applied. In commercial transactions, this would lead to 
abnormal  competitive  situations.  Therefore,  it  was 
necessary to offset those price differences by charging 
or  granting  ·monetary  compensatory  amounts  on 
commercial _transactions.  The  following  provision  is 
made: 
(a)  for Member States whose currency has risen above 
the  exchange  value  of the  ecu  laid  down  for  their 
agncultural conversion rate (green rate), the charging 
of monetary compensatory amounts on imports and the 
grant of monetary  compensatory  amounts  on  exports 
(positive MCAs);
3 
(b)  for  Member  States  whose  currency  has  fallen 
below  the  exchange  value  of the  ecu  laid  down  for 
their agricultural conversion rate (green rate), the grant 
of compensatory amounts on imports and the charging 
of  compensatory  amounts  on  exports  (negative 
MCAs). 
4.  Since  the  compensation  to  offset  the  difference 
between national  price levels is  based in  all  cases on 
the  common  price  level,  MCAs  are  applied  on  both 
sides  of this  demarcation  line,  as  explained  in  the 
previous chapter. In trade between two Member States, 
if  both  receive  positive  MCAs  or  negative  MCAs, 
double  application  thereof  partially  or  even  - in 
somewhat exceptional cases - totally neutralizes their 
effects. 
5.  The  total  compensatory  amount,  charged  or 
granted, is calculated by reference to: 
(a)  the price of the product (gen~rally the intervention 
price); 
(b)  the monetary gaps expressed as percentage appre-
ciation or depreciation of the currency in question; 
(c)  the neutral  margins; 
(d)  the volumes of exports or imports. 
3  'Positive'  because  they  compensate  for  a  national  price  level 
higher than  the common level. 
4  'Negative'  because  they  compensate  for  a  natiOnal  pnce  level 
which is  lower than the common level 
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6.  In  the  case  of  currencies  within  the  European 
Monetary  System,  which  observe  the  maximum 
difference at any  time of +1- 2.25%, this percentage 
represents  the  difference between the green rate and 
the central rate; consequently, it remains fixed (fixed 
MCAs) until such time as there is a decision 
(i)  to modify the green rates, or 
(ii)  to devalue or revalue the central rates. 
7.  In the case of sterling, the drachma, the peseta and 
the escudo, the percentage appreciation or depreciation 
is determined by reference to changes in the ecu rates 
published  in  the  Official  Journal  of the  European 
Communities  (C  Series).  It  is  calculated  weekly 
(average)  and  readjusted  if there  is  a  change  of at 
least 1 point from the percentage used for the previous 
determination (variable MCAs). 
8.  To the percentage differences thus obtained, which 
are known as  real  monetary gaps (ecarts  monetaires 
reels), a neutral margin (franchise) is applied, which at 
present amounts to: 
1.5  points for  all  the Member States and all  sectors, 
with the exception of: 
(a)  1 point for Dutch positive MCAs, 
1 
(b)  5 points for wine, and for eggs and poultrymeat, 
(c)  10 points for olive oi1.
2 
9.  The  result  obtained  is  known  as  the  'applied 
monetary  gap'  (ecart  monitaire  applique),  which  is 
the  monetary  compensatory  amount.  If  this  result 
exceeds  0  and  is  less  than  or equal  to  0.5091,  the 
applied monetary gap (or MCA) is 0. If  it exceeds 0.50 
and is less than or equal to 1, the applied monetary gap 
(or MCA) is  1 (non-cumulation rule). 
10.  The  applied  monetary  gap  or  MCA  is  only 
changed  when  the  difference  between  the  new  gap 
and the existing gap is equal to or exceeds 1 point (de 
minimis  rule).  The non-cumulation  rule  takes  prece-
dence over the de  minimis rule. 
11.  As from the  1984/85 marketing year,  the central 
rates  used  in  calculating  MCAs  have  a  correcting 
factor  applied  to  them,  as  indicated  in  Chapter  III 
(green central rates). 
12.  MCAs  are  applied  to  intra-Community  trade  in 
products covered by intervention measures, which are 
known as basic products. For other products, known as 
derived products, the MCAs are equal to the incidence 
1  Dutch positive MCAs (applied monetary gaps) were d1scontmued 
with effect from the  1988/89 marketmg year. 
2  MCAs m the oliVe-Oil sector were mtroduced as from 7 September 
1987. 
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on such products of the application of the MCA to the 
price  of  the  basic  product  from  which  they  are 
obtained. MCAs are applied to all the Member States 
involved in trade in the products subject to this system. 
13.  MCAs are also applied in trade with non-member 
countries. Starting from the premise that MCAs reflect 
a monetary impact on a price, it would appear logical 
that  a  specific  MCA should  be  calculated,  in  each 
instance,  according  to  the  price  of  the  product  in 
question in the non-member countries, by reference to 
the world market price. 
That approach, which was considered when the system 
was introduced, was replaced long ago by a different 
solution whereby the MCA for a given product is the 
same  regardless  of the  origin,  provenance  or  desti-
nation  of the  product  in  question.  This  approach  is 
administratively  more straightforward.  It implies that 
MCAs  in  trade  with  non-member  countries  should 
cover the difference between the national price and the 
common  price;  the  latter  may  be  calculated  by 
converting  into  national  currency  the  price  f1xed  in 
ecus  using  the  central  rate  or the real  value  of the 
currency  in  question.  From  this  it  follows  that,  to 
compare that price with the world market price and to 
calculate the levy (or refund) the same conversion rate 
should be used in order to ensure that the system is 
consistently applied. 
14.  For that reason, in practice: 
(i)  the world market price is converted into ecus using 
the  real conversion rate which  is  a  specific rate  that 
fairly accurately reflects the real value of the currency 
in which the price is expressed (Community currency 
or non-member country currency); 
(ii)  regulatory  levies  and refunds,  fixed  in ecus,  are 
converted into the national currency of a Member State 
using the green rate for the currency concerned, but at 
the  same  time  they  are  multiplied  by  a  'monetary 
coefficient'. 
The monetary coefficient is derived from the applied 
monetary gap for the currency in question and adjusts 
the green  rate  to  the  level  of the  real  value of that 
currency.  However,  this  procedure  is  applied  on  an 
overall  basis  since  it does  not disregard  the  neutral 
margins and other factors which in some cases affect 
MCAs. 
15.  On  completion  of the  calculation,  therefore,  the 
desired result is achieved: on imports, for example, the 
levy  in  principle  brings  the  price  of the  imported 
product to the common level. Thereafter, it is raised or 
lowered  by  the  MCA  which  compensates  for  the 
difference  between  the  (national)  price  and  the common price, as in the case of trade between Member 
States. 
C - Financial provisions 
1.  The  financial  consequences  of the  agrimonetary 
system take the following forms: 
(i)  the  monetary.  compensatory  amounts  charged  to 
Chapter 28 of the Community budget; 
Financial mechanisms 
the  refunds  is  entered  under  own  resources.  MCAs 
granted on imports are deducted from the agricultural 
regulatory  levies  and  the portion  in  excess  of those 
regulatory  levies  is  · entered  as  an  expenditure  in 
Chapter 28  of the EAGGF Guarantee Section budget. 
3.  As regards  budgetary nomenclature,  the monetary 
compensatory  amounts  set  out  in  Chapter  28  are 
classified according to  the following nomenclature: 
Article 280:  MCAs in trade  between Member States 
(in ira  -Community· trade); 
(ii)  the monetary coefficients (MCs) applied to export  Item 2800:  includes  MCAs  on  imports  granted  by 
refunds  'and  import  levies  and  also  to  accession  importing Member States  (wit\1  a depre-
compensatory amounts;  ciated currency); 
(iii)  the  MCs  used  to  adjust  MCAs  where  they  are 
fixed in advance; 
(iv)  the MCs used to convert the MC of the importing 
country into the currency of the exporting country in 
the event of the latter paying the MCA in question; 
(v)  the  'dual-rate 'coefficients'  (ORCs),. the effects of 
which are recorded within each budgetary line of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-
Guarantee Section. , 
2.  Pursuant  to  Article  13  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 
1677/85 and Article 2 of the Decision of 21  April 1970 
on  the  replacement  of financial  contributions  from 
Member States by  the  Communities'  own resources, 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  are  subject  to  the 
following financial provisions: 
(a)  in  trade  between  Member  States,  monetary 
compensatory  amounts  are  deemed  to  form  part  of 
the  intervention  measures  intended  to  regularize  the 
agricultural markets  and,  as  a result,  they  are always 
accounted for as  'expenditure'; 
(b)  in  trade with non-member countries, Chapter 28, 
covering EAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure, does 
not  contam  all  the  MCAs  resulting  from  extra-
Community  trade.  In  fact,  under  the  regulations  at 
present in force: 
(i)  for positive MCAs, the MCAs granted on exports 
to non-member countries are placed in Chapter 28  of 
the EAGGF Guarantee  Section budget.  On  the other 
hand, MCAs charged on imports are regarded as own 
resources and are entered in the chapter for agricultural 
regulatory levies on an undifferentiated basis; 
(ii)  for negative MCAs, MCAs charged on exports are 
deducted from the refunds and the portion in excess of 
Item 2801:  includes  MCAs  on  imports  granted  by 
exporting  Member  States  on  behalf of 
importing Member States (with a depre-
ciated currency); 
Item 2802:  includes  MCAs  on  imports  levied  by 
importing  Member  States  (with  an 
appreciated currency); 
Item 2803:  includes  MCAs  on  exports  granted  by 
exporting,Member States (with an appre-
ciated currency); 
Item 2804:  includes  MCAs  on  exports  levied  by 
exporting Member States (with a  depre-
ciated currency); 
Article 281:  MCAs in  trade  with  non-member coun-
tries 
Item 2810:  comprises the  portion of MCAs granted 
on  imports  (into  Member States  with  a 
depreciated currency) which exceeds the 
import levy; 
Item 2811:  includes  MCAs  granted  on  exports  by 
exporting Member States (with an appre-
ciated  currency);  the  MCAs  levied  on 
exports  by  exporting  Member  States 
(with a depreciated currency) are deduct-
ed from the refunds and, if they  exceed 
the refunds, the balance is accounted for 
under own resources. 
4.  Having regard to the situation of each currency, the 
financial  mechanisms  are  summarized  in  Table  1, 
where the plus sign (  +) indicates an expenditure for the 
EAGGF and the minus sign (-) represents a reduction 
of  expenditure  or  a  receipt  which  amounts  to  a 
deduction from expenditure. 
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---------·---------------------, 
Table 1 - Financial mechanisms for the implementation of MCAs 
Budgetary item  Appreciated  Depreciated 
currencies  currencies 
Article 280  MCAs in intra-Community trade 
2800  MCAs on  imports  granted by  importing Member States  (+) 
(with a depreciated currency) 
2801  MCAs  on imports granted by  exporting Member States  (+) 
on behalf of importing Member States (with a depreciated 
currency) 
2802  MCAs  on  imports  levied  by  importing  Member  States  (-) 
(with an  appreciated currency) 
2803  MCAs  on  exports  granted by  exporting  Member States  (+) 
(with an  appreciated currency) 
2804 
0  MCAs  on  exports  levied  by  exporting  Member  States  (-) 
(with a depreciated currency) 
Article 281  MCAs in trade with non-member countries 
2810  Portion of MCAs granted on imports (into Member States  (+) 
with  a depreciated  currency)  which  exceeds  the  import 
levy 
2811  MCAs  granted  on  exports by  exporting Member States  (+) 
(with an appreciated currency) 
---
20 V-European Monetary System (EMS) -
The ecu 
1.  The EMS came into operation on 13  March 1979 




system introduced the ecu as the sole Community unit 
of account. 
2.  The ecu is a 'basket' -type monetary unit made up of 
the  currencies  of  the  Member  States  in  specific 
proportions determined according to the basic econo-
mic importance of each of the States. 
3.  As from 8 October 1990,
3 the ecu is made up of: 
Amount of each currency 

























% of each currency 













The value  of the  drachma  and  the  escudo  are  only 
theoretically  taken  into  account  in  calculating  the 
value of the ecu. 
4.  The central rates used in this  system are  the rates 
fixed by the central banks, around which the market 
exchange rates of the EMS currencies may fluctuate, 
within a maximum range of +1- 2.25% (  +1- 6% for the 
lira  until  4  January  1990,  for the peseta as from  21 
I  OJ L 379, 30.12 1978, p.  1 
2  OJ L 379, 30.12.1978, p  2. 
3  Sterling entered the EMS on 8 October 1990 w1th  a central real 
rate  of  0.696904,  which  d1ffered  slightly  from  the  previOus 
(notiOnal)  central  rate  However,  th1s  change  should  not  be 
regarded  as  a  monetary  realignment  smce  sterhng  did  not 
previously  form  part  of  the  mechamsm  for  regulauon  of 
fluctuations in EMS panties. 
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September  1989 and for  sterling  as  from  8  October 
1990).  Fluctuation of the drachma and the escudo is 
not confined to any margin. 
5.  As from  8  October  1990,  the central rates  are  as 
follows:
4 
ECU 1 = BFRILFR  42.4032 
DKR  7.84195 
DM  2.05586 
DR  205.311  (notional rate) 
PTA  133.631  _  (fluctuation margin 
of+/- 6%) 
FF  6.89509 
IRL  0.767417 
LIT  1 538.24 
HFL  2.31643 
ESC  178.735  (notional rate) 
UKL  0.696904 (fluctuation margin 
of +1- 6%) 
6.  The notional central rates are adjusted only where 
there  is  a  change  in  the  real  rates.  Consequently,  a 
change in the market exchange rates for the drachma 
and the escudo does not lead to a change in the central 
rates.  ' 
7.  The value of the ecu against the currencies of the 
Member States is published in the Official Journal of 
the  European  Communities  (C  Series)  for  each 
currency market business day. The Commission has a 
telex  with  an  answering  machine  which  provides 
conversion rates for the main Community and foreign 
currencies on request. 
4  On 5 January 1990 - the date on wh1ch the Lira entered the EMS 
subject to  a max1mum  spread of +1- 2.25% - the central rates 
were as  follows: 
ECU 1 = BFR  42 1679 
DKR  7.79845 
DM  204446 
DR  187.934  (notiOnal  rate) 
PTA  132 889  (fluctuation margin of +1- 6%) 
FF  6.85684 
IRL  0.763159 
LIT  1 529.70 
LFR  42.1679 
HFL  2.30358 
ESC  ·177.743  (nouonal rate) 
UKL  0 728615  (notiOnal rate) 
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VI  - Central rates - Green central 
rates - Correcting factor -
Switch-over 
A - Definitions 
1.  Central rates (CRs) 
These  are  conversion  rates  determined  within  the 
European  Monetary  System.  They  are  stable  rates. 
Changes  to  them  are  decided  under  a  consultation 
procedure  involving  the  Governors  of  the  Central 
Banks of the Member States concerned. 
2.  Green central rates (GCRs) 
These  are  central  rates  multiplied  by  the  correcting 
factor, which serve as a basis for calculating the MCAs 
for  the  stable  currencies  (which  keep  within  the 
maximum spread of +1- 2.25% within the EMS). 
3.  Correcting factor (CF) 
This factor links the value of the ecu to the value of the 
strongest currency in the EMS (German mark)  which 
keeps within the maximum spread of +1- 2.25%.  It is 
determined  mathematically  by  the  Commission  in 
accordance  with  the  management  committee  pro-
cedure. 
It is applied to the central rates of all the currencies in 
the EMS and to  all  the market exchange rates of the 
floating currencies. 
4.  Switch-over 
This mechanism comprises the arrangements whereby, 
since  1984,  existing  positive  MCAs  have  been 
dismantled  and  the  creation  of new  ones  has  been 
avoided. This is done by multiplying each central rate 
by the correcting factor, thus creating the green central 
rates.  The real  monetary  gaps  (RMGs)  between  the 
green  central  rates  and  the  green  rates  are  used  for 
calculation  of the  applied  monetary  gaps  (AMGs) 
wh1ch  become  lower for  Member States  with  strong 
currencies  and  higher for  Member States  with  weak 
currencies, since the switch-over mechanism converts 
positive MCAs into negative MCAs. 
B -Dismantlement of the positive MCAs 
1.  First switch-over (end of March 1984) 
On  31  March  1984,  the  Council decided,  with effect 
from  the  1984/85  marketing  year,  to  dismantle  the 
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existing  positive  MCAs  b('  three  points,  converting 
them into negative MCAs. 
The  purpose  of  that  decis10n  was  to  undertake 
dismantlement  of the  positive  MCAs  without  chan-
ging  the  level  of  the  prices  expressed  in  national 
currency of the  country  with positive MCAs and the 
strongest currency (Germany) and,  therefore,  without 
revaluing its green rate  (problem of lower income for 
German producers). 
In those circumstances, the reduction of the difference 
between the Community price and the German/Dutch 
price - at that hme the only currencies with positive 
MCAs - could only  be  achieved  by  increasing  the 
Community price. That solution was put into practice 
by multiplying the central rates by a coefficient known 
as the correcting factor (1.033651), which reflected the 
desired dismantlement of the positive MCAs. 
Multiplication  of the  central  rates  by  a  coefficient 
exceeding 1 is  equivalent to devaluation of those rates 
or,  from the standpoint of the ecu, revaluation of the 
ecu.  Since the operation was  limited to agriculture, 1t 
was described as  creating the green ecu. 
As  a  result  of the  fact  that  Community  agricultural 
prices are expressed in  ecus and the value of the ecu 
has  increased,  the  level  of Community  agricultural 
prices has risen (see Figures 2 and 3). In the future, the 
agricultural conversion rates  (green  rates)  will  not be 
adjusted  to  the  real  central  rates  for  the  currencies 
concerned but to the green central rates, that is  to  say 
the  central  rates  after  application  of the  correcting 
factor,  which  now  represent  the  Community  price 
level. 
The new green central rate for the German mark - for 
which  the  dismantlement  of three  points  of pos1tive 
MCAs  had  been  decided  upon  - was  calculated 
according to  the following formula: 
GCR =  (100- NRMG) GR
2 
100 
where GCR: green central rate 
NRMG: new desired positive real monetary gap (after 
dismantlement of positive MCAs) 
GR:  green rate 
1  Thts conversiOn resulted m the creation of negative MCAs varymg 
from  3 3 pomts (Denmark) to  3.8  pomts  (Greece),  based on the 
extsting monetary gaps. Those negattve MCAs were immediately 
dismantled  by  an  adJustment of the  green  rates  of the  Member 
States affected by  that conversion. 
2  In  fact,  thts formula constitutes the followmg denvation from  the 
baste formula 
RMG =(1- ~~)x 100 Central rates - Green central rates - Correcting factor - Swttch-over 
The  devaluation  of  the  green  rate,  calculated  in 
accordance with that procedure, may be expressed by 
means  of a  coefficient  representing  the  relationship 
between the real central rate and the green central rate. 
That coefficient is the correcting factor (CF), which is 
calculated according to the formula: 




CR = ECU 1 = DM 2.24284 
GR = ECU 1 = DM 2.51457 
RMG = +  10.846, RMG being the real  monetary gap 
for the CMO as at 31  March 1984. 
Desired  dismantlement  =  3.000,  which  gives  an 
NRMG of+ 7.846. 
Calculation: 
GCR =  (100-7.846) 2.51457  = 
100 
=  DM 2.31728 
92.154 X  2.51457 
100 
Against the real central rate for the German mark, the 
green central rate for that same currency was devalued 
by 3.3651%. Consequently, it was necessary to devalue 
the central rates for the other currencies by the same 
percentage, by applying the correcting factor to them: 
CF = 2.31728 =  1.033651 
2.24284 
Since  the  aim  pursued  is  to  avoid  creating  positive. 
MCAs, the green central rate for the German mark will 
continue to be the basis of the system (the same until 
the  next switch-over) for  such time as  that  currency 
continues to be the strongest in the EMS. 
2.  Second switch-over (beginning of July 1987) 
The dismantlement of one point from positive MCAs 
by  their  conversion  into  negative  MCAs  (second 
switch-over operation), decided upon at the beginning 
of July  1987,  was  calculated  in  accordance with  the 
formula  applied  when  the  system  was  introduced, 
namely: 
NGCR =  (100 - NRMG) GR 
100 
where NGCR: new green central rate 
Data: 
CR = ECU 1 = DM 2.05853 
GR = ECU I = DM 2.38516 
RMG = + 2.846 
Desired  dismantlement  =  1.000,  which  results  in  an 
NRMG of+ 1.846 
Calculation: 
NGCR =  (100-1.846) 2.38516  =  DM 2.341113 
100 
CF = 2.34113 =  1.137282 
2.05853 
C ·_  Revaluation of the central rates 
3.  The switch-over mechanism was also introduced to 
ensure that a revaluation did not create positive MCAs 
for the currencies kept within the maximum spread of 
+1- 2.25%. That objective can only be achieved if the 
relationship between the green central rate, on the one 
hand, and the agricultural conversion rate, on the other, 
for the strongest currency remains unchangeable. 
In principle, the achievement of that result requires the 
(artificial) cancellation of the effect of the revaluation 
of the  central  rate  of the  strongest  currency  on  the 
central rates of the other Community currencies.  For 
that purpose, it is  necessary to  change the correcting 
factor  whenever  the  central  rate  for  the  strongest 
currency is revalued. The new correcting factor (NCF) 
is calculated according to  the formula: 
NCF= GCR 
NCR 
where NCR: new central rate after the revaluation 
Example: (basis:  twelfth readjustment of 12  January 
1987) 
Data: 
GCR  (ECU 1)  =  DM 2.31728 
OCR  (ECU 1)  =  DM 2.11083 
OCF  (ECU 1)  =  DM 1.097805 
NCR  (ECU 1)  =  DM 2.05853 
where  OCR: old central rate 
OCF: old correcting factor. 
Calculation: 
NCF = 2.31728 =  1.125696 
2.05853 
NB: In this case it is clear that the green central rates of 
the  other currencies  are devalued,  whereas  the green 
central rate for the German mark remains unchanged 
(since its central rate is revalued). 
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D - Aid to  compensate for reduced 
agricultural income resulting from the 
dismantlement of positive MCAs 
Mention should also be made  of the measures which 
came into operation on  1 January 1985, as part of the 
agrimonetary decisions of 31 March 1984, even though 
the latter were not directly linked with the switch-over 
mechanism. On that date, as  an additional measure, 5 
points  were  dismantled  from  the  German  positive 
MCAs by adjustment of the green rate for the German 
mark. The drop in agricultural income in Germany was 
compensated for by national aid through VAT, 
1 with a 
financial  contribution  from  the  Community?  At  the 
same  time,  the  Dutch  MCAs  were  reduced  - by 
1  See  the  Comm1sswn  report,  SEC(89)  1574  final  of 30  October 
1989  Accordmg  to  that  report,  the  aggregate  amount  of  the 
compensatiOn given to German farmers  through  VAT  to  miugate 
the losses suffered by them as a result of the mcrease in  the green 
rate  for  the  German  mark  on  1 January  1985  was  German  mark 
2 563 million in 1986 and DM 2 391  m1lhon in  1987. In 1987, the 
total sum represented 4 5% of final farm productiOn and 13.8% of 
net added value. 
2  ECU  120 milhon  for  1985  and  ECU  100  million  for  1986  (see 
Newsflash  - Green  Europe,  No  27,  Apnl  1984,  'Agncultural 
prices  1984/85  and  rauonahzatwn  of  the  CAP  - Council 
decisions', paragraph 4.2 b,  p  19) 
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adjustment of the green rate for  the Dutch  guilder -
by  0.6 points for the dairy products sector, 0.7 points 
for  the  cereals  sector  and  0.8  points  for  the  other 
sectors. The fall  in  agricultural  income  was  compen-
sated  for  by  national  structural  aid.  These  compen-
satory operations, using national aid, offsetting the fall 
in  agricultural income deriving from the reduction of 
the positive MCAs brought about by changes to green 
rates, have been repeated and even become institutio-
nalized  (see  Chapter  XIV,  Section  A,  regarding  the 
future system and Section B, regarding dismantlement 
of the existing MCAs and also Chapter XVIII, Section 
D- 10). VII - Agricultural conversion rates 
(representative or green rates) 
A - Definitions 
I.  The  green rate  (GR)  is  applied  for  conversion  of 
prices  and  other  amounts  fixed  in  ecus  under  the 
common agricultural policy (CAP). 
2.  The Council determines the agricultural conversion 
rates, by  a qualified majority and on a proposal from 
the Commission (Article 2(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 
1676/85). This procedure is the one generally followed 
for the  adoption,  under the CAP,  of provisions which 
are of manifest political importance. 
3.  No  provision  is  made  for  consultation  of  the 
European Parliament since no question of principle is 
involved;  Parliament  was  consulted  on  Regulation 
(EEC) No  1676/85, which contains the legal basis for 
determination of the green rates. 
However,  since the  determination  of green rates  is  a 
component of the annual decision concerning agricul-
tural prices (the prices package and related measures) 
and that package is regularly submitted, in its entirety, 
to Parliament for an opinion, the European Parliament 
has  an  opportunity  to  express  its  views  on  the 
determination  of green  rates  as  well.  Nevertheless, 
where  rates  are fixed  in  the  course of the  marketing 
year, Parliament is not consulted. 
4.  On  the  other  hand,  when  rates  are  fixed  the 
Monetary  Committee  must  be  consulted  (Article  11 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1676/85).  In  principle,  the 
committee  must  be  consulted  before  a  decision  is 
adopted. In practice, decisions are very often a matter 
of urgency  for  political  reasons.  In  such  cases,  the 
Monetary  Committee is  consulted  ex  post facto.  The 
validity of the decision is not thereby undermined; the 
measures  taken  are  provisional  and  are  - auto-
matically  - made  definitive  following  a favourable 
report from the Committee. If the  Committee were to 
issue  a  negative  opinion,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
review  the  decision  taken,  without  prejudice  to  its 
being  kept  in  place.  In  such  circumstances,  a  new 
legislative measure would be required. · 
5.  It must be emphasized that agricultural conversion 
rates  may  exist which differ from  those fixed  by  the 
Council  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1678/85  (Articles 
2(4) and 3(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1676/85). 
The importance of this legal power to derogate lies in 
the procedure referred to by Article 10(2) of the same 
Regulation. That procedure is twofold in character: 
Agncultural conversion rates (representative or green rates) 
(i)  either the Council procedure, referred to earlier; 
(ii)  or  a  procedure  under  which  the  Commission 
adopts  a  decision  by  virtue  of the  powers  available 
to it for special cases.  -
6.  The Commission has powers to  fix  a green rate by 
way  of derogation  to  the  extent  to  which  - and 
according to the procedure by which - it has to fix the 
amounts which are to be converted. More precisely, it 
follows  that,  with  respect  to  an  amount  to  be  fixed 
under  the  management  committee  procedure  (for 
example, export refunds), the Commission may, under 
the  same  procedure,  lay  down  another  agricultural 
conversion rate. If  the Commission alone has powers, 
without  the  management  committee,  it  may  also, 
acting  alone,  fix  a  special  green  rate  (for  example, 
with  respect  to  regulatory  levies).  That  basis  was 
recently  used,  for  example,  in  the  adoption  of 
Regulati.on  (EEC)  No  3294/86,
1  in  which  it  is 
provided  that  the  levies.  and  refunds  for  rice 
applicable  to  trade  with  non-member countries  must 
not be converted in accordance with the normal green 
rates  but  on  the  basis  of green  rates  which  closely 
reflect the real situation. The purpose of that provision 
is to render the levies and refunds fixed for this sector 
more  comparable  - if not  identical  - in  all  the 
Member States, thus  avoiding the  distortions in  trade 
which result from levies of very different levels, such 
as  would have been arrived at using the normal green 
rates.'  In  this  way,  a  common  level  of protection  is 
established vis-a-vis third countries. The determination 
of this special agricultural conversion rate - which is 
applicable  only  to  trade  with  non-member countries, 
even  though  the  normal  green  rates  continue  to  be 
applied  for  conversions  within  the  Community 
(intervention prices, aids, etc.) -has made it possible 
to  nlitigate  monetary  difficulties  in  the  rice  sector, 
which are liable to arise essentially in trade with non-
member countries, without introducing MCAs in intra-
Community  trade,  these  being  unnecessary  in  the 
Commission's  view,  owing  to  the  market  character-
istics of this sector (see Chapter XII,  Section F - 3). 
NB:  In  February  1990,  the  Commission  submitted  a 
proposal (COM(90) 73 final of 20 February 1990) for 
'the possibility of wider use of rates more in line with 
economic reality  where there is  a risk of distortion of 
the agricultural market by 'reason of monetary factors. 
In  addition,  to  avoid  unequal  treatment  as  between 
Member States, the possibility is also envisaged of the 
fixing  of a specific conversion rate closely reflecting 
economic  reality  in  order  to  convert  amounts 
expressed in  the  national  currency  of a non-member 
I  OJ L 304, 20 10.1986, p.  25. 
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country into the national currency of a Member State. 
The procedure used is that mentioned in Section A - 2 
to  4  of  this  chapter  in  the  first  case  and  the 
'management  committee'  procedure  in  the  second 
case. The proposal was finally adopted by the Council 
in July 1990 (Regulation (EEC) No 2205/90, OJ L 201, 
31.  7.  1990,  p.  9),  which  rejected  the  amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament (PE  141.422). 
The Commission is  also empowered to fix new green 
rates deriving from  the  applicatwn of agreements for 
the  automatic  dismantlement  of  negative  MCAs, 
known  as  'artificial'  or  'transferred'  MCAs  (see 
Chapter  XIV)  and  compliance  with  the  maximum 
limit of 8 points between MCAs applied in the pigmeat 
sector and the cereals sector (see Chapter XV). 
B  - Calculation of the new green rate, 
devalued or revalued by a specified 
percentage 
1.  Under the  common  agricultural  policy,  the  green 
rate (GR) is defined as: 
ECU 1 =  GR 
In  the event of a devaluation (revaluation) of Y%  of 
the green rate of the Member State concerned against 
the ecu, the new green rate (NGR) is fixed as follows: 
ECU 1 =  NGR 
where the NGR will  be greater (or less)  than the old 
green rate (OGR). 
Formula: 
(  100  ) 
NGR =  (IOO +I- Y)  x OGR 
where Y is the percentage devaluation (Y is  negative) 
or revaluation (Y is  positive) of the green rate. 
NB:  This  formula  is  applicable  to  all  the  Member 
States .. 
Example: French franc 
OGR =  ECU 1 =  FF 5.99526 
Devaluation of 3% (Y =  -3) 
.  (  100  )  NGR =  ECU 1 = 100 _ 3  x 5.99526 =  FF 6.18068 
NB:  Green rates are rounded to six significant figures. 
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C - Calculation of the new green rate, 
devalued or revalued according to  the 
desired result in terms of prices 
1.  Hit is wished to increase or decrease the green rate 
according  to  the desired result in  terms of prices, the 
OGR  value  must  be  amended  in  order  to  obtain the 
NGR value. The green rate is redefined as follows: 
Formula: 
NGR = ( 
10~0~  Y)x OGR 
where Y is the desired percentage change in prices (Y 
is  positive:  price  increase)  or  (Y  is  negative:  price 
reduction), expressed in national currency. 
NB:  This  formula  is  applicable  to  all  the  Member 
States. 
Example: French franc 
OGR = ECU  1 =  FF 7.00089 
Desired price increase in FF: + 1.5% (Y =  1.5) 
NGR =  ECU  1 = eool;Ol.
5
)  x 7.00089 =  7.10590 
NB: The new value of the green rate is rounded to  six 
significant figures. 
D - Calculation of the new green rate, 
devalued or revalued according to  the 
desired result in terms of applied 
monetary gaps 
1.  In  this  case,  the  calculation  method  must  distin-
guish between the  Member States which keep within 
the  maximum  spread  of +1- 2.25%  imposed  by  the 
EMS  (EMS  currencies) and those outside the  system 
(floating currencies). 
2.  Calculation for EMS currencies 
(a)  Calculation of the applied monetary gap 
As far as Member States in the EMS are concerned, the 
correcting factor must be applied to  the central rate. 
Thus, GCR =  ECU 1 =  CR x CF. 
Since the green rate is defined as ECU  1 =  GR for the 
purposes of the CAP, the real monetary gap (RMG) is, 
consequently, the  existing gap between the green rate 
and the green central rate. Formula: 
Example: French franc 
CR =  ECU 1 =  FF 6.90403 
GCR = ECU 1 = FF 6.90403 x 1.137282 =  FF 7.85183 
GR (milk) =  ECU 1 =  FF 7.47587 
( 
7.85183) 
RMG =  1 - 7.45787  X  100 = -5.029 
Neutral margin:  1 500 
Corrected monetary gap: -3.529 
Applied monetary gap:  -3.5 
NB: The real monetary gap is rounded to three decimal 
pla~es and the applied monetary gap is rounded to one 
decimal place. 
(b)  Calculation of the new green rate 
In order to obtain the new devalued or revalued green 
rate  giving  the  desired  result  in  terms  of  applied 
monetary  gaps,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  the  real 
monetary  gap  (including,  where  appropriate,  the 
neutral  margin)  and  then  calculate  the  value  of the 
green rate in  accordance with the following formula: 
(  100  ) 
NGR =  100 +1- NRMG  x GCR 
where NRMG is the desired new real monetary gap. 
Example: If it is sought to obtain a real monetary gap 
for France of -2.0 points: 
Agncultural conversion rates (representative or green rates) 
(ii)  if it is  sought to  obtain a new applied  monetary 
gap (NAMG), it is necessary to calculate the new real 
monetary  gap  (NRMG)  and  the  corresponding  new 
green  rate  (NGR);  the  RMG  is  rounded  to  three 
decimal places. 
·Formulas: 
(a)  Devaluation of the green rate: 
.  (RMG-NRMG) 
Y(%) = 100 +1- RMG  X  100 
(b)  New green rate: 
(  100  ) 
NGR =  100 +I- y  x OGR 
where RMG  =real monetary gap (existing) 
NRMG  = new real  monetary gap 
OGR  = old green rate 
Example: Greek drachma 








If the intention is  to reduce the applied monetary gap 




= -17.636- 1.5 = -19.136 
Devaluation of the green rate: 
New green rate: 
NGR = ECU 1 =(10~~0  2.0)x 7.85183 = FF 7.69787  NGR = ECU  1 =( 100  ~~~.374) x 134.174 =DR 156.699 
NB: The new value for the green rate is rounded to six 
figures. 
3.  Calculation applied to floating currencies 
Since there is no real central rate for Greece and Portugal, 
and since the United Kingdom and Spain do not observe 
the  maximum  spread  of +1- 2.25%,  the  method  of 
calculation set out above - based on the green central 
rate-is not applicable to those Member States. 
With respect to the latter, the new green rate, devalued 
or revalued according to the desired result in terms of 
applied monetary gaps, is determined as follows: 
(i)  on  the  basis  of the existing green rate,  there  IS  a 
real monetary gap (RMG) and a corresponding applied 
monetary gap (AMG); 
NB:  The  devaluation  or revaluation  percentages  are 
rounded to three decimal places in all cases; the green 
rate  is  always  rounded  to  six  figures;  the  RMG  is 
rounded to  three decimal places. 
E - Calculation of the effect of a change in 
the green rate on agricultural prices 
expressed in national currency 
1.  Only the agricultural conversion rate is changed 
Since prices fixed in  ecus are converted into national 
currency  using  the  green  rate,  a change to  the green 
rate  means  that  agricultural  prices  expressed  in 
national currency are also changed. 
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The  impact,  in  percentage terms,  of a change in  the 
agricultural  conversion  rate  on  the  level  of common 
prices  in  national  currency  (CPNC)  is  calculated  in 
accordance with the following formula: 
( NGR  )  CPNC =  OGR - 1  x 100 
Example: 
OGR =DR 134.174 
NGR =DR 151.501 
( 
151.501  )  CPNC =  134.174 - 1  x 100 = 12.914% 
2.  The agricultural conversion rate and the agricultural 
prices fixed in  ecus are changed 
Where the change in the green rate is accompanied by 
a  change  in  the  common  prices  fixed  in  ecus,  the 
formula applied to calculate the total effect on the level 
of agricultural prices in national currency is as follows: 
(
NCP  NGR) 
Impact (amount) =  OCP x OGR  x 100 
where OCP: old common price 
NCP:  new common price 
Where  the  increase  in  prices  fixed  in  ecus  and  the 
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effect  of the  change  of prices  in  national  currency 
resulting from  adjustment of the  agricultural  conver-
sion rate are  expressed as  a percentage (P),  the  total 
impact on  the  national  level  of agricultural  prices  is 
calculated in  accordance with the following formula: 
Impact(%)= ( (100 + P)  \6~00 + p GR)) - 100 
Example: Spanish peseta 
OCP  (intervention  price  for  durum  wheat)  =  ECU 
211.06/tonne 
NCP  (intervention  price  for  durum  wheat)  =  ECU 
219.78/tonne (increase: + 4.13%) 
OGR  = ECU 1 = PTA 145.796 
NGR  = ECU 1 = PTA 154.213 
(devaluation: - 5.77%) 
(219.78)  (154.213)  Impact (amount)=  21 1.06  x  145.796  x 100= 110.14 
or 
I  (~) - ((100 + 4.13)  X  (100 + 5.77))  mpact  o  - 100 
- 100 =  10.14% Real conversiOn rates or world market rates used for the purposes of the common agricultural policy 
VIII - Real conversion rates or world 
market rates used for the purposes 
of the common agricultural policy 
A - Definitions 
1.  The term 'world market rate' (WMR) is employed 
because  those  rates  are  used  essentially  for  the 
conversion  of world  market prices  for  the  purposes 
of the CAP. 
Using the published data, it is possible to calculate the 
· bilateral  cross-rates  used  for  calculation  of the  real 
conversion rates. 
Example: 
ECU 1 = BFRILFR 43.0965 
ECU 1 = DR 158.775 
from which it follows that: 




=DR 3 684174  43.0965  . 
which  is  the  cross-rate  for  the  fifth  line  in  the first 
2.  The value of the ecu, which is published daily in the  column of Annex II. 
Official Journal, is not used as such in the agricultural 
sector. 
3.  The  regulations  laying  down  the  calculation 
methods  for  monetary  gaps  are  based essentially  on 
the  EMS  currencies  which  remain  within  the 
maximum spread of +1- 2.25%. Accordingly, th.e  real 
conversion rates are calculated in accordan~;e with the 
methods set out in the following paragraphs. 
B -Calculation of the real conversion rate 
for EMS currencies 
The values for the central rates expressed in  ecus,  to 
which  the  correcting  factor  has  been  applied,  are 
treated as  real  conversion rates  and  are  used for  the 
purposes of world market data. 
Example: DM 1 =  ECU 0.485784, to which rate the 
correcting factor of 0.879289 
(1.13~282) 
must  be  applied,  which  gives  a  resultant  real 
conversion rate  (RCR) for the  German mark equiva-
lent to DM 1 =  ECU 0.42714. 
C- Calculation of the real conversion rate 
for floating currencies 
These calculations are made as between each floating 
currency and the EMS currencies which remain within 
the  maximum  spread  of +/- 2.25%  - namely  the 
Belgian/Luxembourg  franc,  the  Danish  krone,  the 
German  mark,  the  French  franc,  the  Dutch  guilder 
and  the  Irish  pound
1 
- for  the  five  business  days 
(from Wednesday to Tuesday) making up the reference 
period (lines 5 to  10 of columns 1 to 5 of Annex II). 
Formula: 
1  ~  6  DR  NC  2 
RCR =  6  1..  i=1  NC  MR x  ECU GCR 
where  RCR: real conversion rate, 
NC: EMS currencies observing the maximum 
spread of +1- 2.25%, 
DR: floating currency for which the calcula-
tion is made, 
MR: market rate of exchange, 
GCR: green central rate 
NB: The cross-rates for the floating currencies 
(lines 1 to 4 of Annex II) are determined merely 
for information; they are not used in calculating 
the market exchange rate for the drachma. 
The  daily  values  enable  a  weekly  average  to  be 
calculated for each EMS currency (column 6 of Annex 
II). This weekly average· gives a market value for the 
drachma in relation to the Belgian/Luxembourg franc, 
the Danish krone, the German mark, the French franc, 
the Dutch guilder and the Irish pound. 
2 
Example: Average for 23 to  29 September 1987 (line 
5, column 6 of Annex II) 
(See  Annex  II  - calculation  procedure 
drachma.) 
for  the  BFRILFR 1 = DR 3.686105 
(a)  Basic data 
The daily values of the ecu, in the various currencies, 
as  published  daily  in  the  Official  Journal  of the 
European Communities, are used as  basic data. 
(b)  Calculation method 
NB: All the cross-rates, and also the weekly averages, 
are rounded to six decimal places. 
1  The Italian bra 1s included from 5 January  1990. 
2  From 5 January 1990, the formula IS. 
1  ~  7  DR  NC 
RCR = "j  £..  i=l  NC  MR x ECU  GCR 
(See Annex III.) 
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However, the intention is still to  obtain a value for the 
drachma in ecus.  Since the value for the  drachma in 
Belgian francs  is already  avmlable,  it  is  necessary to 
convert the Belgian franc into ecus. This relationship is 
defined  by  the  central  rate  for  the  Belgian  franc 
expressed in ecus. Accordingly, column 7 of Annex II 
contains the central rates  (in ecus)  for  the currencies 
participating in the EMS. 
A value  for  the  drachma  in  ecus  is  obtained  on  the 
basis of the Belgian franc by dividing the central rate 
for the Belgian franc  (in ecus) by the weekly average 
of the market rate of exchange for the  Belgian franc 
against the drachma. 
BFR 1 = DR 3.686105 
BFR 1 = ECU 0.0235526 
from which it follows that: 
DR 100 =  ( 
03~~~~i~~
6 ) x 100 = ECU 0.638956 
or ECU 1 =DR 156.505 
which is the real conversion rate (or world market rate) 
for the drachma on the basis of the Belgian franc. 
The result of the  calculations  is  shown,  currency  by 
currency, in  column 8 of Annex  II  to  six  significant 
figures  in  terms  of DR  100  =  ECU  x.  Then  an 
arithmetic  mean  of the  six  values  thus  obtained  is 
given. The result is the average weekly market value of 
proposal (COM(90) 73 final  of 20 February 1990) for 
amendment of the current agrimonetary rules (Article 
5(2)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85)  to  allow 
recourse  to  the  ecu,  directly,  as  a  reference  basis 
(instead of the EMS currencies) in order to determine 
the market exchange rates of floating currencies and to 
fix  the  MCAs  calculated  by  reference  to  them.  The 
proposal  was  finally  adopted  by  the  Council  in  July 
1990 (Regulation (EEC) No 2205/90, OJ L 201, 31. 7. 
1990, p.  9) which rejected the  amendments proposed 
by the European Parliament (PE 141.422). 
D - Calculation of the real conversion rate 
for non-Community currencies 
(a)  Every week, the real conversion rate is calculated 






United States dollar 
Canadian dollar 
the drachma, expressed in ecus.  Japanese yen 
For example, for the period from 23  September 1987 
to 29 September 1987, the average market value of the 
drachma was DR 100 = ECU 0.635639, to which rate 
must  be  applied  the  correcting  factor  (1.137282), 
which  gives  an  RCR for  the  drachma  of DR  100  = 
ECU 0.558911. 
In the event of a change in  the MCAs for. the currency 
in  question,  the  ruling conversion rate is replaced by 
the new average. 
The average value thus obtained is applied: 
(a)  for  calculation  of  the  MCAs  (see  Chapter  X, 
Section B); 
(b)  calculation of the  cross-rates in  the Annex to  the 
Regulation  fixing  the  conversion  rates  used  for 
calculation  of  the  MCAs  applicable  to  specified 
amounts (see Chapter XI, Section C). 
NB:  In February  1990,  the  Commission  submitted a 
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New Zealand dollar 
Australian dollar 
(b)  Basic data 
The basic data for these calculations are the ecu values 
published  in  the  Official  Journal  of the  European 
Communities, C Series. 
(c)  Calculation method 
The calculation method is the same as that used for the 
drachma. 
In Annexes IV (before 5 January 1990) and V (after 5 
January 1990), an example is  given of the calculation 
for the US  dollar. 
The  current  real  conversion  rate  is  adjusted  and 
replaced  by  a  new  average  calculated  in  the  same 
way when the difference between the two rates is equal 
to or greater than 1  %. IX - Monetary compensatory amounts 
A- Legal basis 
(a)  Basic regulation: Regulation (EEC) No 1677/88 of 
11  June  1985  on monetary  compensatory amounts  in 
agriculture (OJ L  164,24. 6.  1985, p.  6). 
(b)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No  3153/85 of 11 
November 1985 fixing the methods for the calculation 
of monetary compensatory amounts (OJ L 310, 21.  11. 
1985, p.  4). 
B - Definition 
1.  MCAs are intended to compensate, in international 
trade,  for  differences  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Community  price  (defined  by  the  real  ecu  central 
rates)  and,  on  the  other,  the  prices  in  the  Member 
States (defined by the agricultural conversion rates) in 
appreciated or depreciated currency. 
C - Real, corrected and applied monetary 
gap 
1.  The  monetary  gap  is  defined  as  the  percentage 
difference between the market rate of exchange for a 
currency, after application of the correcting factor, and 
the green rate for that currency. 
2.  The  market  exchange  rate  (MR)  which  must  be 
used as  a basis for calculating the gaps is: 
(i)  the  central  rate,  in  the  case  of currencies  which 
observe  the  maximum  spread  of +1- 2.25%  (EMS 
currencies), adjusted  by  application of the  correcting 
factor (GCR); 
(ii)  an  average  of the  daily  exchange  rates  (market 
exchange rates) in the case of currencies which are not 
kept within  that spread (floating currencies), adjusted 
by  application of the correcting factor  (green market 
rates (GMRs)). 
3.  The  gap  thus  defined  - stated  to  three  decimal 
places - is the real monetary gap (RMG). The neutral 
margin is deducted, giving the corrected monetary gap 
(CMG)  which,  after  being  rounded  to  one  decimal 
place  (applied  monetary  gap  (AMG)),  is  applied  to 
calculation of the monetary compensatory amounts. 
Monetary compensatory amounts 
D- Neutral margin ('Franchise') 
1.  It has always been accepted that under the CAP a 
certain  margin  of monetary  fluctuation  will  not  be 
compensated for.  The reason for. this is  t~at there is a 
monetary risk inherent in every agricultural import or 
export  transaction,  which  must  be  borne  by  the 
economic  agent  concerned.  The  purpose  of neutral 
margins  is,  therefore,  to  reduce  the  impact  of the 
M~As  in order to promote free trade. 
As  is  the  case  whenever  limits  are  defined,  those 
adopted  for the  various  sectors- subject  to  the  MCA 
system are arbitrary in character. 
2.  At present, the following neutral margins apply: 
1.5  points for all  Member States and all  sectors, with 
the exception of: 
1  point  for  Dutch  positive  MCAs  (NB:  the  Dutch 
positive MCAs were abolished at the start of the 1988/ 
89 marketing year); 
5 points for wine, eggs and poultrymeat; 
10 points for olive oil. 
In the last two cases the neutral margins are maximum 
margins  which  are  all  subject  to  an  implementing 
decision  of the  Commission.  That decision  has  been 
adopted (see ·Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3156/ 
85, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1995/87);
1 in 
the three sectors (wine, poultrymeat and olive oil) the 
maximum has been chosen. 
E - Minimum threshold 
1.  Previously there was no minimum threshold for the 
application  of MCAs  except  in  the  case  of certain 
products  obtained  from  agricultural  products,  which 
were not included in Annex II to the EEC Treaty. That 
minimum threshold was ECU 1 per 100 kg;  where the 
exchange value of an MCA was less than ECU 1, that 
MCA  was  not  applied  (Article  5(3)  of Regulation 
(EEC) No 3153/85)_2 
2.  The  specific  regime  applied  to  the  goods  in 
question  also provided for periodical examination of 
the  list of products  subject  to  MCAs. If the  highest 
MCA in  the  Community  did  not exceed  3%  of the 
value of the product concerned, no MCA was applied. 
This system - described here only briefly ~  proved 
unsatisfactory, owing in particular to the fact that the 
I  OJ L  186, 6.7.1987, p.  1.. 
2  OJ L 310,2111.1985, p. 4. 
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situation  in  a  Member  State  had  repercussions 
throughout  the  Community.  Accordingly,  a  higher 
minimum  threshold  was  substituted (ECU  3 per  100 
kg). 
3.  The same threshold has been  applied to  preserves 
and jams wh1ch will be subject to MCAs in the future. 
The minimum threshold for application of MCAs must 
not be confused with a neutral margin. The latter leads 
to  a  generalized  reduction  in  MCAs  of an  identical 
amount.  On  the  other hand,  the  threshold  eliminates 
MCAs below the limit value, but the remaining MCAs 
which exceed the threshold are applicable without any 
deduction.  Consequently,  the  minimum  threshold  is 
closer to the earlier system of products not included in 
Annex  II  to  the  Treaty,  but avoids  the  exaggerations 
inherent in the latter and is easier to apply (see Chapter 
X,  Section B - 5(h)). 
F - The de  minimis rule 
1.  This  rule  provides  that  the  AMG  will  only  be 
changed when the difference between the new gap and 
the pre-existing gap is equal to or greater _than  1 point. 
2.  Where  several  green  rates  are  applied  and, 
consequently,  several  AMGs,  all  the  AMGs  will  be 
changed when that minimum difference of 1 point is 
reached in one or more sectors or when the AMG has 
to be changed in one sector through application of the 
'non-cumulation' rule. 
3.  It has been agreed that the  'world market rate' for 
the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal will 
not  be  changed  unless  the  real  monetary  gap  is 
changed. 
G - The non-cumulation rule 
1.  This rule provides that: 
(i)  0% will apply until such time as, after deduction of 
the  neutral  margin, the result obtained is  less than or 
equal to  0.5  and greater than 0; 
(ii)  1% shall apply until such time as, after deductjon 
of the neutral margin, the result obtained is less than or 
equal to  1 and greater than 0.5. 
2.  It  has  been  decided  that  the  non-cumulation  rule 
will  take  precedence  over  the  de  minimis  rule. 
Consequently, the de  minimis rule will  not come into 
play  either  on  commencement  or  on  completion  of 
application of the non-cumulation rule. 
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3.  In determining results between 0.50 exclusive and 1 
inclusive,  the  amended  gap  must  be  rounded  as 
follows: 
(1)  figures  as from 0.501  are rounded to 0.51; 
(ii)  figures  up  to  1.049 are rounded to  1. 
H - Monetary and agrimonetary information 
1.  The conversion rates for the ecu are published each 
day  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Communities,  C  Series.  In  addition,  an  answering 
machine gives this information and another answering 
machine reports  on daily trends in  the monetary gaps 
applied for the purposes  of the  common  agricultural 
policy. 
I - Calculation of the applied monetary gap 
(a)  EMS  currencies 
The  real  monetary  gap  is  the  percentage  difference 
between the green rate and the green central rate for 
the currency in  question. 
Formula: 
(  GCR)  RMG =  1 - GR  x 100 
from which it follows  that the green central rate: 
GCR =  ECU 1 =  CR x CF 
Example: French franc 
CR =  ECU 1 =  FF 6.90403 
GCR = ECU 1 = 6.90403  x 1.37282 =  FF 7.85283 





)  100 =  5 029  7.47587  X 
Neutral margin =  1.500 
CMG =- 3.529 
AMG =- 3.5 
(b)  Floating currencies 
In principle, the calculation method used is the same as 
for  those  currencies  that  are  maintained  within  a 
maximum spread of +1- 2.25%. The difference lies in 
the fact that instead of the green central rate, the green 
market  rate  is  used,  being  calculated  in  accordance with the method shown in Chapter VIII, Section C, and 
adjusted by application of the correcting factor. 
The  real  monetary  gap  is  the  percentage  difference 
between the green market rate and  the  green rate for 
the currency in question. 
Formula: 
from which it follows that the market rate: 
MR  =  ECU  1  =  weekly  average  of  the  market 
exchange  rates  calculated  as  against  the  EMS 
currencies, 
and the green market rate: 
GMR = ECU 1 = MR x CF 
Example: Greek drachma 
MR = ECU 1 =DR 157.322 
GMR = ECU 1 = 157.322 x 1.137282) =DR 178.919 
GR = (cereals) = ECU 1 =DR 134.174 
( 
178.919) 
RMG =  1 - 134.174  X 100 = 33.348 
Neutral margin = 1.5 
CMG = 31.848 
AMG = 31.8 
In the case of floating currencies, the applied monetary 
gaps are calculated weekly on the basis of trends in the 
market  rate  of  exchange  (from  Wednesday  to  the 
following  Tuesday)  of  the  floating  currency  in 
question, against the seven EMS currencies. 
1 
Annex  VI  shows  the  calculation  procedure  for  the 
drachma. 
Line 1 indicates the average market exchange rate for 
the drachma against the  ecu for  the  reference period 
between 23  and  29  September 1987, as  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  method  given  in  Chapter  VIII, 
Section C (see also Annex II). 
All the rates expressed in ecus are in the EMS and the 
agrimonetary  system  and  thus  line  2  indicates  the 
average market exchange rate in ecus for the currency 
in  question  (reverse  of line  1).  This  real  average 
market exchange rate  is  multiplied  by  the correcting 
factor (line 3) and is compared with the green rate (line 
4). Using the formula: 
1 Eight, with mclusion ofthe Itahan hra as from 5 January 1990 (see 
Annex III)  The calculatiOns are adjusted by the correcting factor. 
Monetary compensatory amounts 
RMG =( 1-G~R)x 100 
the real monetary gap is calculated in line 5, with the 
neutral margin being' deducted thereafter (line 6). It is 
then  necessary  to  check (line  7)  whether  or  not  the 
non-cumulation rule applies to the result. If  it does, the 
new monetary gap to  be applied is fixed in  line 7a. 
If the non-cumulation rule is not applied, the corrected 
monetary  gap  used  for  the  last  deterrrunation  of the 
AMG is inserted in  line 8,  to  establish whether or not 
the  de  minimis  rule  is  applicable,  i.e.  whether  the 
difference is of such a degree that it entails a change to 
the AMG. If  that is the case, the requisite amendment 
is shown in line 9a. 
In  line  10,  the  new  monetary  gap  from  line  5  is 
repeated  and  the  new  monetary  gap  to  be  applied is 
calculated  (line  12),  after  deduction  of the  neutral 
margin. 
If there  is  no  change,  line  10  repeats  the  applicable 
monetary gap appearing in line 8 and the AMG is not 
changed in line  12. 
Line  14 contains the results of the applicable deroga-
tions.  The  example  gives  the  new  green  rate  for 
pigmeat, established in accordance with Article 6(a) of 
Regulation {EEC) No 1677/85 (see Chapter XV). 
Annex VII gives the  monetary  gaps applicable to  the 
drachma in early May 1988. Both the magnitude of the 
Greek MCAs (almost 50%) and the difference between 
them and those applied to the other Member States will 
be noted. 
NB:  In  February  1990,  the  Commission submitted  a 
proposal (COM(90) 73  final of 20 February 1990) for 
amendment of the current agrimonetary rules (Article 
5(2)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85)  to  allow 
recourse  to  the  ecu,  directly,  as  a  reference  basis 
(instead of the EMS currencies) in order to  determine 
the market exchange rates of floating currencies and to 
fix  the  MCAs  calculated  by  reference  to  them.  The 
proposal  was  finally  adopted  by  the  Council  in  July 
1990 (Regulation (EEC) No 2205/90, OJ L 201, 31. 7. 
1990,. p.  9)  which rejected the  amendments proposed 
by the European Parliament (PE  141.422). 
Article  2  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  2205/90  amends 
Regulation (EEC) No 1677/85 as follows with respect 
to  this matter: 
'(b)  in  respect  of  Member  States  other  than  those 
referred to in (a),
2 to the percentage difference for the 
currency of the Member State concerned between: 
2  In other words, the Member States that observe a maximum spread 
as between the1r  currencies at any ttme of +1- 2.25%. 
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- the agricultural conversion rate, and 
- the  average  of the  ecu  rates  published  in  the 
Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities,  C 
Series, over a period to be determined in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 12.' 
Annex  VIII  sets  out  a  calculatwn  of  the  applied 
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monetary gap (or MCA) for the drachma in accordance 
with  the  new  provisions  introduced  by  Regulation 
(EEC) No  2205/90. 
Annex  IX  sets  out  the  MCAs  applied  to  the  other 
currencies  for  the  same  period  as  that  covered  by 
Annex VII. X - Areas of  -application of MCAs -
Calculation methods 
A - Sectors covered 
1.  At  the  present  time,  monetary  compensatory 
amounts  apply  in  the  Member  States  concerned  as 
regards production and trade to the following products: 
cereals (excluding rice) and derived products, 
pigmeat, eggs and poultrymeat, 
beef and veal, 
milk and dairy products, 
wine, 
sugar and isoglucose, 
products not included in Annex II to the Treaty, 
preserves and jams, 
olive oil. 
NB: The numbering of the products subject to MCAs 
corresponds  to  the  relevant  part  of Annex  I  to  the 
regulation fixing the MCAs.
1 
To  these  products  must  be  added  01lseeds  (colza, 
rapeseed and sunflower), and high protein plants (peas, 
beans,  fteld  beans  and  lupms),  to  which  differential 
amounts are applied (see Chapter II, paragraph 3). 
B - Calculation of monetary compensatory 
amounts in Annex I to the regulation 
fixing the MCAs 
1.  Monetary  compensatory  amounts  are  fixed  in 
national  currency  and  are  published  periodically  in 
Annex  1 to  the  regulation  fixing  the  MCAs.  These 
amounts are calculated using the following formula: 
MCA =  CP x GR x AMG 
where CP: common price (ecu/tonne) 
GR: green rate (ECU 1 = x national currency (NC) 
AMG:  applied  monetary  gap  (percentage  difference 
between the GCR and the GR for EMS currenc1es and 
between the GMR and the GR for floatmg currencies) 
2.  In principle, the price in ecus used in calculating the 
MCAs is .the intervention price. In those sectors where 
there are no intervention prices, MCAs are not as a rule 
applied  except  where  the  products  in  the  sector  are 
regarded as  derived products. This occurs particularly 
1  See,  for  example,  CommiSSIOn  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1207/90, 
II 5.1990, which lays down the monetary compensatory amounts 
to  be  apphed  in  agnculture  and  certam  coeffictents  and 
conversion  rates  necessary  for  thetr  apphcatwn  (OJ  L  122, 
14 5 1990, p.  1). 
Areas of applicatiOn of MCAs - Calculauon methods 
in  the  case  of  poultrymeat  products  (regarded  as 
products  derived  from  cereals)  and  in  the  case  of 
products not covered by Annex II to  the EEC Treaty 
which  are  obtained  by  the  processing  of  basic 
agricultural products (cereals, sugar, milk). 
3.  For products  without  an  intervention  price,  how-
ever,  there  may  be  an  intervention  system  with 
comparable effects; that applies in particular to  wine, 
for  which the minimum guaranteed price serves  as  a 
basis for calculating MCAs. 
4.  For  derived  products  for  which  there  is  no 
intervention  price, MCAs are calculated by reference 
to  the  MCA  for  the  basic  product,  to  which  a 
derivation  coefficient  1s  applied  (Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1677/85,  last  subparagraph of Article  5(1)).  The 
coefficients are determined case by case. Although this 
does not occur as  a rule, they may be the same as  the 
denvation  coefficients  used  in  calculating  levies  or 
refunds  (see  Chapter  XI).  The  specific  objectives 
pursued by levies  and refunds, on the one hand,  and 
MCAs, on the other, mean that in most cases it would 
be inappropriate to  use the same coefficients. 
5.  The  prices  and  factors  taken  into  account  in 
calculating  MCAs  for  the  various  products  are  as 
follows:2 
(a)  Milk and dairy products 
MCAs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of 95%  of  the 
intervention  price  for  butter  and  skimmed-milk 
powder.  For those two products, the MCAs are equal 
to  the  impact of the  applied  monetary  gap  on  their 
respective prices. As regards the remaining products in 
the  sector, the basis of calculation is the intervention 
price,  after a flat-rate deduction for processing costs. 
The specific calculatiOns are carried out by reference 
to  the  proportion  of  fat  and  nitrogenated  matter 
contained  in  them  and,  where  applicable,  the  sugar 
content. 
(b)  Cereals 
MCAs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of 92.5%  of the 
intervention  price  for  the  product  in  question, 
disregarding monthly increases. 
As regards starch products and maize grits intended for 
the  brewing industry,  the  MCA is  calculated  on  the 
basis of the price used for calculation of the MCA for 
the  product  in  _question,  after  deduction  of  the 
production refund. 
(c)  Pigmeat 
Within  the  common orgamzation of the  markets,  the 
pigmeat sector is  regarded as  a  sector 'derived' from 
2  See, for example, Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3153/85 (OJ 
L 310,  21  II 1985, p.  4)  and subsequent amendments. 
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cereals;  the  conditions ,applicable  to  trade  with  non-
member countries are based entirely on that approxi-
mation.  As  far  as  the  price  system  is  concerned, 
however,  the  pigmeat  sector is  closer  to  an  mdustry 
covered by  the  normal  regime,  since there is  a basic 
price and an  intervention price, and there is  no  direct 
connection with the  cereals industry. The intervention 
price must be fixed withm a specified range defined by 
reference  to  the  basic  product.  It is  not fixed  unless 
intervention purchases have actually taken place, in so 
far as  they  are  not· compulsory.  In  fact,  there  are no 
intervention measures other than those in the form  of 
private storage aid. 
When  the  agrimonetary  system  was  introduced,  the 
MCAs for the pigmeat sector were based on the upper 
limit of the range (92% of the basic price). That limit 
was  subsequently  replaced  by  the  lower  limit  wtuch 
had  originally been fixed  at  85%  of the  basic  price. 
When that limit was reduced to  78% and, subsequent-
ly,  to  70.2%  (90%  of  78%),  the  reduction  was 
essentially  attributable  to  the  level  of  the  MCAs 
which it was sought to  reduce in  that way. 
In  1984  the  system  was  completely  overhauled  by 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  855/84,  with  the  MCA 
subsequently  being  based  on  the  feed  ration  (the 
quantity  of cereals  necessary  to  produce  1  kg  of 
pigmeat),  which in  fact once  again reduced the MCA 
by 50% (of the basic price). 
However, that solution (which was vigorously suppor-
ted  by  France)  proved  somewhat  unsuitable  since  it 
impeded the dismantlement of MCAs in the pigmeat 
sector  without  a parallel  dismantlement of MCAs  in 
the cereals sector. Moreover, there is a large variation 
between the Member States as  regards the proportion 
of  cereals  used  in  the  feed  ration  for  pigs. 
1 
Consequently,  without changing the  level  reached by 
the MCAs, there was a return to a system based on the 
basic price, the relevant percentage now being 35%? 
(d)  Eggs and poultrymeat 
Since  no  intervention  price  has  been  fixed  for  this 
sector,  MCAs  are  based on  the  quantities  of cereals 
(feeding ratio) deemed to be used in the production of 
1  It has been estimated that in  1983  the proportion of cereals m the 
cost of p1gmeat  production  was  37 2%  m  Denmark,  28.3%  in 
France,  11.7%  m  Germany  and  8.4%  m  the  Netherlands. 
Commission  data  for  1985  show  that  the  proportion  of cereals 
m compound feedingstuffs (for all ammals) was 46 8% m France, 
24.6% m Germany and  15 2% m the Netherlands. 
2  The ongms of the problems m the pigmeat sector are,  however, 
structural.  In  the  Netherlands,  Northern  Germany  and  Flanders, 
pigmeat  is  produced  on  an  mtensive  basis  with  low  unit  costs 
resulting  from  the  use  of cheap  cereal  substitutes  (soya  and 
tapioca) Imported through Rotterdam and Hamburg, which are not 
subject  to  MCAs.  French  production,  on  the  contrary,  IS 
concentrated m the North West (Bnttany), further from the  mam 
36 
eggs and poultrymeat. In principle, the same derivation 
coefficients  are  used  in  calculating  MCAs  as  m 
calculating levies. 
(e)  Beef and veal 
In this sector, MCAs are calculated on the basis of the 
intervention price for full-grown cattle in the Member 
State  in  question,  less  20%  (Regulation  (EEC)  No 
3153/,85,  Article 4(3)(b)). This rule was  introduced to 
take account of the  fact that the market price  was  m 
practice  permanently  15  to  20%  lower  than  the 
intervention price.  T~e application of an  MCA based 
on the intervention price would have had the effect of 
overcompensating for the real price differences.  With 
certain exceptions, the MCAs for derived products are 
calculated on the basis of the coefficients used for the 
calculation of levies. 
(f) Sugar 
MCAs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  an  amount 
compnsmg  the  intervention  price  and  the  amount 
received under the storage costs compensation scheme. 
In  the  case  of MCAs  for  white  sugar,  no  account  is 
taken of the  regionalization of intervention prices.  In 
the  case of unrefined  sugar,  an  output  coefftcient of 
0.92 is applied to the amount of the storage premium. 
For the remaining products in the sector,  the MCA is 
derived  from  the  MCA  for  white  sugar  and  is 
calculated  by  reference  to  their  sugar  or  dry  matter 
(isoglucose) content. 
MCAs for sugar intended for the chemical industry are 
calculated  on  the  basis  of the  price  for  white  sugar, 
after deduction of the production refund. 
Non-quota sugar  (C  sugar)  exported  to  non-member 
countries is exempt from the MCA system. 
(g)  Wine 
In  the  winegrowing  sector,  MCAs  apply  only  to  the 
main  wine-producing  countries  of  the  Community, 
namely  France,  Italy,  Germany,  Greece  and  Spain. 
Among the products in  the winegrowing sector,  only 
wine  is  subject to  MCAs.  In  intra-Community  trade, 
MCAs  apply  only  to  table  wines  as  defined  by 
French  markets  than  the  principal  production  areas  in  the 
Netherlands and  Belgium, and there the percentage of cereals m 
the feed ration IS  h1ghest. It was considered that the  agnmonetary 
system  mcreased  the  comparative  advantage  enJoyed  by  Dutch, 
German and  Belgian producers,  smce  both  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany  had  positive  MCAs  (granted  for  exports)  and  the 
negative  MCAs  in  Belgium  were  lower  than  those  m  France. 
Although  It could  not  be  proved  that  the  level  of the  MCAs 
brought about by treating p1gmeat as a bas1c  product was the sole 
cause of the French problems in  the mdustry dunng the  1980s, It 
was  agreed  to  reduce  the  level,  basmg  the  calculation  on  a 
standard cereal component,  th1s  bemg  reflected  in  the  figure  of 
35% of the bas1c  pnce now  used Community  regulations  and  semi-sparkling  wines 
marketed  in  containers of a volume  exceeding  three 
litres; thus, quality wines produced in specified regions 
(quality wines psr), sparkling wines, dessert wines and 
semi-sparkling  wines  marketed  in  containers  of  a 
volume of less than three litres are excluded. 
<  < 
In/ Germany, MCAs apply only to A II, A III and R III 
type table wines  (table wines  produced in Germany), 
and- therefore  MCAs  do  not  apply  to  semi-sparkling 
wines,  wines  generally  produced from  must or table 
wines of the  'non-German' type. 
In  trade  with non-member countries,  MCAs apply .to 
still  wines,  namely  wines  for  everyday  consumption 
and  wines  of designated  origin,  and  also  to  semi-
sparkling  wines  in  barrels.  As  regards  imports  into 
Germany,  MCAs apply  only  to  wines  produced from 
the  'Portugieser',  'Riesling'  and  'Sylvaner' _ vine 
varieties. 
MCAs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of the  minimum 
guaranteed prices fixed in accordance with Regulation 
(EEC) No 822/87, for example: 
(i)  for  R I,  R II  and A I  type  wines:  the  arithmetic · 
mean  of the  corresponding activating  prices  (prix  de 
declenchement); 
(ii)  for A II and A III type wines: the arithmetic niean 
of the activating prices; 
(iii)  for R Ill type wines, the activating priCe. 
(h)  Products  not  covered  by  Annex  II  to  the  EEC 
Treaty 
MCAs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  MCAs 
applicable  to  the  basic  products  incorporated  in. the 
final product, less  10~. 
A reduced amount is applied to the flat rate quantity of 
sugar contained in  the  products covered by  headings 
29.04 C and  38.19 T of the  Common Customs Tariff 
(CCT), that amount bein'g the normal basic price, less 
the production refund provided for sugar intended for 
industrial purposes. 
Areas of apphcation of MCAs - Calculation methods 
In  principle,  the  fixed  quantities  of  those  basic 
products laid down in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3034/85 
are  used  for  the  calculation  of MCAs.  The,possible 
exceptions to that rule are indicated in a footnote to the 
regulation fixing the MCAs. 
MCAs  apply  only. to  a limited  number  of processed 
agricultural  products, in  view  of the fact  that MCAs 
are to  have an economic impact. 
Pol'  that reason,  MCAs  of an  exchange  value  of less 
than ECU 3 per 100 kg are not  applie~i. 
(i)  Products processed from fruit and  vegetables 
As from  7 September 1987, MCAs apply to  products 
processed from fruit and vegetables (products covered 
by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  426/86,  in  particular 
preserves  and  jams  classified  under  subheadings 
20.05  B  and  20.05  C  of  the  CCT,  whose  sugar 
content exceeds 50% by  weight. 
For such products, the MCAs are equivalent to 50% of 
the MCAs applied to white sugar (subheading 17.01  A 
of heading 7 of Annex  I to  the regulation  fixing  the 
MCAs). 
In  any  event,  MCAs  are  not  applied  when  their 
exchange value is  less than ECU 3 per 100 kg of the 
product. 
(j)  Olive oil 
The  application  of MCAs  has  been  extended  to  the 
olive-oil sector as from 7 September 1987. The MCAs 
are calculated on the basis of the  intervention price. It 
is a derived·price arrived at by reference to the various 
customs subheadings. 
The  ,tviCAs  are  also  differentiated  depending  on 
whether or not  the  oil  is  marketed  in  containers  of 
less  than  five  litres,  in  view  of the  availability  of 
consumption. aid, under the CMO in this  sector. 
(k)  The  rules  concerning  calculation  of the  MCAs 
by  sector,  commented  on  above,  are  summarized  in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 - Sectors where MCAs applied at the beginning of 1988 
Sector 
Milk and milk products 
Cereals 
Pigmeat 
Eggs and poultrymeat 
Beef 
Sugar and isoglucose 
Wine  (France,  Italy,  Germany, 
Greece and Spain) 
Olive oil (from 7.  9.  1987) 
Processed  fruits  and  vegetables 
Gaims  and  marmalades  with 
more than 50% sugar) 
Non-Annex II products 
Basis used for MCA calculation 
95%  of  intervention  price  for  butter  and  skimmed-milk;  for  other 
products, the basis of calculation is the two intervention prices less a flat 
rate amount for processing costs 
92.5% of intervention price, without reference to monthly increases (for 
starch and maize groats for brewing, MCA calculated on basis of price 
used for calculation of product concerned minus production refund) 
35% of the basic price (reflects pigmeat as  derived product of cereals) 
Derived from MCAs for cereals according to content of various cereals 
in  the feed ration 
Coefficients of derivation as for import levies 
80% of intervention price 
Intervention  price plus  storage levy;  for  raw  sugar the storage levy  is 
multiplied by yield factor of 0.92 
MCAs limited to certain wines only. Basis is guaranteed minimum price 
Intervention  price;  where  packed  in  packs  of  less  than  5  litres, 
consumption aid deducted 
50% of MCA for white sugar (do not apply if less than ECU 3/100 kg) 
Derived from MCAs of basic ingredients (cereals, milk, sugar) less 10% 
(do  not apply if less than ECU 3/100 kg 
NB: In addition, monetary differential amounts are applied to the aids for colza, rape, sunflower seeds, peas, field 
beans and lupins. 
Source: Special report No 1/89 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system, accompanied by the replies 
of the Commission, OJ C  128, 24.  5.  1989, p.  1. 
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A - Calculation of the coefficients in Annex 
II to the regulation fixing the monetary 
coefficients 
Legal basis: 
(a)  Basic  regulation:  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
1677/85  of 11  June  1985  on  monetary compensatory 
amounts in  agriculture (OJ L 64, 24. 6.  1985, p.  6); 
(b)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3153/85 of 11 
November 1985 fixing the methods for the calculation 
of monetary compensatory amounts (OJ L 310, 21.  11. 
1985, p.  4), Article 6(3). 
These coefficients,  which are also  fixed  periodically, 
apply  to  levies,  refunds  and  accession  compensatory 
amounts, fixed in ecus, before conversion into national 
currency  (see,  for  example,  Commission  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  1207/90 of 11  May  1990 which fixes  the 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  applicable  in  agri-
culture together with certain coefficients and conver-
sion  rates  necessary  for  their  application  (OJ L  122, 
14. 5.  1990, p.  1).  c 
The  coefficients  mentioned  in  Annex  II  to  the 
regulation fixing the monetary coefficients (MCs) are 
calculated as follows: 
MC =  ( 100- AMG) 
100 
The coefficients in force at the beginning of 1991  are 
shown in Annex X. 
B - Calculation of the coefficients in Annex 
III to the regulation fixing the monetary 
coefficients 
Legal basis: 
(a)  Basic regulation: Regulation (EEC) No 1677/85 of 
11  June  1985  on  monetary  compensatory amounts in 
agriculture (OJ L 64, 24.  6.  1985, p.  6). 
(b)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3155/85 of 11 
November  1985  providing for  the  advance  fixing  of 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  (OJ  L  310, 21.  11. 
1985, p.  22), Article 6. 
Annex  III  to  the  Regulation  contams  the  adjustment 
coefficients  to  be  used  for  the  advance  fixing  of 
MCAs. The adjustments are only made to the extent to 
Monetary coefficients 
which it is known at the time of  fixing that, for a given 
sector,  a  new  green  rate  will  be  applied  and, 
consequently,  there  will  be a  new  monetary  gap  on 
the date on which the operation is carried out (see, for 
example, Commission, Regulation (EEC) No  1207/90 
of  11  May  1990 , fixing  monetary  compensatory 
amounts  to  be  applied  in  agriculture  and  certain 
coefficients  and  conversion  rates  necessary  for  their 
implementation  (OJ  L  122,  14.  5.  1990,  p.  1).  The 
coefficient takes no account of any changes which may 
be made to  common agricultural prices. 
The coefficients in Annex III to the regulation fixing 
the  monetary  coefficients  reflect  only  monetary 
factors. 
Formula: 
NGR  NAMG 
MC = OGR  x  OAMG 
where  OGR:  old green rate 
NGR:  new green rate 
OAMG: old applied monetary gap 
NAMG: new applied monetary gap 
C - Calculation of the coefficients in the 
Annex to  the regulation fixing the 
conversion_rates used for calculation of 
the MCAs applicable to specified 
amounts 
Legal basis: 
(a)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1676/85 of 11  June 
1985  on  the  value  of  the  unit  account  and  the 
conversion rates to  be applied for the purposes of the 
common agricultural  policy  (OJ  L  164,  24.  6.  1985, 
p.  1). 
(b)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1677/85 of 11  June 
1985  on, monetary  compensatory amounts in agricul-
ture (OJ L 164, 24.  6.  1985, p.  6),  Article 10; 
(c)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3152/85 of 11 
November  1985  laying  down  detailed  rules  for  the 
application  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1676/85  (OJ  L 
310, 21.  11.  1985, p.  1),  Article 3. 
Article  10 of Regulation (EEC) No  1677/85 provides 
for  the  possibility  of  an  exporting  Member  State 
paying the  MCA which  the  importing  Member State 
must grant on importation. To convert the MCA of the 
importing  country  into  the  currency  of the  exporting 
country, it is necessary to use the (bilateral) conversion 
rates fixed in the Annex to the Regulation laying down 
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the conversion rates used for calculation of the MCAs 
applicable  to  specified  amounts  (see,  for  example, 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1208/90 of 11  May 
1990 fixing  the conversion rates  used  for  the calcul-
ation of monetary compensatory amounts applicable to 
certain amounts in agriculture (OJ L 122, 14. 5.  1990, 
p.  82);  this  option  has  been  exercised  by  Italy,  the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. It means that the Annex 
to  the Regulation in question is  only  changed in  the 
event of a variation in the AMG, on the  basis of the 
market exchange rate for floating currencies or central 
rates  for  EMS  currencies  (both  adjusted  by  the 
correcting factor). 
Calculation method: 
(a)  for currencies maintained within the spread of+/-
2.25%, the coefficient is equal to the ratio between the 
green  central  rates  concerned;  in  other  words,  it  is 
equal to the bilateral green cross-rates; 
(b)  for floating currencies, the coefficient is  equal to 
the ratio between: 
(i)  the green central rate of the EMS currency and the 
green market exchange rate of the floating currency m 
the case of the conversion rate applicable to an EMS 
currency and a floating currency, respectively; 
(ii)  the green market exchange rates, in the case of the 
conversion rate between two floating currencies. 
The coefficients in force at the beginning of 1991  are 
given in  Annex XL 
D- Dual-rate coefficients 
1.  In  the  agrimonetary  system,  all  the  amounts 
provided for  in  the  CAP (regulatory  levies,  refunds, 
aids, compensatory charges, etc.) are fixed in ecus and 
are converted into national currencies on  the basis of 
the green rates. 
When the expenditure declared by the Member States 
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in  national  currency  is  entered  in  the  Community 
accounts, it is  converted mto ecus  on  the basis of the 
ecu  market  exchange  rates  for  each  currency. 
Consequently, forecasts of the real expenditure of the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section depend, for each currency 
and,  sometimes,  for  each  product,  on  the  (variable) 
relationship  between  the  green  rate  and  the  market 
exchange  rate.  This  ratio  is  called  the  'dual-rate 
coefficient' (DRC). 
2.  The  DRC  is,  thus,  an  indicator  of the  level  of 
intervention prices in national currency (translated into 
ecus  on the  basis of the green rate)  of each Member 
State, which could be compared with the relative level 
of the  agricultural  intervention  prices  of  the  other 
Member States expressed by the same indicator. Table 
3  shows  the  dual-rate  coefficients  for  May  1988  for 
cereals and milk products in all the Member States. It 
will  be  seen  that  there  is  a considerable discrepancy 
between coefficients, particularly those of the Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  (higher  level)  and  those  of 
Greece (lower level). 
3.  For  each  national  currency,  the  volume  of  the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure thus  varies in 
proportion to  the fluctuations of the relative levels of 
intervention prices. Where the market exchange rate of 
a currency falls,  the  relative level of the intervention 
prices  falls  (reduction  in  the  DRC)  and  likewise the 
EAGGF Guarantee  Section  expenditure and  the own 
resources of the currency concerned. In the event of a 
rise  in  the  market  exchange  rate  of a  currency,  the 
relative  level  of the  intervention  price  rises  (higher 
dual-rate  coefficient)  resulting  in  additional  expen-
diture and own resources. It is  apparent from Table 3 
that the  DRC are  below zero only in  the  case of the 
United  Kingdom  and  Greece,  whose  currencies 
(market  exchange  rates)  fluctuate  without  limit 
against their central rate  (that also  being the  case for 
the United Kingdom over the period covered by Table 




- Cereals, milk and milk products 
----~--- --------------------------- --- --------------------l 
Member State  Cereals  Milk and milk products 
Belgmm  1.1094  1.1172 
Denmark  1.1025  11025 
FR of Germany  1.1455  1.1515 
Greece  0.8089  0 7526 
Spam  1.1095  1.1208 
France  1.0625  10626 
Ireland  1.0723  1.0733 
Italy  1.0413  1.0733 
Luxembourg  1.1094  1.1172 
Netherlands  1.137  11493 
Portugal 
United Kmgdom  0.9781  0.9921 
1  Dual-rate coeffictent = 
ECU 1 converted to  nat10nal  currency at green rate 
ECU  1 converted to  nat10nal currency at market rate 
2  The market rates used to record expenditure declared m May 1988 m the EAGGF accounts m ecus IS  the rate of 18 March 1988 (OJ C 73, 
19  3  1988). 
Source  Spec1al  report No 1/89 of the Court of Aud1tors on the agnmonetary system, accompamed by the rephes of the Commtsston, OJ 
c 128, 24  5  1989, p  1) 
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XII - Repercussions of the agrimonetary 
system 
A - Repercussions on the unity of the 
market 
1.  In  view  of the  fact  that  there  are  different  green 
rates  and  market  rates,  when  common  agricultural 
prices  in  ecus  are  converted  into  the  national 
currencies of the  various Member States, the unity of 
the  common agricultural  market is  no  more  than  an 
illusion.  In  reality,  the  common  price  level  differs 
according  to  the  Member  State  concerned  and, 
therefore,  is  not  common.  The  extent  of the  varia-
tion, whtch is measured in relation to the monetary gap 
between  the  green  and  real  rates,  has  varied 
considerably  during  the  life  of  the  agnmonetary 
system and,  at certain times,  the differences between 
Member  States  have  been  small  and  at  other  times 
large.  For example, when the switch-over mechanism 
was  applied  in  spring  1984,  the  difference  between 
institutional  agricultural  price  levels  expressed  in 
national currency in  Germany and France was  of the 
order of 17%. 
2.  In addition  to  the  variations in  common prices  as 
between Member States, since 1984 there has been an 
increase in  the  number of different green rates in  the 
national  agricultural  market  sectors.  However,  the 
difference  in  green  rates  is  not  the  same  in  all 
countries. For example, in March 1988, Germany had 
three green rates (milk, cereals and all other products), 
France had six (milk, pigmeat, beef and veal, sheepmeat, 
other  animal  products,  wme  and  other  vegetable 
products), the United Kingdom had five (pigmeat, beef 
and veal, sheepmeat, other animal products, all products 
of vegetable  origin)  and  Italy  had  three  (pigmeat, 
cereals/oilseeds,  other products). This  multiplicity  of 
prices was aggravated by the introduction of different 
neutral margins (see Section F - 4 of this chapter). 
3.  Thus,  although  MCAs  succeeded  in  maintaining 
unity of the Community market in  trade, in  reality in 
the  national  markets  there  are  as  many  different 
agricultural prices as there are green rates. 
B - Repercussions on the level of 
institutional prices 
1.  The switch-over mechanism was created in  1984 to 
resolve the difficulty of dismantling positive MCAs at 
a  time  when  increases  in  ecus  prices  were  being 
severely restricted. It is  true  that  the  creation of new 
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positive MCAs in  the fixed  exchange rate currencies 
was thereby avoided and that those already existing in 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  have  been  eliminated. 
These successes have been achieved,  however,  at the 
expense of: 
(a)  greater  conceptual  complexity  deriving  from  the 
creation of a set of artificial  exchange values for the 
green ecu (green central rates); 
(b)  disguised increases in common price levels. 
2.  The result of creating a green ecu  by  multiplying 
the central rates of each currency against the ecu by the 
correcting  factor  is  that,  in  addttion  to  the  specific 
green rates  used  for  converting common agricultural 
prices  in  ecus  into  national  currencies,  a  new  set of 
totally theoretical exchange values is  created. 
3.  Since the German mark is the strongest currency in 
the  EMS  and  the  one  that  has  most  appreciated,  in 
practice  the  new  calculation  method  means  that  the 
evolution of the green central rate m ecus is  linked to 
that of the central rate of the German mark against the 
ecu.  Whenever the  German  mark has  been  revalued, 
the level of common agricultural prices has increased. 
At  the  beginning  of 1988,  the  cumulative  effect  of 
those  revaluations  had  caused  the  level  of common 
prices to rise by 13.7% since March 1984. The result is 
that  the  green  ecu  is  13.7% higher than  the  real  ecu 
(14.5%  at  the  start  of  1990)  and  that,  with  each 
readjustment,  the  agricultural  ecu  becomes  further 
remote from the real ecu (see paragraph 10 of Chapter 
III). 
4.  An  increase of this  kind  in  the  common  level  of 
prices carries with it the following consequences: 
(a)  The  correcting  factor  gives  nse  to  automatic 
increases  in  the  common  level  of prices  whenever 
there is  a revaluation of the German mark against the 
real ecu;  increases in  the level  of prices are linked to 
the German mark, which reflects the industrial power 
of  Germany  and  not  the  reality  of  Community 
agriculture; 
(b)  such automatic  increases in the level of common 
prices  are  dissociated  from  the  normal  yearly  pro-
cedures for fixing agricultural market prices; 
(c)  increases in the common level of prices in this way 
cause the rises to be largely masked: the prices in ecus 
agreed  at  the  annual  fixing  of agricultural  prices  no 
longer reflect the real level of the common prices. 
5.  The  switch-over mechanism  is,  therefore,  a  tech-
nical  device  making  it  possible  to  dismantle  the 
German  and  Dutch  positive  MCAs,  whilst  at  the 
same time maintaining the appearance of a restrictive common price policy. However, in reality, this has not 
been achieved without increases in the common prices. 
Its  operation  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  'gentle-
men's agreement' of March 1979, in  that most of the 
reductions in the positive MCAs have been offset by 
increases in  the common level of prices.  Some of the 
reductions of the positive MCAs have been offset by 
compensation aids  charged  to  the national  (and  even 
the  Community)  budget,  m  order  to  avoid  adverse 
effects on agricultural income. On some occasions, the 
national aid has given rise to compensation of a greater 
amount than the fall in agricultural income. 
1 
C - Repercussions on refunds and levies 
1.  Export refunds and regulatory import levies reflect, 
for given products, the difference between their world 
market price converted  into  ecus  and  their  common 
price fixed in  ecus. 
2.  Under the green ecu system, whenever a monetary 
realignment  is  carried  out  usmg  the  switch-over 
mechanism,  there  is  an  increase  in  common  prices 
(although  the  prices  in  national  currency  are  not 
changed)  and,  therefore,  an  increase in the  variances 
from world prices, which leads to a rise in refunds and 
regulatory levies (see Figure 2). 
D - Repercussions on national price levels 
1.  A  readjustment  in  parities  which  gives  rise  to  a 
higher  correcting  factor  raises  the  level  of common 
prices, the effects of which are felt  in the  subsequent 
devaluation of the green rates. 
2.  The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
formally  decides  on  changes  in  the  green  rate. 
Generally,  such changes are made once each year,  as 
part of the annual pnce-fixing decisions.
2 This means 
that,  in  negotiations,  the Member States  are  able  to 
1  See the Commtssion report on the functiomng, in  1978, of the atd 
mecham~m provtded for by  the  20th Council Dtrective (85/361/ 
EEC) of 16 July  1985 on  hannonization of the legislatwn of the 
Member States on turnover taxes  - Common system of value-
added  tax:  exceptions  concemmg  spec1al  atds  granted  for 
parttcular  agncultural  products  (SEC(89)  157 4  final,  30 10. 
1989, paragraph 3 3,  p  8). 
2  This is done m an attempt to ensure that the institutional pnces m 
natwnal currency remam stable for fixed penods, for example, a 
marketmg  year.  However,  on  occaswn  changes  occur  at  other 
ttmes. Smce the  declSlon f1xmg  pnces for the  1987/88 marketing 
year, in  winch provlSlon  was  made  for automatic  d1smantlmg  of 
MCAs after the fixing of new  panttes and spectfic provlSlons on 
MCAs  for  ptgmeat  (see  Chapter XV),  the  practice  of changing 
green  rates  other  than  at  the  ume  of the  annual  pnce-fixmg 
deciswns  ha~ become msututwnalized. 
RepercussiOns of the agnmonetary system 
bring considerable  influence  to  bear on  the  level  of 
their  green  rates,  thus  maintaining  extensive  control 
over their domestic prices. 
3.  At  certain times,  the  Member States have consid-
ered it to their advantage to resist pressure to dismantle 
MCAs. In  the case of positive MCAs, the reason has 
been that the national  priority  was  to  avoid reducing 
farmers'  income  (for  example,  Germany  and  the 
United Kingdom between 1980 and 1985) and, in  the 
case  of negative  MCAs,  to  avoid  increases  in  food 
prices (for example, the United Kingdom in the 1970s 
and in  1986 and 1987; France in  the first years of the 
agrimonetary system). 
4.  There have been other cases in which the Member 
States with negative MCAs asked for special treatment 
for  groups  of  producers  in  the  form  of  selective 
devaluation  of green rates.  This  has  occurred,  above 
all, where it was sought to alleviate the effects of the 
restrictive  policy  on  prices  fixed  in  ecus,  achieving 
increases  in  prices in  national currency  by  means  of 
adjustments to the  green rates.  For example, in  1986 
and early 1987, MCAs were reduced more for animal 
products  than lfor  cereals  because  it  was  considered 
that  the  trend  in  livestock  farmers'  net  income 
presented  greater  difficulties,  at  a  time  when  there 
could  be  no  justification  for  higher prices  for  cereal 
producers. 
5.  Annex XII and Figure 4 show that since  1984 the 
Member  States  have  been  able  to  achieve  price 
increases in  national  currencies by  means of changes 
in  the green rates,  whilst at the same time  containing . 
increases  in  common  prices  in  ecus.  As  far  as  the 
Community  of Ten  is  concerned,  common  prices  in 
ecus have recorded a fall since 1983/84, although, as a 
result  of adJustments  to  the  green  rates,  they  have 
displayed  s1gnificant  annual  increases  in  natiOnal 
currencies.  In  some  Member  States,  these  increases 
have been considerable: leaving aside the special case 
of Greece,  which is  influenced  by  the  adjustment in 
price levels made after its  accession,  France, Ireland 
and  Italy  obtained,  during  the  period  in  question, 
nominal increases in  prices in their own currencies in 
excess of 4% per year. 
However,  the  discrepancy between the two curves  in 
Figure 4  is  merely  apparent,  since  producers are  not 
paid  in  ecus  but  in  national  currency.  The  price 
increases  in  national  currency  in  fact  reflect  the 
devaluation  of the  currency  in  question  against  the 
ecu. If  the green rates are adjusted immediately - in 
other words, if no new negative MCAs are created -
then  producers  receive  in  national  currency  the 
equivalent of the common price fixed  in  ecus,  which 
is not always the case. 
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E - Repercussions on the allocation of 
resources 
1.  Where  there  are  different  price  levels  in  the 
Member  States  and  agriculture  is  isolated  from  the 
remainder of the  economy  because of the  green-rate 
system and MCAs, it is  not surprising that the normal 
functioning  of the  price  machinery  should  produce 
distortions in the allocation of resources. For example: 
(a)  In  countries  with  an  appreciated  currency,  the 
green  rates  lower  than  those  of  the  market  keep 
agricultural  prices  above  the  real  common  price, 
increasmg farmers'  income.  This  means  that  agricul-
tural investment and  production are greater than they 
would have been at market rates.  In  countries  whose 
currencies  have  depreciated,  the  reverse  situation 
emerges,  when  the  green  rates  remain  below  the 
market  rates.  The  result  is  that  in  the  high-income 
Community  regions  production  is  stimulated  and  in 
low-income regions  it  is  discouraged,  thus exacerba-
ting  the  already  considerable  regional  disparities 
within the Community. 
(b)  The  agrimonetary  system  makes  it  possible  for 
different treatment to be accorded to different Member 
States. As a result of devaluation, production costs rise 
at  the  same  time  as  the  prices  of  non-agricultural 
imports,  and  the  same  process  occurs  with  labour 
costs,  which  are  part  of  the  wage-price  spiral. 
Conversely,  revaluation  tends  to  lead  to  lower 
production  costs.  Thus,  if the  green  rates  are  not 
changed,  farmers  are  better  off  when  currencies 
appreciate  and  less  well  off  when  they  depreciate, 
which  again  tends  to  channel  agricultural  resources 
towards  countries  with  appreciating  currencies  and 
higher price levels. 
2.  The Court of Auditors has  examined the  available 
Commission reports in an attempt to evaluate the effect 
of  the  agrimonetary  system  on  the  structures  of 
agricultural production in the Community.
1 Apparent-
ly,  little  effort  has  been  made  to  analyse  the 
repercussions  of such  a  fundamental  system,  which 
affects  the  functioning  of  the  common  market 
organizations. The Commission published four reports 
in 1978, 1979, 1984 and 1987
2 on the economic effects 
of the agrimonetary system, which consist merely of a 
series  of official  statistics  for' each  market  together 
with analytical comments. In the first two reports, the 
Commission interpreted the  statistics as  meaning that 
I  Specml  report  No  1/89  of  the  Court  of  Aud1tors  on  the 
agnmonetary  system,  accompamed  by  the  replies  of  the 
CommiSSion,  OJ C 128, 24 5 1989, p.  I. 
2  COM(78)  20  final,  10 2.1978,  COM(79)  11  final,  14.3.1979; 
COM(84) 95  final,  2641984, COM(87)  168  final,  14.8.1987. 
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the  Member  States  with  positive  MCAs  attracted 
resources for agriculture and increased their proportion 
of final  Community  agricultural  production  at  the 
expense  of  others  with  negative  MCAs.  Those 
conclusions  have  been  contested,
3  but  no  specific 
measures have been taken as  a result. 
F - Repercussions on patterns of trade 
1.  Principles 
Although the green-rate system applies to all sectors of 
the  market,  the existence of a monetary gap does  not 
necessarily mean that compensation will  be paid. The 
pnnciple of applying MCAs is that they are only paid 
or charged in cases where their absence might give rise 
to  'distortions  in  the  intervention  system  and/or  in 
trade' .
4  Where there  is  no  intervention  system or no 
apparent  risk  of  distortion  of  trade,  despite  the 
existence of a monetary gap, MCAs are not applied. 
2.  The basis of calculation of MCAs 
The system for calculating MCAs is necessarily based 
on fixed data. In most cases, when the level of market 
prices is directly related to that of prices supported by 
the  intervention  system,  the  method  of basing  the 
calculation  of  MCAs  on  the  intervention  price, 
adjusted to  reflect the  real  level of the  support price, 
operates reasonably well and, in general, does not lead 
to  distortion  of the  market.  Moreover,  it  does  not 
appear  that,  for  the  present  at  least,  the  technical 
coefficients used for derived products are giving rise to 
difficulties.  This  does  not necessarily mean  that they 
are correct in all cases, but economic agents recognize 
the  need  for  a  standardized  system  and,  unless  they 
observe serious  anomalies,  they  do  not  object to  the 
coefficients apphed by  the Commission. 
Nevertheless,  there  have  been  problems  when  the 
influence of the intervention system on  market prices 
is  limited, and when the market is affected by  factors 
other than  the  price-support  system.  In  that  respect, 
one of the  most problematic sectors has  been  that of 
pigmeat (see Chapters X,  Section B - 5(c) and XV). 
That sector exemplifies the difficulty of applying the 
MCA  system  when  the  market  is  not  under  the 
influence of a strong intervention system. Neither the 
option  of treating  meat  as  a  basic  product  nor  the 
option of treating it as a derived product of cereals has 
3  See, for example,  Strauss, R  'The economic effects of monetary 
compensatory amounts', Journal of  Common Market Studies,  Vol. 
XXI, No 3,  March  1983 
4  Thirteenth recital m the preamble to Council RegulatiOn (EEC) No 
1677/85 of 11.6.1985, OJ L 164, 24.6 1985,  p.  6. provided an adequate formula. The de facto policy in 
recent years, in line w1th the interests of the producers 
in  Member  States  with  depreciated  currencies,  has 
been  the  total  elimination  of MCAs.  However,  the 
structural problems affecting the sector have persisted. 
3.  Absence of MCAs in particular sectors 
As indicated in Chapter X, MCAs are not applied to all 
sectors,  even if they  have green rates.  In  accordance 
with the principles on  which the  system is  based, the 
reason for this is the absence of any risk of disturbance 
of the market or trade-support mechanisms. 
However, the Court of Auditors identified a number of 
problems in the rice and beef/veal sectors, even though 
they are not subject to MCAs.
1 
In the case of rice, in particular, despite the evidence 
repeatedly produced by the Court in its annual reports 
for  the  years  1978,  1980  and  1985
2  that  the 
Community was losing own resources, measures were 
not taken until 1986. 
The Court of Auditors severely criticized the triangular 
trade  in  rice  occurring  as  a result of the  absence  of 
MCAs in that sector. The Court identified shipments of 
rice from  third  countries  entering  the Community  in 
Member States where the import levy was low because 
of  an  overvalued  green  rate,  and  then  re-exported 
immediately to  the  real  destination  in other Member 
States. As a result, own resources were lost (estimated 
at  ECU 1.5  million  in  1984 and ECU 2.0 million  in 
1985). The problem worsened in 1986, a year in which 
the depreciation  of sterling  and  the opening up  of a 
wide negative monetary gap meant that large quantities 
of  rice  for  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  flowed 
through  the  United  Kingdom.  Exports  of long-grain 
husked rice from the United Kingdom increased from 
77  tonnes in 1985 to 27 262 tonnes in 1986 and to the 
Netherlands from 20 tonnes in the first year to 30 636 
in  the  second.  The  Court estimated the  loss  of own 
resources involved as  ECU 3.7  million.  When action 
was finally taken, interestingly, it did not take the form 
of  the  introduction  of  MCAs.  Instead,  a  special 
conversion  rate  virtually  equivalent  to  the  market 
rate was introduced for the purposes of calculating the 
rice levies (see Chapter VII, Section A - 5). 
1  Spectal  report  No  1/89  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  on  the 
agnmonetary  system,  accompamed  by  the  rephes  of  the 
2  Comrmsswn, OJ C 128, 24.5  1989,  p.  1 
Paragraph  2 36  of  the  annual  report  for  1978,  OJ  C  326. 
31.12 1979;  paragraphs  3.12  to  3.22  of the  annual  report  for 
1980, OJ C 344, 31.12 1981 , paragraphs 3 35 to 3 39 of the annual 
report for 1985, OJ C 321,  15  12 1986. 
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4.  Neutral margin 
The MCAs are calculated and then are reduced by  a 
flat-rate  amount known as  the  'neutral margin'. This 
means that the monetary gap between Member States 
is not fully covered. Between two Member States, one 
with positive and the  other with  negative MCAs, the 
neutral  margins  are .cumulative.  The  purpose  of the 
neutral  margins  is  to avoid  any  overcompensation in 
the calculation ofMCAs, although their flat-rate nature 
makes this a rather approximate way of achieving this. 
The  Commission  in  1987  sought  a  more  flexible 
approach,  with wider neutral margins in those sectors 
where  the  impact  of the  intervention  system  on  the 
market  was  reduced.  It  saw  this  as  a  step  towards 
further gradual dismantling  of the  system.  However, 
although the Council agreed to  wider neutral margins 
in  certain  specific  sectors  where  it was  considered 
artificial  trade flows would not result (e.g.  olive oil), 
Member States were not ready to  devolve the general 
power of the  Council  to  decide  the  level  of neutral 
margins to  the Commission. 
The  Court  of Auditors  has  examined  a  number  of 
situations  to  see  whether  the  existence  of  neutral 
margins  (and  thus  of uncovered  monetary  gaps)  has 
encouraged artificial trade flows.  While there seems to 
be no  real  evidence  that  the  neutral  margins  result 
systematically in such flows, there are particular cases 
which illustrate the extent of the problem. 
A  recent  example  concerns  the  marked  increase  in 
expenditure  on  export  refunds  in  the  Netherlands. 
Although there has always been a tendency for exports 
to be directed through strong-currency Member States, 
the  1988  increases  were  exceptional.  The  Dutch 
authorities  observed  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
export  refunds  paid  to  firms  established  outside  the 
Netherland's  and  without  subsidiaries  in  the  Nether-
lands:  for  example,  for  the  period  January  to  April 
1988, 60% of export refunds in the sugar sector paid 
by Dutch  intervention  agencies  were  to  such  firms, 
whereas in  1987 the percentage was only 7%.  At the 
same  time,  French  and  Belgian  export  refunds  fell 
significantly. 
A  particular  traffic  that  has  been  observed  involves 
loading  goods  at  Antwerp  in  Belgium,  sailing  them 
along  the  Scheidt  to  Vlissingen,  where  they  are 
declared  and  cleared  for  export,  thus  obtaining  the 
export  refunds  in  Dutch  guilders.  Another  involves 
ships  loading  at  Dunkirk  in  France  and  sailing  to 
Vlissingen for export clearance, for the same purpose. 
The firms that export to non-member countries through 
the Netherlands in this way are taking advantage of an 
uncovered monetary gap made up of: 
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(a)  the  neutral  margin  for  the  two  countries  in 
question,  added  together:  in  the  case  of cereals,  0.9 
points of the 1.0 point neutral margin for Netherlands 
remaining uncovered plus 1.5 points for France (total 
2.4 points), and plus 0.5 of the 1.5 points for Belgium 
(total  1.4 points); 
(b)  additional parts of the  monetary gap not covered 
by MCAs because of rounding and application of the 
non-cumulation rule:  in  the case of cereals there is no 
more than the 0.029 points of rounding m respect of 
France:  for  milk  products,  however,  an  additional 
0.385  points  were  uncovered  in  the  Netherlands  by 
virtue of the non- cumulation rule; 
(c)  additional parts of the monetary gap caused by the 
extent  of the  actual  divergence  of market  rates  of 
exchange as compared with central rates:  in this  case 
0.9 points between the Netherlands and France and 1.7 
points between the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The direct consequence of this situation is  an increase 
in the Community budget expenditure as a result of the 
fact that the level of common prices in the Netherlands 
is  greater than  in  Belgium and France.  The Court of 
Auditors has calculated that such expenditure is  3 to 
4.5%  higher (according  to  the  sector),  which  means 
that EAGGF expenditure for the first half of 1988 was 
increased by at least ECU 25  million  by  the  refunds 
being paid in guilders. 
1 
I 
1  Spectal  report  No  1/89  of  the  Court  of  Audttors  on  the 
agnmonetary  system,  accompanied  by  the  replies  of  the 
Commission, OJ C 128,  24 5 1989, p.  I. 
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G - Direct budgetary repercussions 
Table  4  shows  the  amounts  recorded  in  the  annual 
accounts of the Community budget under Chapter 28 
for the period 1983-87, for which definitive data are 
available.  It  appears  that  in  1987,  for  example, 
payments  in  respect  of  MCAs  amounted  to  ECU 
1 300.9  million  and  revenue  (negative  expenditure) 
amounted  to  ECU 664  million,  leaving a  balance of 
ECU  636.9  million.  The  MCAs  in  intra-Community 
trade-payments of ECU 1 073.9 million (83% of the 
total)  and revenue of ECU 664  million  (100% of the 
total) - play a dominant role. 
Table 4 also shows that the individual budget items and 
net  totals  fluctuate  considerably  from  year  to  year, 
depending  on  the  size  of  the  monetary  gaps.  For 
example, the fall  in net expenditure in  1984 and  1985 
reflects  the  degree  of success  in  dismantling  MCAs 
after the introduction of the switch-over, but in  1986 
and  1987  there  was  a  period  of relative  monetary 
instability resulting  in  wider negative gaps,  which  is 
reflected in the amounts recorded in the accounts. The 
importance of MCAs in the budget (as a percentage of 
EAGGF  Guarantee  Section  payments)  is  shown  in 
Table 5. RepercussiOns of the agnmonetary system 
Table 4 - MCAs recorded in the accounts 
'  '  (million ECU) 
Budgetary item  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
280  MCAs in  intra-community trade 
2800  MCAs on imports paid by importing Member State 
(depreciating currency)  174.8  84,5  67.7  269,3  368.7 
2801  MCAs on imports paid by exporting Member State 
for importing,Member State (depreciating currency)  72.4  25.0  66.3  326.4  551.0 
2802  MCAs imports levied by importing Member State 
(appreciating currency)  -635.3  -583.2  -213.9  - 179.7  - 121.8 
2803  MCAs on exports paid by exporting Member State 
(apl'reciating currency)  750.9  590.8  213.4  185.9  154.2 
2804  MCAs on exports charged by exporting Member 
<  < 
State (depreciating currency)  - 213.8  - 157.7  -72.3  -296.0  -542.2 
Subtotal - Article 280  149.0  -39.6  61.2  305.9  409.9 
281  MCAs in Extra Community trade 
2810  Portion of MCAs granted on imports 
(into Member State with depreciating currency) · 
exceeding import levy  0.5  0.1  4.1  69.4  116.1 
2811  MCAs on exports paid by exporting Member State 
(appreciating currency)  338.7  415.5  124.3  100.6  110.9 
Subtotal -Article 281  '  339.2  415.5  128.4  170.0  227.0 
Total - Chapter 28  488.2  375.9  189.8  475.9  636.9 
Source:  Special report No 1/89 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system, accompanied by. the replies 
of the CommissiOn, OJ C 128, 24.  5.  1989, p.  1. 
'  .. 
Table 5 - The importance of MCAs within the Community budget 
"  (million ecu) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
MCAs  488.6  376.2  189.8  481.7  654.9  569.5 
EAGGF Guarantee  ' 
Section payments  15 788.2  18 328.3  19725.9  22120.0  22 951.8  26 389.6 
MCAs (%)  3.1  2.1  1.0  2.2  2.9  2.2 
Source: Annual reports of the Court of Auditors for 1983 to 1988 (OJ C 348, 31.12.1984; OJ C 326, 16.12.1985; 
OJ C 321,  15.12.1986; OJ C 336,  15.12.1987; OJ C 316,  12.12.1988 and OJ C 312, 12.12.1989). 
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H - Indirect budgetary repercussions 
In  addition  to  the direct budgetary  impact of MCAs, 
there is a cost to the Community budget resulting from 
the  use  of  dual-rate  coefficients  (see  Chapter  IV, 
Section C - 1). 
The  dual-rate  coefficients  affect  every  line  in  the 
EAGGF expenditure  budget,  and  Chapter  10  (Agri-
cultural levies)  in  the  revenue budget.  However,  this 
effect is  not separately identified. In its annual report 
on the 1987 financial year, the Court criticized the fact 
that  the  published  budget  of  the  European 
Communities  and  the  accounts  do  not  permit  the 
effect  of dual  rates  to  be  assessed.  In  its  reply,  the 
1.  Direct budgetary cost 
(a)  MCAs in intra-Community trade 




Subtotal- MCAs in  Intra-Community Trade 
(b) MCAs in Extra-Community trade 
Article 281  - Expenditure 
1 
MCAs deducted from export refunds
2 
MCAs adjusting import levies
2 
Subtotal - MCAs in  extra-Community trade 
Subtotal - direct budgetary cost 







Subtotal -indirect budgetary cost 
Total - budgetary cost (1 +2) 
1  From EAGGF accounts. 
Commission  argued  that  the  dual-rate  effect  was 
weakening as  monetary gaps were reduced. This may 
have  been  so  under  the  pre-April  1984  system,  but 
under  the  switch-over  arrangements  the  effect  is 
becoming  more  significant  and  should  be  clearly 
identifiable.  The Court of Auditors has  calculated the 
indirect  effect  of  MCAs  on  the  1987  EAGGF 
expenditure  accounts,  as  shown  in  Table  6.  For  the 
10 months' expenditure given in the official accounts, 
it  amounts  to  ECU 1 005.6  million.  If , this  is 
extrapolated  to  cover  the  12  months  of  1987,  the 
impact  increases  to  ECU 1 206.8  million,  which  is 
almost twice as high as the direct budget cost. In both 
cases,  the  MCAs  represent  5%  of  total  EAGGF 
Guarantee Section expenditure. 
(million ecu) 
10 months  12 months 
(January to October)  (January to  December) 
1 073.9  1 212.7 
(664.0)  (764.8) 
409.9  447.8 
227.0  247.2 
(94.3)  (113.2) 
30.0  36.0 
162.7  170.0 
572.6  617.8 
1 137.5  1 365.1 
(41.5)  (49.8) 
(90.4)  (108.5) 
1 005.6  1 206.8 
1 578.2  1 824.6 
2  Budget estlmates  For the  10 months January to October, the  12-month data have  been reduced proportionately 
3  Calculated by  Court of Auditors from  actual expenditure data m EAGGF accounts. 
4  Calculated by Court of Auditors from actual data m the revenue accounts  The 12-month data have been reduced proportionately to give 10 
months January to  October data. 
Source: Special report No 1/89 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system, accompanied by the replies 
of the Commission. OJ C 128, 24.5.1989, p.  1. 
48 I - Frauds and irregularities 
1  Frauds and megularitles mvolving MCAs can occur 
both m  mtra-Commumty and  third  country  trade  In 
the case of thtrd country trade, however, tt ts normally 
the export refund or import levy  whtch is  the  pnme 
reason for the fraud or irregulanty, the MCA element 
bemg merely mctdental 
2.  Table 7 sets  out the  number of cases of frauds  or 
irregulantles  mvolvmg  MCAs  m  mtra-Commumty 
trade  reported  by  the Member States  under Councll 
Regulatwn  (EEC)  No  283/72 
1  These  142  cases 
mvolve an  estimated ECU 11.5  mllhon,  95  of which 
were  constdered  as  closed  at  the  begmning  of 
September 1988-ECU 1.5  million had been recover-
ed (13% of the total amount involved) 
3. Table 7 also shows that 58 of the 142 cases reported 
concerned  the  Umted  Kmgdom,  nearly  all  of them 
involvmg problems on  the  border between  Northern 
Ireland  and  Ireland.  In  1980  and  1981,  when  the 
Umted Kmgdom had  htgh  posttive MCAs,  ptgs  and 
cattle  were  smuggled  across  the  border to  Northern 
Ireland to avmd the MCA payable on Import, and then 
legally exported back to Ireland, thus qualifying for the 
MCA payment (granted on exports). In some cases the 
ammals  repeated  the  JOurney  several  times.  Thts 
RepercussiOns of the agnmonetary system 
'carousel'  arrangement  was  stopped  when  improved 
controls  were  mtroduced,  but  also  because  the 
smugghng  became  no  longer  worthwhile  as  the 
monetary  gaps  between  the  Umted  Kmgdom  and 
Ireland  dimmished.  Subsequently,  m  1986,  sterhng 
deprectated  substantially,  leading  to  a large  negative 
gap, with Significant disparities m MCAs between the 
two countries. Cattle reared m Northern Ireland were 
then  smuggled across  the  border to avoid paymg the 
MCA on import,  were slaughtered m Ireland and the 
meat  then  exported  legally  to  the  Umted  Kmgdom 
mamland where it attracted a large MCA payment. TJie 
Illegal trade was estlmated
2 to have netted m excess of 
UKL  100  (ECU 150-160)  per  head  of cattle,  paid 
from  the  Commumty  budget  In  order  to  stop  this 
trade, special task forces were established m 1986 by 
the Umted Kmgdom and Insh customs authontles to 
pollee  the  border  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  the 
smugghng. 
J - Complexity of the agrimonetary system 
1.  As  the  Commission  itself  has  recognized, 
3  the 
system  has  become  extraordmarily  complex  and  the 
changes  made  have  gradually  depnved  It  of  any 
Table 7-Frauds and megularities mvolvmg MCAs m intra-Commumty trade, 






























1981  1982 
0  1 
0  1 
4  3 
0  0 
5  4 
0  0 
'  0  0 
0  0 
1  0 
12  8 
22  17 
(Number of  cases) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  Total 
1  0  '  2  1  0  7 
0  0  0  2  1  7 
3  3  10  2  0  35 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  3  1  3  0  19 
1  0  0  0  0  1 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  2  2  0  1  15 
3  8  9  1  0  58 
9  16  24  9  2  142 
Source: Special report No 1189 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system accompamed by the rephes 
of the Comffilssion, OJ C 128, 24 5 1989, p.  1. 
I  OJ L 36,  10 2 1972 
2  'External trade measures for agncultural produce', report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, UK National Audit Office, 22 
January  1988, p  12 
3  'Report  on  the  agnmonetary  system',  COM(87)  64  final, 
24 2 1987, p  25 
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transparency.  The first  aspect  may  be  considered  at 
different levels,  namely, the conceptual complexity of 
the roles for calculating MCAs and the complexity of 
the  day-to-day  functioning  of  the  system  with  its 
multiplicity of rates and  scales of customs duties and 
procedural and control requirements. 
2.  Similarly complicated are the rules for calculating 
the MCAs and for dismantling them, which were laid 
down by  the June  1987  agreement,  and considerable 
experience  and  dedication  is  needed  to  understand 
them. An indication of  the importance of succeeding in 
understanding  them  is  the  number  of organizations, 
governmental departments, institutions  with commer-
cial  responsibilities  and  commercial  undertakings 
which  have  their  own  computer  programmes  for 
'momtoring'  the  Commission's  official  calculations, 
particularly the weekly changes in the rates of variable 
MCAs. 
3. Conceptually, the system has become more complex 
as it has developed and the introduction of the switch-
over mechanism,  with  the  correcting  factor  and  the 
green ecu,  has  meant that  very few  people,  with  the 
exception  of specialists  in  the  Commission,  in  the 
administrations  of  the  Member  States  and  in  the 
private sector, understand it entirely. 
4.  The complexity of the  agrimonetary  system  is  so 
great that fresh problems to be resolved are frequently 
discovered.  This  occurred  after  the  reform  of  the 
structural  Funds,  which  also  affected  the  EAGGF-
Guidance Section. 
5.  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85,  based  on 
Article  43  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  provides  for  the 
application of the agrimonetary system to all amounts 
fixed  in  the  measures  concerning  the  common 
agricultural policy. Consequently, the green rate fixed 
by the Council must be applied to the amounts relating 
to the EAGGF-Guidance Section. 
Similarly, Article 22 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4253/88,  based  on  Article  130e  of the  EEC  Treaty, 
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excludes from the scope of the agrimonetary system all 
amounts  relating  to  the  EAGGF  Guidance  Section 
fixed by the Commission. 
6.  In  this  way,  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Commission Regulation laying down the rules for use 
of  the  ecu  in  budgetary  implementation  of  the 
structural  Funds (OJ L  170,  3.7.1990,  p.  36)  (Regul-
ation (EEC)  No  1866/90), the amounts relating to  the 
EAGGF-Guidance Section are dealt with as follows: 
(i)  The  amounts  fixed  by  the  Commission  are 
excluded  from  the  agrimonetary  system.  These 
amounts  are  fixed  in  real  ecus  and  are  converted 
using the  'accounting rate'; 
(ii)  The amounts fixed by the Council remain subject 
to  the  agnmonetary  system.  They are  fixed  in  green 
ecu and are converted using the  'green rate'. 
7.  One  of the  consequences  of this  situation  is  that 
decisions to  grant Commission aid, expressed in ecus, 
remain  subject  to  the  maximum  limits  fixed  by  the 
Counc11 in green ecu. Expenditure incurred in national 
currency must be converted at the green rate in order to 
verify compliance with the maximum limits laid down 
by the Council, and  this  is  already being done at the 
present  time.  Once  this  condition  is  satisfied,  the 
expenditure in  national  currency is  then  converted at 
the accounting rate for payment m ecus. 
This creates great administrative complexity owing to 
the use of two conversion rates: 
(i)  the accounting rate, for aid and payments; and 
(ii)  The  agricultural  conversion rate,  to  verify  com-
pliance with the maximum grant limits. 
In  order  to  avmd  this  complexity,  it  is  therefore 
necessary  for  the  amounts  relating  to  the  EAGGF-
Guidance Section  fixed  by  the Council  in  green  ecu 
also to be converted into accounting ecu, the correcting 
factor being applied to them. D1smandement of MCAs- The  ·gendemen's agreement'  of March  1979 
XIII - Dismantlement of MCAs -··, 
The 'gentlemen's agreement' of 
March 1979 
1.  On various occasions, the Commission has  submit-
ted proposals to the Council defining clear and simple 
criteria for the fixing of green rates, on the basis that 
the  MCAs  should  be  dismantled  in  accordance  with 
more or less mathematical rules. 
(a)  The  first  proposal  was  submitted  in  1976.
1  It 
provided for  adjustment  of the  green rates  whenever 
the applied monetary gap passed a specified threshold. 
The adjustment niust be made every six months for the 
Member States with negative MCAs and, in principle, 
at the beginning of each marketing year for Member 
States  with  positive  MCAs;  this  applied  to  both 
categories  of MCAs,  depending  on  the trends  of the 
rates  of exchange  recorded  in  the  market  during  a 
reference period. This period was  18  months  starting, 
as  a rule;  two years before the entry into  force of the 
new  green  rate.  Nevertheless,  that  mathematical 
method  was  no( to  provide  a  basis  for  exceeding  a 
maximum  percentage  which  differed  as  between 
Member  States  with  positive  MCAs  and  Member 
States with negative MCAs: it was to be lower for the 
former than for the latter. 
(b)  The second proposal, made  in  1977, provided for 
dismantlement  in  seven  equal  steps  of  the. MCAs 
existing at that time;  newly created MCAs were to  be 
dismantled  at  each  of the  stages.  In  any  event,  the 
adjustment of the green rates was not to exceed 5% per 
year;  any  portion remaining  was  to  be dismantled  at 
the time of the following adjustment. 
(c)  A third proposal, made in 1979,
2 in the context of 
establishment of the EMS, provided that every time the 
average rates were changed the Council should decide 
what was to  happen to the new MCAs. If the Council 
made  no  decision,  then  an  automatic  system  would 
come into operation under which the new MCAs were 
to be  dismantled in  two equal  stages,  taking effect at 
the  beginning  of the  first  and  the  second  marketing 
years following the introduction of the MCAs. 
The  old  MCAs  existing  at  the  beginning  of  the 
definitive EMS phase were to  be  dismantled within a 
period of two years. 
Those rules  were, however, limited to Member States 
with stable currencies. 
(d)  A fourth  proposal,  made  in  1983,
3
,  distinguished 
between old  and new MCAs.  Old MCAs were  to  be 
I  OJ c 274,  19.11  1976, p.  3. 
2  OJ C 50, 24.2 1979, p.  15. 
3  OJ C 299,5.111983, p.  7. 
dismantled in two equal stages at the beginning of the 
two  marketing years following the entry  into force of 
the proposed system; new MCAs were to be eliminated 
m three stages, the first coming immediately after the 
average rates  were changed, and the other two at the 
start of 'the following marketing years. 
2.  The reason for which all these proposals failed was 
the  same  in  all  cases:  the  political  impossibility  of 
achieving  agreement  for  the  principle  of automatic 
adjustment of the level of prices in national currency, 
even where this process would have taken place some 
time after the monetary event. 
In any case, experience  with the MCA system meant 
that,  year after year, the need became more urgent to 
eliminate  these  amounts,  whose  negative  effects 
became  more  evident  as  the  monetary  gaps  became 
wider. Since that time, efforts have been made to agree 
a compromise between the  wish for rapid dismantle-
ment and the fear of an  uncontrolled effect on prices. 
From the legal point of view, no solution has yet been 
arrived  at.  Nevertheless,  a  political  agreement  was 
reached  between  most  of the  Member  States  which 
has, since then, guided the political decisions taken in 
this area. 
This agreement was reached in 1979 in Luxembourg in 
the form  of a  'gentlemen's agreement', based on the 
view that the creation of new MCAs had to be avoided 
and that, accordingly, the Council should meet to study 
the  impact  of a  change  in  the  average  rates  for  the 
functioning  of the  CAP  and  to  adopt  the  necessary 
measures. 
In the case of the new MCAs which came into being, 
despite everything, the Council had to adjust the green 
rates in order to eliminate them within the framework 
of the  annual  price-fixing  decisiOn.  In  doing  so,  the 
Council  had to  take  particular account of the  market 
situation, without thereby bringing about an automatic 
increase  in  prices  in  units  of account,  and  develop-
ments concerning agricultural income. 
The green rates had to  be  adjusted in order to reduce 
the  new  MCAs  in  two  stages,  taking  effect  at  the 
beginning  of the  first  and  second  marketing  years 
following  the decision  on  agricultural  prices adopted 
after the introduction of those amounts. 
However, it was necessary that those reductions should 
not amount either to a drop or to an increase in prices 
in  national  currency, which  might lead  to  difficulties 
for the economy of the Member State in question, but 
this rule did not exclude a rapid reduction designed to 
avmd the creation of permanent MCAs. 
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During the two stages mentioned above, the preferred 
course of action would be to  increase common prices 
expressed  in  ecus  before  dismantling  the  positive 
MCAs. 
The strategy was even less clearly defined with regard 
to  existing  MCAs;  the  Member  States  which  were 
parties to  the agreement recorded their firm  intention 
progressively to reduce the existing MCAs in order to 
restore the unity of common agricultural prices, taking 
due  account of the  prices policy,  and also envisaging 
the possibility that this progressive reduction might be 
accelerated  on  the  initiative  of the  Member State in 
question. 
3.  Although it is true that the question of dismantling 
MCAs  arose  each  year  when  price  fixing  and 
associated measures in  agriculture  were  discussed,  in 
1968 several factors converged which accentuated the 
scope  of the problem.  Under Article  6(1)  and  (4)  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85,  the  switch-over 
mechanism  was  limited  to  the  expiry  of the  1986/ 
1987  marketing  year  and  the  Council  was  therefore 
required to take a decision on the future system before 
the  start of the  1987/88  milk  marketing  year  on  the 
basis  of  the  Commission  report.  Moreover,  under 
Article  5(1)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  855/84,  the 
German and Dutch positive MCAs which .had been in 
existence since  1 January  1985  were to be eliminated 
by the beginning of the 1987/88 marketing year by an 
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adjustment to  the green rates, which was not possible 
without  infringing  the  'gentlemen's  agreement'  of 
March  1979,  under  which  the  dismantlement  of 
positive MCAs should not lead to a reduction in prices. 
In  the  report  which  it  submitted  to  the  Council  in 
1987,
1  the  Commission  expressed  the  view  that  the 
switch-over  mechanism  had  operated  correctly  from 
the technical point of view; it went on  to say that the 
system could not be maintained in that form and had to 
be  supplemented  by  means  of an  almost  automatic 
system for  dismantling  MCAs.  It had  also  submitted 
proposals  for  green  rates  designed  to  reduce  the 
monetary  gaps  and,  above  all,  to  eliminate  positive 
MCAs  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands.  It  had  also 
expressed its intention to subject to the MCA system a 
number of products such as olive oil and a number of 
preserves  and jams,  at  the  same  time  increasing  the 
neutral margin to 10 points. Within that framework, the 
Commission would have had to  decide,  by  means of 
the management committee procedure, on  the neutral 
margin to be applied to each sector. 
4.  The decisions finally adopted by the Council on 30 
June  1987  (Regulation  (EEC)  No  1889/87  and 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1890/87  of  2  July  1987) 
observe the guidelines proposed by  the Commission, 
although the fact remains that the implementation and 
details thereof depart considerably from the proposals. 
Those decisions are dealt with in  Chapter XIV. 
1  COM(87) 64 final, 24.2.1987. XIV - Dismantlement of MCAs -
Council Decisions of 30 June 1987 
Those decisions may be summarized as  follows:
1
' 
A - Future system 
1.  The present agrimonetary system is maintained (the 
green ecu' or 'switch-over' system). As a result, every 
future readjustment of the monetary parities within the 
EMS  can  only  give  rise  to  the  creation  of negative 
MCAs, since positive MCAs deriving from revaluation 
of the  strongest currency are automatically converted 
into negative MCAs for the other Member States. 
2.  The  system  is  to  be  reshaped  as  regards  the 
dismantlement  of  negative  MCAs  resulting  from 
application  of the  switch-over mechanism,  known as 
'artificial'  or  'transferred'  MCAs.  These  negative 
MCAs will be dismantled in  three  stages  at the start 
of the  three  marketing  years following  the  monetary 
realignment, i.e.: 
(a)  25%  at the start of the following marketing year. 
The increase in  prices resulting from  this  dismantle-
ment will, however, be neutralized by a corresponding 
fall  in  prices  in  ecus.  Nevertheless,  Member  States 
whose  currency  would  be  revalued  and  for  which 
prices in national currency would be affected by  this 
fall,  will  be entitled  to  allocate  compensatory  social 
aid not linked to production, chargeable to the national 
budget; 
(b) 50% of the remamder at the start of the marketing 
year  after  the  monetary  realignment,  without  this 
operation  being  accompanied  by  any  parallel  fall  in 
prices; 
(c)  the  remainder  at  the  start  of the third marketing 
year after 'the monetary realignment, likewise without 
any reduction of prices. 
3.  As  far  as  negative  MCAs  are  concerned,  the  so-
called  'traditional'  or  'natural'  MCAs,  i.e.  those 
resulting  from  the  devaluation  of  a  currency,  will 
also be dismantled in three stages as  follows: 
(a)  a maximum of 30% at the  time of the  monetary 
realignment; 
(b) dismantlement of the remainder in two equal stages 
at the start of the  two marketing years following the 
monetary adjustment. 
1  See  the  document entitled  Newsflash  - Green  Europe,  No  41, 
1987,  'Farm  prices  1987/88  Council  deciswns',  paragraph  3.2, 
p.  3. 
Dismantlement of MCAs- Council Decisions of 30 June 1987 
4.  These adjustments will  be ordered by  the Commis-
sion under the management committee procedure. The 
dismantlement of the  negative applied monetary gaps 
may  not,  however,  at  any  time  exceed  the  real 
monetary  gap  existing  when  the  agricultural  conver-
sion rate is adjusted. 
The increase in  prices resulting from the first stage of 
dismantlement of the  artificial MCAs (25%) must be 
offset, as  indicated earlier, by  a corresponding reduc-
tion in the agricultural prices fixed in ecus. 
For that purpose: 
(a)  a  coefficient  will  be  fixed,  appropriately  appor-
tioned at the stage envisaged for dismantlement, which 
reflects the  relationship between the new  and  the old 
correcting factors; 
(b)  prices  fixed  under  the  CAP  are  divided  by  that 
coefficient. The other amounts fixed in ecus under the 
same policy  will  be  adjusted correspondingly,  as  the 
case arises. 
5., The  future  agrimonetary  system  will  be reviewed 
before 1 July  1988 in  the light of a joint report of the 
Minsters for Finance and the Ministers for Agriculture 
(in  fact,  this  did  not  occur  - see  Chapter  XVI; 
paragraph 6). 
B - Dismantlement of the existing MCAs 
The agrimonetary decisions for the 1987/88 marketing 
year and their impact on prices are set out in detail in 
Annex XIII. The decisions applicable after the 1988/89 
marketing year, already decided upon in the context of 
the 1987/88 price package, are set out in Annex XIV. 
Those decisions may be summarized as  follows: 
1. Positive MCAs 
(a)  Immediate dismantlement by 15 points, as follows: 
1 point by the switch-over mechanism (conversion into 
negative  MCAs  for  the  other  Member States),  with 
effect from the start of the marketing years or from  1 
July where the  year has  already commenced (without 
any  effect on  the  prices in  Germany  and  the  Nether-
lands); 
0.5 points with effect from 1 July 1987, by means of an 
increase in the neutral margin (from 1 to 1.5 points) for 
Germany (no effect on prices) and with revaluation of 
the  green  Dutch  guilder  for  the  Netherlands  (price 
reduction of 0.5%). 
(b) Dismantlement by  1 point at the start of the 1988/ 
89  marketing  year,  with  revaluation  of  the  green 
currencies involved (German mark and Dutch guilder), 
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bringing about a price reduction of 1%.  In  Germany, 
this price reduction will be offset by means of national 
aid equivalent to 2 VAT points which will disappear at 
the end of 1988, the aid in question not being linked to 
production. 
(c)  Elimination  of the  remainder  (which  should  be 
minimal and affect a very limited number of products) 
at the beginning of the 1989/90 marketing year. 
2.  Negative MCAs 
(a) Dismantlement of the existing negative MCAs (in 
accordance  with  the  procedures  set  out  in  Annexes 
XIII and XIV). 
(b) Additional dismantlement of part (0.5 pomts) of the 
'artificial' MCAs created following the switch-over of 
1 point, only for France, Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and Spain. 
(c) As regards the remaining negative MCAs ('stock'), 
the Council took no decision. This means that they will 
be  able  to  be  dismantled  in  accordance  with  the 
ordinary procedures (i.e.  in  general, by devaluation of 
the  green  currencies  when  the  decision  on  prices  is 
adopted).
1 
C - Other decisions on MCAs 
1.  Introduction of MCAs and  differential  amounts  in 
new sectors 
(a) Olive oil and certain processed products 
The Commission will apply the MCA system from  17 
August  1987  to  olive  oil,  certain  preserved  fruits, 
prepared  meats  and  certain  products  covered  by 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3033/80  (non-Annex  II  pro-
ducts);  (in  fact,  MCAs  in  the  olive-oil  sector  were 
introduced with effect from 7 September 1987 -see 
Chapter X,  Section B - 5(j). 
(b) Peas, field beans and sweet lupins 
Introduction in  this  sector of a  system of differential 
amounts, similar to that applied to oilseeds, but with a 
neutral margin of 5 points. 
2.  Method of calculating MCAs 
(a) Basic price 
There is  a possibility that the  Commission (manage-
ment  committee  procedure)  may  base  the  overall 
1  The dismantling of these negalive MCAs must be earned out on a 
proposal by the CommiSSIOn  accordmg to the economic slluatwn 
m the Member States, takmg mto account, in the hght of previOus 
expenence, the need not to  disturb the balance in  the market and 
not  to  aggravate  mflauon  m  the  Member  States  affected 
('gentlemen's agreement' of March  1979). 
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calculation of MCAs on the market price in the cereals 
and  milk  sector,  within  the  limits  of a  reduction  in 
relation  to  intervention  prices  of  7.5%  and  5%, 
respectively;  reduction  of 20%  (instead of the  earlier 
15%) of the price in the beef and veal sector; reduction 
of 7%  in  relation  to  the  target price for  the  oilseeds 
sector. 
(b) Pigmeat 
In  the  case  of pigmeat,  the  Commission  adjusts  the 
green  rates,  in  accordance  with  the  management 
committee  procedure,  in  order to  avoid  the  creation 
of new MCAs. In any event, this adjustment must not 
have  the  effect  m  the  Member  State  in  question  of 
making  the  difference  between  the  monetary  gap 
applicable to  the pigmeat sector, on the one hand, and 
the  monetary  gap  applicable to  the  cereals sector,  on 
the  other,  exceed  8  points.  This  Council  decision 
represents  a  further  endeavour  to  maintain  the 
competitiveness of those  pigmeat producers  who  use 
a  higher  proportion of cereals  in  the  feed  ration  for 
pigs (see Chapter XV). 
(c) Neutral margin 
Extension of the existing maximum neutral margin of 
5 points for  wine to  the poultrymeat sector (5  points) 
and fixing of a neutral margin of 10 points for olive oil. 
(d) Monetary coefficients 
For products  subject  to  MCAs, the  monetary  coeffi-
cient will be derived from the  applied  monetary gap. 
For  eggs  and  poultry,  the  basis  used  will  be  the 
enlarged neutral margin. 
(e) Non-Annex II products 
Commission  preparedness  to  raise  the  mm1mum 
threshold for applying MCAs from ECU  1/100 kg  to 
ECU 2 or 3/100 kg (see Chapter X,  Section B-5(i). 
D - System for the automatic dismantlement 
of negative MCAs 
1.  Provisions 
The  provisions  governing  the  dismantlement  of 
negative  MCAs  are  set out  in  Article  6(2),  (3),  (4), 
(5), (6) of Regulation (EEC) No 1677/85, as  amended 
by Regulation (EEC) No  1889/87. 
Pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 6(2) of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85,  the  agricultural 
conversion rates  are  to  be adjusted  in  such a way  as 
to  eliminate  any  newly  created  monetary  gaps.  The 
first  subparagraph  of Article  6(2)  of that  regulation defines  artificial  or  transferred  MCAs  as  those 
resulting  from  the  application  of  the  correcting 
factor;  this implies that the monetary gap in question 
is  an  artificial real monetary gap. 
In  order  to  ensure  a  uniform  approach  to  the 
dismantlement  of  transferred  MCAs,  on  the  one 
hand, and natural MCAs, on the other,  it  is  necessary 
to apply the automatic dismantling rules to the newly 
created real monetary gaps. 
The system for the adjustment of green rates extends 
also to the sectors not subject to MCAs. This results in 
uniform treatment for  all  sectors and all the  Member 
States, regardless of the level of the neutral margins. 
2.  Calculations 
(a)  The  negative  artificial  or transferred  MCAs  are 
those resulting from a change to the green central rate 
(GCR)  for  currencies  in  the  EMS  or  to  the  green 
market exchange rate (GMR) for floating currencies in 
the  form  of  an  mcrease  in  the  correcting  factor, 
calculated in accordance with the following: 
Formula for EMS currencies: 
NTRMG =  100  X  (NCR X  (~~F  - OCF)) 
where  NTRMG: new transferred real monetary gap 
NCR: new central rate GR: green rate (existing) 
NCF:  new correcting factor 
OCF: old correcting factor 
Formula for floating currencies: 
NTRMG = 100 x r-MR x (~iF  - OCF)) 
where NMR: new market exchange rate. 
(b) The additional or natural negative MCAs are those 
which result from  the  devaluation of a currency as  a 
consequ(!nce  of  a  monetary  realignment  and  are 
equivalent to the difference between the total  volume 
of the new negative real monetary gaps and the volume 
of the  transferred  real  monetary  gaps,  calculated  in 
accordance with the following formula: 
NNRMG =  NTRMG - NtRMG 
where  NNRMG: new natural real monetary gap 
NTRMG: new total real monetary gap 
NtRMG: new transferred real monetary gap 
For currencies in the EMS, the NTRMG is equal to the 
difference between the real monetary gap ruling on the 
eve  of  the  realignment  (RMGO)  and  the  gap 
immediately thereafter (RMG 1). 
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Formula: 
.NTRMG =  RMG 1 - RMG 0 
For floating currencies, account must be taken of three 
factors  in determining the level of the MCAs created 
after the last realignment, namely: 
(i)  changes affecting the currency in question during 
the period between two realignments;  · 
(ii)  the  dismantlement  camed ·out during  the  period 
between the two realignments; 
(iii)  the  impact  of the  realignment  on  the  monetary 
gaps. 
The last factor is taken into account by calculating, for 
floating currencies, the real monetary gap immediately 
after the reahgnment on the basis of the quotations for 
the  currencies  in  question  during  the  two  days 
(Monday and Tuesday) following the realignment. 
Formula: 
NTRMG =  RMG 1 - DE - RMG-1 
where  RMG 1:  real monetary gap recorded imme-
diately after the realignment in ques-
tion, before the dismantlement 
RMG-1:  real monetary gap established after 
the previous realignment 
DE:  dismantlement effected, in points 
In  any  case,  this  formula  does  not  apply  where  a 
specified  curre~cy  with  negative  MCAs  has  been 
revalued in the period prior to the realignment. In fact, 
the revaluation occurring in that period may be equal 
or superior to the MCAs created, above all the MCAs 
transferred by  the  realignment.  In any  such case,  the 
decrease  in. the  negative  monetary  gap  occurring 
during  that  period  as  a  result  of revaluation  of the 
exchange rate is not taken into account in  calculating 
the newly created monetary gap. In any such case, the 
new  monetary  gap  must be  calculated  by  the  same 
procedure as  that used for EMS 'currencies. 
3.  Rate of dismantlement 
The new MCAs must be dismantled as follows: 
(i)  up  to  30%  of the  new  natural real  monetary  gap 
immediately after the realignment of parities; 
(ii)  50%  of the  remainder  of the  new  natural  real 
monetary  gap,  plus  25%  of the  new  transferred real 
monetary gap,  at  the  start of the  first marketing year 
following the realignment of parities; 
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(iii)  the remainder of the  new  natural  real  monetary 
gap, plus 37.5% of the transferred real monetary gap, 
at the start of the second marketing year following the 
realignment of parities; 
(iv)  the remainder (namely, 37.5%) of the transferred 
real  monetary  gap  at  the  start of the  third  marketing 
year following the realignment of parities. 
4.  First phase of dismantlement 
The first phase of dismantlement entails a reduction of 
30%, as a maximum, of the new natural real monetary 
gap. 
It is  necessary, first,  to calculate the dismantlement in 
points  and then  to  determine  the  total  real  monetary 
gap  after  dismantlement  in  accordance  with  the 
following formula: 
NRMG2 =  RMG 1 - (NNRMG x D%) 
where D%  is the percentage of the real monetary gap 
which is to be dismantled. 
On the basis of the new total for the real gap, the new 
green  rate  (NGRl)  is  calculated  using  the  usual 
formulas: 
NGRl = 100 x ( 100 _E~MG2 )  EMS currencies: 
NGRl = 100 x ( 100 ~~~G2 )  floating currencies: 
5.  Second phase of dismantlement 
In the second stage, there must be dismantled: 
(a)  50%  of the  remainder  of the  undismantled  new 
natural real monetary gap; 
(b) 25%  of the new transferred real monetary gap. 
The first dismantlement of the 'transferred' MCAs (i.e. 
the dismantlement of 25%  of them,  with effect from 
the  start  of the  first  marketing  year  following  the 
realignment  of parities)  must  be  accompanied  by  a 
reduction in  agricultural prices fixed in ecus, so  as  to 
neutralize  any  increase  in  the  prices  in  national 
currency  deriving  from  changed  agncultural  conver-
sion rates. 
For  that  purpose,  a  coefficient  is  determined  which 
represents 25% of the difference· between the new and 
the old correcting factors.  Thereafter, the  agricultural 
prices in  ecus must be divided by  that coefficient. 
NB:  The calculations and  the coefficient are rounded 
to eight decimal places. 
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(c)  The  real  monetary  gap  applicable  after  the 
dismantlement  will  then  be  calculated  using  the 
following formula: 
NRMG3  = NRMG2  - (NnRMG  x 0.35)  - (NtRMG 
X 0.25). 
Then the NRMG3 will be incorporated in the formulas 
set out in the foregoing section for calculation of the 
new green rates. 
6.  Third phase of dismantlement 
During  the  third  phase  of dismantlement,  both  the 
remainder of the new  natural  real  monetary  gap and 
37% of the new transferred real monetary gap must be 
eliminated.  Thus,  the  real  monetary  gap  applicable 
after the dismantlement and the new green rate will be 
calculated using the following formula: 
NRMG4 =  NRMG3 - (NnRMG x 0.35) - (NtRMG x 
0.375) 
The new green rate will be calculated by incorporating 
the NRMG4 in the formula given in  paragraph 4. 
7.  Fourth phase of dismantlement 
In the final phase, the remainder of the new transferred 
real monetary gap has to be dismantled so that the real 
monetary  gap applicable  after  such dismantlement  is 
equal  to  the  level  in  force  immediately  after  the 
realignment  of parities  existing  at  the  start  of the 
dismantlement process, using the following formula: 
NRMG5 = NRMG4 - NRMGts = RMGO 
where NRMGts is the remainder of the new transferred 
real monetary gap after dismantlement. 
8.  Possible modifications 
The scheme for  automatic  dismantlement just descri-
bed  may  be  changed  by  new  events  of a  monetary 
nature, by  decisions of the Council on dismantlement 
of the  existing  MCAs  or  as  a  result  of accelerated 
dismantlement of the new MCAs. 
If,  as  a  result  of  a  monetary  development,  a  new 
monetary realignment were to be carried out during the 
period for automatic dismantlement of the MCAs, the 
dismantlement deriving from the automatic scheme for 
MCAs  created by  the  new  realignmeAt  would  merge 
with the dismantlement envisaged for the phases of the 
first automatic dismantlement. 
If decisions  are  adopted  to  dismantle  the  existing 
MCAs  ('stock')  with  effect  from  the  start  of  the marketing year, the new green rates will be fixed on the 
basis of the dismantlement decided on by the Council, 
with the addition  of the  dismantlement envisaged for 
the  marketing  year  in  question  within  the  automatic 
system. 
Such decisions  as  may be adopted  by  the Council  in 
order  to  accelerate  automatic  dismantlement  for  a 
given  marketing  year,  by  increasing  the  number  of 
points to  be dismantled, will not affect the  automatic 
dismantlement  envisaged  for  the  subsequent  phases 
provided that the new  monetary  gaps covered by  the 
automatic  dismantlement  are  not  yet  completely 
dismantled. 
Dismantlement of MCAs- Council Deciswns of 30 June 1987 
9.  Entry into force of the  new  agricultural conversion 
rates 
The new green rates, decided on as part of the second, 
third and fourth phases, will come into force at the start 
of the  marketing year for the products in- question. In 
the past, for those products without a marketing year, 
the date of entry into force of the new green rates was 
fixed as the date of entry into force of the new prices 
fixed for  those products. The same procedure will be 
followed  for  the  green  rates  resulting  from  the 
automatic  dismantlement  of  the  second,  third  and 
fourth phases. 
Should  the  Council  decide  to  prolong  certain 
marketing  periods,  the  entry  into  force  of the  new 
agricultural conversion rates will also be deferred. 
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XV - Dismantlement of MCAs in the 
pigmeat sector 
A - Principles 
A  new  provision  (Article  6(a))  was  inserted  in 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85,  which  has  applied 
since 1 July 1987 and provides that, as from that date, 
in principle, it will not be permissible to introduce any 
new MCA in that sector. For that purpose, it would be 
necessary to adjust the conversion rate whenever new 
MCAs  were  introduced  or  existing  MCAs  were 
increased.  The  Commission  undertakes  the  adjust-
ment in  accordance with the  management committee 
procedure. 
However, such adjustments to the green rate may not 
have the effect,  in the Member State in  question,  of 
making the difference between the MCA applicable to 
the  pigmeat  sector,  on the  one  hand,  and  the MCA 
applicable to the cereals sector, on the other, exceed 8 
points. 
B - Adjustment of the green rates 
The  MCAs,  expressed  in  national  currency,  are 
calculated using the following formula: 
MCA =  CP x GR x AMG 
where  CP: 
GR: 
AMG: 
is the common price, 
green rate 
applied monetary gap (See Chapter X, 
Section B). 
In  this  formula,  GR  and  AMG  are  interdependent 
variables - m other words, by defimt10n, a change in 
one factor will modify the other. 
This means that, if the stable result is  maintained in 
this  formula  (the  MCA),  it  is  mathematically 
impossible to calculate from it the green rate and the 
applied monetary gap corresponding to the unchanged 
MCA. 
For this reason,  the factor treated as  stable is  not the 
MCA expressed in national  currency but the applied 
monetary gap. 
Where  the  real  monetary  gap  exceeds  the  neutral 
margin  by  more  than  0.5  points  (non-accumulation 
rule),  the  calculation  of the  new green  rate  must be 
based on the real monetary gap, since a change to the 
real gap would directly entail a corresponding change 






where ORMG is the old real monetary gap which is to 
be maintained unchanged. 
However, where: 
(i)  it  is  necessary,  m  principle,  to  introduce  new 
MCAs (in other words, where the old real gap was less 
than the neutral margm by up to 0.5 points); or 
(ii)  the  negative  MCAs  are  converted  into  positive 
MCAs or,  conversely, the positive MCAs are conver-
ted into negative MCAs, 
the formula for calculating the NGR is, then as follows: 
GCR 
NGR =  (100 x NM) 
where NM: neutral margin 
Example: 
In  the  reference  period  between  19  and  25  August 
1987,  the  drachma  was  devalued  so  that  the  real 
monetary gap increased from -47.798 (i.e.  gap taken 
into consideration for the last fixing of the MCAs) to-
49.190. It would therefore be necessary to increase the 
MCA from -46.3 to -47.7. 
During  that  period,  the  green  market  rate  for  the 
drachma was Ecu 1 =  175.892. At the same time, the 
real market rate was:  Ecu 1 = 156.252 drachmas, and 
the correcting factor was 1.125696. 
The new green rate is equal to: 
( 
175.892  ) 
NGR =  lOO  _ (-47.798)  x  100 =DR 119.008 
whilst the green rate ruling on 1 July 1987 was Ecu 1 = 
DR 117.901. 
C - Compliance with the  8-point limit 
The  purpose  of the  limit  for  the  dismantlement  of 
MCAs in the pigmeat sector, set out in Article 6(a) of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85,  is  to  limit  any 
distortion  which  might  result  from  the  difference 
between the  prices of cereals  (factor of production), 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  prices  of pigmeat  (final 
product), on the other. This limit must be interpreted so 
as  to  ensure  that,  when  Article  6(a)  is  applied,  the 
adjustment  to  the  agricultural  conversion  rate  for pigmeat  does  not  increase  the  difference  existing 
between  the  AMG  for  cereals  and  the  AMG  for 
pigmeat. 
Article  6(2)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85 
(automatic  dismantlement  of  transferred  MCAs)  is 
applicable  only  where  the  monetary  parities  are 
readjusted in  the context of the EMS. In principle, in 
s~ch a case it is  necessary, pursuant to Article 6(a), to 
dtsmantle the MCAs created for the pigmeat sector as 
a result of that monetary development. However, it is 
possible that Article 6(a) could not be applied since the 
maximum difference of 8 points between the pigmeat 
AMG  and  the  cereals  AMG  was  attained;  in  those 
circumstances, the remainder of the MCAs, left after 
the first dismantlement phase (a maximum of 30% of 
the natural MCAs with immediate effect)  would have 
to  be  applied.  This  consequence  does .not  raise  any 
prob_lem  in  practice.  In fact,  either the  impact of the 
readjustment of parities or that of automatic dismant-
lement  of the  monetary  gaps  for  the  pigmeat  and 
cereals sectors is the same or else the overstepping of 
the  8-point .limit  resulting  from  the  realignment  of 
parities would be reduced by the automatic dismantle-
ment. 
It must  be  emphasized that automatic  dismantlement 
does not conflict with the provisions of Articles 6 and 
6(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1677/85. The purpose of 
DJsmantlement of MCAs m the ptgmeat sector 
Article  6(a)  is  to  avoid  the  creation  of new  MCAs 
without compromising compliance with the  maximu~ 
difference  of 8-points.  Once  the  MCAs  are  created, 
A~ic_le  6  applies  with  a  view  to  eliminating  the 
extstmg MCAs; consequentl'y, the 8-point limit comes 
into play. 
Tlle  revolutionary  aspect  of  this  system  is  the 
possibility of frequent changes to the green rate. This 
approach is intended to resolve, in a limited sector, the 
problem raised  by  one  of the  factors  which,  to  date, 
have  justified  the · fixing  of  MCAs:  the  need  for 
stability  of guaranteed  prices  during  the  marketing 
year.  However,  a  special  situation  prevails  in  the 
pigmeat  sector,  where  the  institutional  prices  have 
hardly any  impact on the market price. 
NB:  In February  1990,  the  Commission submitted  a 
proposal (COM(90) 73 final  of 20 February  1990) for 
amendment of the current agrilflonetary rules (Article 
6(2)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85)  to  limit  the 
possibilities  of adjusting  the  agricultural  conversion 
rate for pigmeat,  so  as  to reduce the risk of frequent 
and  economically  unjustified  changes in  MCAs.  The 
proposal  was  finally  adopted  by  the  Council  in  July 
1990  (Regulation  (EEC)  No  2205/90,  OJ  L  201, 
31.7.1990,  p.  9)  which  rejected  the  amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament (PE 141.422). 
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XVI - Dismantlement of MCAs -
Council Decisions of 19 July 1988 
At its meeting held on 18 and 19 July 1988, the Council 
reached a formal agreement on institutional agricultural 
prices and on certain related measures applicable during 
the  1988/89 marketing year.  That agreement envisages 
the following agrimonetary measures: 
1 
1.  The  Council  and  the  Commission  declared  their 
intention to dismantle existing real negative monetary 
gaps for those currencies which comply with the rules 
of the EMS,  by  adjustment of the green rates in four 
stages by 1992. 
As  regards  the  other  currencies  with  real  monetary 
gaps  which  are  not  the  subject  of  automatic 
dismantlement arrangements, the Council also  agreed 
on the need to  provide for appropriate dismantlement 
measures. 
2.  The first  stage of dismantlement of approximately 
25% was undertaken on 1 January 1989 in the manner 
set out below: 
(a)  1 point for Denmark, 
1 point for sheepmeat in Spain, 
1.5 points for France, 
1.55 points for Ireland, 
2.5  points for  Italy (except for  sheepmeat, for which 
the  green  rate  is  aligned  with  that  applicable  to  the 
other sectors), 
3.2 points for the United Kingdom, 
all  gaps for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic  Union 
(BLEU). 
However, as regards beef and veal, the decisions on green 
rates  will  be adopted when  the reform of the common 
market organization in that sector is finally approved. 
1  See the  document entitled Newsflash  - Green  Europe,  No 44, 
1988,  'Farm  pnces',  1988/89  and  related  measures-Council 
decisions', paragraph 2.2,  p.  3. 
60 
(b)  For  Portugal,  the  dismantlement  extends  to  all 
existing monetary  gaps,  with effect from  the  start of 
the  1988/89  marketing  year,  except  for  marketing 
years  which  have  already  commenced, for which the 
effective date was  25  July 1988. 
3. For Greece there is a dismantlement of 15 points for 
animal products and 20 points for crop products. The 
new  green  rates  are  applicable  at  the  start  of  the 
marketing  years,  for  each  product,  except  for 
marketing  years  which  have  already  commenced, 
where the operation started on 25  July  1988. 
4.  For the  Netherlands,  the  green  rate  for  milk  was 
aligned with that for cereals at the start of the 1988/89 
marketing year. 
5.  Under  this  agreement,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission have agreed  that  in  the  next  dismantle-
ment,  to  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the 
gentlemen's agreement, the appropriate measures will 
be adopted for Greece, taking account of its economic 
situation and its pattern of trade, in order to follow the 
direction  established in  the  decision  already  adopted 
for its benefit. 
6. The Council also formally adopted a text on 9 June 
1988  which,  in  view  of the  lack of recent monetary 
developments, placed on record that it was impossible 
to undertake, before  1 July 1988, a new review of the 
agrimonetary system envisaged by  the Heads of State 
or Government of the Twelve at its meeting on 29 and 
30 June 1987. That summit meeting had planned a new 
review 'in the light of a joint report from the Ministers 
for  Finance  and  the  Ministers  for  Agriculture'.  That 
Council decision is tantamount to a tacit renewal, sine 
die,  of the  currently  valid  agrimonetary  system  at 
present in force (green ecu or switch-over system). 
7.  The  Council's  agrimonetary  decisions  of 19  July 
1988 are set out in  more detail in  Annex XV. XVII - Dismantlement of MCAs -
Council Decisions of 22 April 
1989 
These decisions may be summarized as  follows:  ~ 
1. Federal Republic of Germany 
Dismantlement of up to 0.4 points of the real monetary 
gaps for all products of animal origin. 
No dismantlement for other products. 
2.  Netherlands 
Elimination of the real ·monetary gap for all products 
except cereals. 
3.  Denmark 
Elimination of all remaining real monetary gaps in all 
sectors. 
4. France 
Reduction of the real monetary gap of 2 points for all 
sectors, except the pigmeat sector, for  which the  gap 
(1.5  points) was  totally dismantled,  and the beef and 
veal  sector,  where  the  existing  residual  gap  (0.531 
points) was totally dismantled. 
5.  Ireland 
Reduction of the real monetary gap of 2 points for all 
sectors,  except for  beef and  veal,  where  the  existing 
real monetary gap(- 2.0 points) was totally dismantled. 
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6.  Italy 
Dismantlement of 50% of the  existing real  monetary 
gap as  at  1 January  1989. 
7.  United Kingdom 
Dismantlement of 50% of the existing real  monetary 
gap as at 24 April1989 for all products. In the beef and 
veal sector, dismantlement of the entire monetary gap 
existing as  at 24 April 1989. 
8.  Greece 
Dismantlement  of 16.5  points  of· the  real  monetary 
gaps for all products, except in  the sheepmeat sector 
and structural measures, for  which the monetary gap 
existing as at 24 April  1989 was totally dismantled. 
9.  Spain 
Dismantlement of one-third of the real monetary gaps 
in force on 1 January 1989 in the sectors of rice, olive 
oil, oilseeds, wine,  fruit and vegetables, dried fodder, 
linseed, hemp and silkworms. 
10. Portugal 
Total dismantlement of the real monetary gap existing 
as  at  24  April  1989  for  the  sectors subject to  MCAs 
(sugar and olive oil). 
11.  The Council's agrimonetary decisions of 22 April 
1989 are shown in more detail in Annex XVI. 
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XVIII - Dismantlement of MCAs - The 
Commission's plan of autumn 
1989 
A - Principles 
1.  Attainment of the  objectives of 1992  presupposes 
the  elimination  of all  controls  on  intra-Community 
trade  and,  consequently,  the  abolition  of monetary 
compensatory amounts. 
2.  This objective  cannot be attained  without parallel 
monetary integration of the agricultural sector into the 
economy as a whole. In the Commission's view, it will 
be necessary, in order to follow that course, to ensure 
that: 
(a)  between now and the end of 1992, all MCAs are 
completely dismantled; 
(b)  as from  1993, an  agrimonetary system is  adopted 
which is  based on the principles antedating 1969 (see 
Chapter I,  Section  A - 4).  In  view  of the  specific 
features of the agricultural sector and the requirements 
of the CAP, that system would be implemented after a 
transitional period of adjustment (of 18 to-36 months). 
3.  In  order  to  achieve  that  objective,  it  would  be 
necessary, in the Commission's view: 
(a)  to  abandon the switch-over mechanism; 
(b)  to change the current system of dismantling MCAs 
for the period between  1989 and 1992; 
(c)  to  introduce,  as  from  1993,  a  new  agrimonetary 
system  which  would  integrate  the  agricultural  sector 
into the remainder of the economy. 
B - Abandonment of the green ecu 
agrimonetary system 
1.  Since the introduction of the agrimonetary switch-
over  system  in  1984,  the  CAP  guidelines  have 
developed  substantially,  particularly  with  regard 
to  agricultural  prices,  guarantees  and  budgetary 
discipline. 
2. A policy of drastically reducing prices in ecus with a 
view  to  eliminating  surpluses,  such  as  that  system-
atically  followed  by  the Community  in  the  last  few 
years,  is  pointless  if it  is  hampered by  a  pattern  of 
prices in  natiOnal  currency  which runs counter to the 
efforts  made  at  Community  level  (see  Chapter  XII, 
Section  D).  Whilst  the  switch-over  system  was  a 
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technical  innovation  designed  to  provide  a  political 
solution for the problem of the fall  in farm income in 
some Member States with a strong currency which, on 
other occasions and for different reasons, supported a 
reduced Community budgetary effort for the benefit of 
the agricultural sector, It will be impossible to maintain 
it  as  from  1992.  The  reason  for  this  is  that,  by 
converting positive monetary gaps into negative gaps, 
that system constantly generates negative MCAs, and 
also an artificial potential for devaluation of the green 
rates which, particularly in Member States with weak 
currencies, goes further than monetary developments, 
thus increasing the differences in price levels between 
Member States within a (theoretically) single market. 
3.  Nevertheless,  abandonment  of  the  switch-over 
system  would  entail  the  creation  of positive  MCAs, 
giving  rise  to  a  whole  series  of political  problems 
regarding their dismantlement. The use of national aid 
to  compensate  for  the  fall  of agricultural  income  in 
Member States with strong currencies, resulting from a 
reduction in  the common prices consequential on  the 
dismantlement of positive MCAs, might be a solution 
to this problem, as it was in  the past (see Chapters VI, 
Section  D  and  XII,  Section  B).  The  greatest 
disadvantages of this  option are the risk of overcom-
pensating some farmers  and  the  temptation  for  some 
rich countries to  re-nationalize the CAP. 
C - Modification of the current system of 
dismantling MCAs during the period 
1989-92 
1.  Dismantlement of the existing MCAs and of those 
created  before  the  end of 1992  is  governed  by  two 
Council decisions  which  provide for  their systematic 
elimination (see Chapter XIV).  A brief description of 
them  is  repeated below to facilitate  better understan-
ding  of the  considerations  which  follow  concerning 
changes to  them: 
(a)  Newly created MCAs 
As  from  1  July  1987,  strict  rules  were  introduced 
concernmg  the  so-called  newly  created  MCAs.  This 
system provides, in the event of monetary realignment, 
for  automatic  dismantlement  of transferred  negative 
MCAs  (resulting  from  the  switch-over)  in  the 
following way: 
(i)  25%  at  the  start of the  marketing  year following 
monetary realignment (with a reductwn in  the prices 
fixed  in  ecus  in  order  to  neutralize  the  increase  m 
prices  in  national  currency  brought  about  by  the 
simultaneous modification of the green rates). (n)  37 5%  at  the  start  of  the  second  and  third 
marketing years followmg the monetary realignments. 
The other negative MCAs, known  as  natural  MCAs, 
created  after  a  monetary  realignment,  will  be 
dismantled 
(I)  by  a  maximum  of  30%  at  the  time  of  the 
realignment, 
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(n)  m two equal stages (35% each) at the start of the 
two marketmg years followmg the realignment. 
The procedures for dismantling the transferred MCAs 
resultmg from the switch-over and the natural MCAs 
resultmg  from  changes  to  the  exchange  rate  for  a 
currency (GCR or GMR) are shown m Table 8. 
Table 8 - ApplicatiOn of the system for automatic dismantlement of newly created MCAs up to the end of 1992 
(%) 
Dismantlement of newly created MCAs 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3  Phase 4 
Immediately  At the start of the 
after  first  second  third 
Newly created  monetary  marketing  marketmg  marketing 
MCAs  realignment  year  year  year 
Natural MCAs  30  35  35 
(maximum) 
Transferred MCAs  - 25
1  37 5  37 5 
1  Wtth reductiOn of the pnces fixed  tn ecus 
NB· The system for automatic dismantlement IS  tnggered solely by a monetary realignment. 
(b)  Existmg MCAs 
1.  In July  1988, the Council adopted the pnnciple of 
dismantlmg the stock of MCAs (essentially, the MCAs 
existmg after the monetary realignment of 12 January 
1987): 
(I)  m  four  stages  for  EMS  currencies  (the  first  two 
stages of 25% each were earned out at the start of the 
1988/89 and 1989/90 marketmg years); 
(n)  at  an  appropnate rate  for  the floatmg  currencies 
(see Chapter XVI, paragraph 1). 
For  the  stable  currencies,  the  above  automatic 
dismantlmg system results, m practice,  m small-scale 
reductiOns (1  to 1 3 pomts), the effects of which can be 
venfied without great difficulty. 
Special problems anse for the floatmg currencies smce 
the automatic dismantling system affects only MCAs 
created after  the  last  realignm~nt (12  January  1987). 
However, the creatiOn of MCAs for those currencies IS 
not linked solely to a realignment smce It  depends on 
dmly  trends  in  their  exchange  rates  Consequently, 
dunng the penod 1989 to 1992, such variable MCAs as 
are created  will  be amenable to  dismantling only by 
means  of monetary  realignment  Otherwise,  special 
decisiOns  would have  to  be  taken  for  the  dismantle-
ment of MCAs created as from  I January 1987. 
For  monetary  realignments  occumng  after  1  Apnl 
1990, the automatic dismantling system will lead to the 
total ehmmatwn of MCAs at the start of the 1992/93 
marketmg  year  Whilst  the  first  stage  of automatic 
dismantlement  comes  after  the  start  of the  1990/91 
marketmg year, the complete elimmatwn of MCAs at 
the  end  of  1992  cannot  be  hoped  for  under  the 
automatic system as It stands  Accordmgly, the system 
must  be  changed  (the  dismantling  penod  must  be 
shortened) 
If the realignments take place at the end of the penod 
1989-92, It  will be necessary to  carry out' rapid and 
substantial dismantling  operations.  The large devalu-
ations  of the  green  rates  which  would  come  about 
would, without doubt, have far-reachmg repercussiOns 
for agncultural productiOn. 
The  system for  the  automatic  dismantling  of MCAs 
envisages  automatic  reduction  of agncultural  pnces, 
nulhfymg a 25%  mcrease of them resultmg from the 
switch-over This reductiOn would have to be greater If 
the rate of dismantlement were to be changed, m order 
to comply with the obJectives of 1992 
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D - Introduction, as  from  1993, of a new 
agrimonetary system directed towards 
greater integration of the agricultural 
sector into the remainder of the 
economy 
1.  MCAs reflect the difference in price levels between 
the Member States. The problem of MCAs is in fact a 
problem  of prices  reflected  in  the  existence  of  a 
multitude  of green  rates  which  differ  according  to 
product and to  country.  This price problem in tum is 
the result, in the agricultural sector, of the differences 
in the economies of the Member States, reflected by 
the existence of weak currencies and strong currencies. 
How can harmony be restored at Community level? 
2.  The simplest solution would of course be to achieve 
economic and monetary union. If stable exchange rates 
were fixed there would be no  need for specific green 
rates.  Community  farmers  would  benefit  from  fair 
prices and, what is of fundamental importance, MCAs 
would be unnecessary. Unfortunately, it is pointless to 
dream  of any  political  and  economic  consensus  for 
such  a  union  in  the  near  future.  The  European 
Commission  is  thus  faced  with  the  titanic  task  of 
dismantling  the MCAs in a situation  wl}ere  Portugal 
and  Greece  have  floating  currencies,  Spain  and  the 
United  Kingdom have a margin  of fluctuation  of +1-
6%,  and the remainder of the  Member States adhere 
rigorously  to  the  Bundesbank  discipline,  within  a 
spread of +1- 2.25%. 
3.  If this  illogical  situation  is  accepted,  and  if the 
principle is adopted that it should persist in the coming 
years,  the  Commission's main  concern  should  be  to 
find  a  realistic  approach  which,  without  producing 
intolerable  disturbances,  can  replace  the  present 
switch-over mechanism which has been in force since 
1984.  The relative  success  of that  system so  far  has 
been  attributable  above  all  to  the fact  that  it  affects 
MCAs  only  in  the  event  of a  general  realignment 
within the EMS. Between 1984 and the end of 1989, 
there  were  only  two general  realignments,  thanks  to 
the  convergence  of the  monetary  amounts  and  the 
acceptance  of the  hegemony  of the  German  mark 
within the system. On the other hand, there have been 
several  unilateral  devaluations  of the  currencies  of 
some Member States, even though they were not very 
substantial.  Under the present system, green rates  are 
devalued only after a realignment. These devaluations 
ensure compensatory price increases for farmers in the 
countries with negative MCAs. At the same time, they 
prevent  the  creation  of new  positive  MCAs  after  a 
change in the central rate. The negative MCAs created 
by  the  switch-over  mechanism  are  thus  known  as 
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artificial MCAs. In this way,  until a realignment takes 
place, the Commission may be certain of the success, 
even  if  partial,  of  its  policy  of  progressively 
eliminating MCAs. 
4.  This  apparently  satisfactory solution  is  valid  only 
for countries with a strong currency. The enlargement 
of the  Community  and  the  obstinate  refusal  of the 
United  Kingdom  to  join the  EMS  make  the  present 
switch-over  system  ineffective  and  unrealistic.  Ost-
ensibly, nothing prevents the creation of new MCAs in 
countries  with weak currencies,  as  was  demonstrated 
by the introduction of positive MCAs in Spain in 1988. 
However,  with  all  its  imperfections,  the  system  has 
been able  to  limit MCAs only in four countries  with 
almost stable or floating currencies. The exchange-rate 
discipline  imposed  on  the  other  Member  States  has 
made it possible, over the last five  years, to eliminate 
all  the  MCAs  which  affected  their  agricultural 
products. 
In order to reinforce the partial success of the switch-
over system,  whilst implicitly  recognizing its  defects 
as a long-term Community approach, the Commission 
examined a number of more comprehensive solutions. 
The suggestions made by the experts are  set out in  a 
working document prepared by  Commission  officials 
for the members of the Commission in autumn 1989. It 
must be  pointed out that in the  absence of a genuine 
economic  and  monetary  union,  those  suggestions,  if 
examined closely, are far from ideal. Unfortunately, at 
present this  union is  more a matter of ~esire than  of 
political reality. 
5.  The  first  suggestion  made  by  the  Commission 
experts  for  the  dismantlement of MCAs  consists  in 
returning to the 1968 position. The green rate would be 
eliminated  and  exchange  rates  would  be  fixed 
permanently for agricultural trade in accordance with 
the  market  exchange  rates  for  each  of the  Member 
States. Many objections may be made to  this  sugges-
tion.  The  stability  of  the  exchange  rate  would 
guarantee  general  stability  in  agricultural  prices  in 
the  countries  with  strong  currencies,  whereas  in  the 
others  an  impossible  situation  would  arise,  with 
frequent  variations  in  the  fixed  agricultural  prices, 
reflecting  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates.  These 
changes  in  the  common  prices  in  national  currency 
could  endanger  the  Community  agricultural  price 
policy.  In  practice,  the  economic  effectiveness  of 
such  a policy depends  on  three factors:  the  extent of 
the intervention systems for market prices; the market 
situation (surplus, deficit or balance); and the capacity 
to  control  agricultural  production. Thus,  where there 
was a surplus on  the market, a 3%  revaluation of the 
German mark and a 2% devaluation of the french franc 
would cause the price of French products imported into Germany to fall by around 5%. In such a case, theJact 
that the  maximum guaranteed figures  were  exceeded 
could be offset by the level of market prices. The price 
increases  would  thus  affect  the  Community  budget 
discipline. Furthermore, price rises are inflationary in a 
country  where  there  is  a  devaluation  and  inflation 
triggered by  a change in  exchange rates is  incompat-
ible  with  the  main  objective  of  the  EMS,  which 
pursues a system of anti-inflationary exchange rates. 
6.  The  second  perspective,  which  is  slightly  less 
effective,  is  to  finance all  CAP measures in ecus and 
to  'pay  farmers  in  ecus  instead  of  their  national 
currency. Thus, transfrontier exchange rates would be 
eliminated  but  it  would  be  necessary  to  convert 
transactions  back  into  national  currency.  In  any 
event, this proposal is, for the time being, pure fiction 
since there has been little progress in the use of the ecu 
as  a  substitute  currency.  Everything  points  to  the 
conclusion that, apart from developments in the private 
ecu market, it is unrealistic to think that the ecu could 
be  used  as  a  working  currency  in  the  short  term. 
Moreover, in  consequence of the different weightings 
of the currencies within the value of the ecu, farrr).ers in 
Member States  with  weak  currencies  would  suffer a 
loss  on  conversion  by  comparison  with  those  in 
Member  States  with  strong  currencies.  Reality  must 
thus prevai( this suggestion once again places the cart 
before  the  horse  unless  the  ecu  is  first  successfully 
converted into a working currency. 
7.  A third possibility, which appears to be realistiC for 
at least some products under present circumstances, is 
the enlargement of the  neutral margins. This solution 
partially  isolates  products  from  the  reality  of  the 
market  without  creating  distortions  in  trade  and 
exchange  rates.  The  level  of  the  neutral  margins 
depends on the  impa~t of the intervention systems on 
market  prices.  The  lesser  that impact,  the  more  the 
neutral margin can be extended. If  account is taken of 
that factor, it is possible, for a product such as olive oil 
for which the support policy is fairly liberal, to have a 
neutral  margin  of  10  points.  However,  the  neutral 
margin and extension thereof do  no  more than widen 
the gap between the green rate and the exchange rate. 
For a product subject to Community support measures, 
which are very strict, and  whose level of trade within 
the  Community  is  very  high,  the  extension  of  the 
neutral margins would not be possible. Since the green 
rate governs the intervention price, the larger the gap 
between the green rate and the central rate the greater 
is  the  tendency  of producers  in  Member States  with 
overvalued  green rates  to  invest in  a product whose 
yield  reflects  the  market  reality.  In  other  words,  an 
extension of the neutral margin could destabilize even 
further  the  precarious  equilibrium  of  the  various 
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agricultural  markets.  In  conclusion,  even though this 
measure is feasible in the short term, it could be used 
only for a limited number of products. 
8.  The Commission's fourth, and most practical, idea 
involves  a  compromise  between  the  two  previous 
suggestions.  Because of the existence of institutional 
prices, the·effects of a monetary event are immediately 
felt  in  the  agricultural  sector.  But  in  the  general 
economic  context,  the  effects  are  neither  total  nor 
immediate,  and  this  different  situation  means  that, 
where there  is  a change in parity,  a mixed system is 
applied  (raising  of  neutral  margins  with  parallel 
adjustment of the green rates). 
This  system  would  in  fact  combine  the  extension  of 
neutral margins and the adjustment of green rates with 
reference to the  market rates. The first component of 
the  system  would  insulate  the  sector  from  the 
application  of market forces  by  dissociating  the  two 
rates, the green and  central rates,, whereas the second 
would expose the sector to  economic reality. The two 
components  are,  thus,  diametrically  opposed.  In  the 
medium  term,  the  neutral  margin  could  be  pro-
gressively  eliminated  for  all  products,  which  would 
mean that the green rates  were progressively brought 
closer to the market rates.  The principal advantage of 
this system would thus be that the Commission could 
announce the timetable for  elimination of the  neutral 
margin  in advance,  which  would make  it possible to 
advise farmers of the forthcoming changes so that they 
could make the adjustments necessary with a view to a 
free  market.  The  dismantlement  of neutral  margins 
would  then  serve  to  integrate  agriculture  into  the 
general  economy.  In  any  event,  if  this  method  is 
analysed critically, it becomes apparent that there is  a 
great  problem:  the  incompatibility  between  the 
intervention  system  envisaged  for  the  CAP  as  a 
means  of ensuring  agricultural ·income,  transfrontier 
trade and floating exchange rates. 
The  problem  of periodical  variations  in  agricultural 
prices would re-emerge once the neutral margins had 
disappeared. It is  possible to  imagine the administra-
tive  problems  which  would  arise  in  an  unstable 
monetary  economy  with  high  inflation  as,  for 
example,  in  the  case  of trade  between  Portugal  and 
Germany.  Agricultural  prices  would  have  to  be 
continuously adjusted in Portugal. 
9.  Thus,  the  dismantlement  of  the  agrimonetary 
system  will  continue  to  be  a  headache  for  the 
Commission,  firstly  because,  whatever  combination 
of measures  is  proposed,  even  the  best can  only  be 
holding measures of a temporary nature.  None of the 
four  scenarios  suggested for  the  post-1992 period is 
economically valid  since none provides a satisfactory) 
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long-term answer and  none resolves the fundamental 
problem of the  exchange rate or,  therefore, of cross-
frontier  trade.  Whilst  exchange  rates  are  not  fixed, 
farmers in the various Member States will have to cope 
with  different  prices  according  to  whether  they  are 
importing or exporting. 
10. In the. short term, the main obstacle to any initiative 
towards the total dismantlement of MCAs will be of a 
political  nature.  Negative  MCAs  may  perhaps  have 
disappeared  in  some  Member  States  with  weak  but 
stable currencies, but positive monetary gaps exist in 
countries with a strong currency such as Germany and 
the Netherlands. The dismantlement of negative MCAs 
guarantees higher pnces for  farmers  in  the  countnes 
concerned,  but  the  converse  occurs  in  the  case  of 
positive MCAs. In the latter cases, German and Dutch 
farmers are faced with an automatic fall in their export 
prices. It is this political problem - made greater by 
the  recent developments  in  the  countries  of Eastern 
Europe, by which the Federal Republic of Germany is 
affected in particular (German unification)- which is 
the  main  reason  for  the  Commission's  very  careful 
approach to agrimonetary  ~atters, its ideas having, so 
far,  been  limited  to  the  abovementioned  working 
document. 
Moreover, the feeling in Bonn is that the Commission 
is  not prepared to extend the reduction in  VAT,  which 
serves to compensate German farmers for the revalua-
tion of the German mark in March 1984 (see Chapter 
VI.D), after 31  December 1992. The amount involved 
at  1992 rates is DM 1 040 million. 
This  reduction  had  been  authorized  by  the  EEC  in 
1984 at a level of 5%, and was later reduced to 3% in 
1989,  although  Bonn  managed  to  ensure  that  the 
remaining  2%  was  replaced  by  national  'socio-
structural'  assistance.  This  system  of  VAT  rebates 
will come to a close at the end of 1991 and the national 
assistance on 31  December 1992. 
According  to  reports  in  the  trade  press,  the  German 
Minister  for  Agriculture,  Mr  Ignaz  Kiechle,  has 
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already  asked  the  Commissioner  for  Agriculture, 
Mr Ray Mac Sharry, for a proposal to the Council for 
an  extension of these arrangements.  However,  accor-
ding  to  the  Commission's  spokesperson,  there  are 
currently no draft texts being prepared on this matter. 
This prompted the spokesperson on agriculture for the 
CDU-CSU Members  of the  German  Parliament,  Mr 
Ego Susset, to call for an alternative solution providing 
equivalent financial cover. 
The  solution  could  lie  in  increasing  structural 
assistance  to  a  level  equivalent  to  the  3%  reduction 
in VAT.  However, the problem is that the present level 
of assistance,  restricted to  a  maximum of DM  8 000 
per holding,  does  not fully  meet  Community  criteria 
and the other States could be opposed to an  extension 
of this aid,  which might seem to  endorse Germany's 
current tendency  to  neglect its  obligations  under the 
CAP  (in  the  last  price-fixing  round,  Bonn  already 
obtained authorization for paying out compensation for 
milk quota reductions in advance), not to  mention the 
fact  that  the  measure  in  question  is  supposedly 
intended  to  compensate  for  income  losses  resulting 
from the revaluation of the German mark seven years 
earlier. 
Another  possibility  would  be  to  make  use  of  the 
system of direct Community aid to agricultural income 
established  in  1989  (Regulation  (EEC)  No  768/89, 
Official  Journal L 84, 29.3.1989,  p.  8).  According to 
the Commission's spokesperson, such a solution would 
create  fewer  problems  than  an  extension  of  the 
national  assistance  scheme.  Moreover,  this  system is 
more  restr1ctive  than  the  current  German  system of 
assistance, as  the former was formulated for a period 
of  five years with the maximum aid being based on the 
average regional or national income and not exceeding 
ECU  2500  per  work  unit,  with  a  maximum  of 
ECU  1000 per  work  unit  per  year degressively  and 
two  work units  per holdmg  as  far  as  the  section co-
financed by the Commission is concerned (70% in the 
regions  listed  under  'Objective  1', 25%  in  all  other 
cases). XIX - Dismantlement of MCAs -
Council Decisions of 27 April 1990 
The  Council  was  obliged  to  take  account  of  the 
specific  features  of  certain  products  in  certain 
countries in the Community. 
Having regard  to  the  Commission's initial  proposals, 
the Council made the following decisions concerning 
the following countries: 
1.  Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany: 
There is  no  dismantlement for cereals.  In the Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  the  new  green  rates  for  sugar 
will enter into force on  1 October 1990. 
2.  Spain 
(i)  There is no dismantlement for cereals, cotton, rice, 
oilseeds, fruit and vegetables and beef and veal. 
(ii)  Dismantlement of one sixth of the real monetary 
gaps existing in the sectors other than wine, olive oil, 
dried  fodder,  linseed,  hemp  and  silk.  The  new  green 
rate  in  the  sugar  sector  will  enter  into  force  on  1 
October 1990. 
3.  United Kingdom 
(i)  Dismantlement of 50%  of the  real  monetary  gap 
existing in the beef and veal  sector. 
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(ii)  Complete  dismantlement  of the  monetary  com-
pensatory amounts in the pigmeat sector, observing the 
8-point  relationship  with  cereals  (green  rate  = 
0.838723). 
(iii)  New  green  rate  of 0.779552  for  pigmeat  and 
agricultural products. 
(iv)  In  the  other  sectors,  adjustments  to  the rate  for 
milk (0.7581,85). 
4.  Greece 
(i)  Dismantlement to  attain  a real  monetary  gap  of a 
neutral margin of 1.5  in the pigmeat sector. 
(ii)  In  the other sectors, the Commission's proposal is 
adopted which, nevertheless, takes account of the real 
rate of inflation, namely + 2 points. 
5.  As regards .all the other sectors and countries not so 
far  mentioned,  the  Council  decided  to  follow  the 
Commission  proposal.  In  the  case  of  the  pigmeat 
sector,  the  Commission  is  willing  to  introduce 
implementing rules  which ensure that in no  case will 
the monetary gap of 8 points between the MCAs in the 
pigmeat and cereals sectors be exceeded. 
Annex  XVII  sets  out  the  Council  decisions  on 
intervention  pnces  for  agricultural  products  for  the 
1990/91  marketing  year  and  the  monetary  repercus-
sions for  1990. 
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XX - Dismantlement of MCAs - Council 
Decisions of 24 May 1991 
1.  Germany and the Netherlands 
Total dismantlement of the positive monetary gaps still 
existing for cereals.  -
2.  Spain 
Dismantlement of one-third of the existing gaps for the 
majority of products. Reduction of 1 point for pigmeat, 
the green rate which will be applied also to  milk, i.e. 
for  the  latter  sector,  a  reduction  of 0.4  points;  no 
reduction will be  applied for  sugar,  whose green rate 
will also apply to cereals, i.e. a reduction of 0.4 points 
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for  the  latter  sector;  the  number  of green  rates  is 
reduced to three. 
3.  United Kingdom 
Alignment of the green rates to the market rates. 
4.  Greece 
Dismantlement of 75% of the negative monetary gaps 
and  alignment  of  the  green  rates  with  1  the  most 
favourable green rate. 
5.  Annex  XVIII  sets  out  the  Council  decisions  on 
prices  for  the  marketing  year  1991192  and  the 
agrimonetary repercussions thereof. XXI - Conclusions 
1.  Monetary compensatory amounts, a nightmare for 
some and a salvation for others, are, without any doubt 
whatsoever, one of the most controversial components 
of  the  common agricultural policy.  Indeed,  monetary 
compensatory amounts are at the same time a foreign 
body  within  the  common  agricultural  policy  and- a 
consequence of it. 
2.  In the first place, they are a foreign body within the 
common  agricultural  policy.  Divergent  monetary 
developme1,1ts  do  not  lead  to  similar  phenomena  in 
the other sectors of the· economy. In order to stabilize 
farm  incomes,  the  common  agricultural  policy 
established a price guarantee mechanism,  based on  a 
common monetary unit,  the  unit of account.  Guaran-
teed  agricultural  prices  are  converted  into  national 
currency  using  the  agricultural  conversion  rate.  By 
definition,  a  guaranteed  price  cannot  vary  weekly 
according  to  monetary  fluctuations.  As  soon  as  the 
monetary gap  diverges significantly from  the conver-
sion rate used in fixing the prices, the risk emerges of 
upsetting  the  mechanisms  which  guarantee  mainten-
ance of price levels. For those mechanisms to operate 
precisely  and effectively, it is  necessary  to  offset the 
resulting price difference. The monetary compensatory 
amount thus came into being which is inherently both 
a mechanism that enables trade to be carried on within 
the framework of the commop market organization and 
an  obstacle to the free movement of products. 
3.  At the same time, MCAs are an integral part of the 
common agricultural  policy.  Having  been introduced 
in the first place for a transitional period under Article 
103 of the Treaty, they were consolidated on the basis 
of Article 43  of the Treaty.  It became clear that their 
financial  consequences  had  to  be  embodied  in  the 
common· agricultural  policy  and  that,  as  a  result  of 
monetary disorder, it was to be an essential element of 
that policy. 
4.  The agrimonetary system, still largely dependent on 
events  of  a  monetary  nature,  is,  therefore,  an 
essentially  agricultural  system.  Even  though  the 
fundamental  features  concerning  compensation  have 
been maintained unchanged, over the years it has been 
altered in  such  a way  as  to  make it increasingly less 
transparent._ In order to take account of specific needs, 
decisions  were  taken  which  follow  divergent . and 
sometim~s contradictory guidelines. 
5.  In this  way,  the  agrimonetary  system  has  become 
more  complex  than  any  other.  In  particular,  the 
difficulty  of dismantling  MCAs,  whether positive  or 
negative, and the need to  take account of the specific 
requirements of particular Member States have led to 
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the evolution of a system which loses itself in a. mass 
of  details  and  is,  from  many  points  of  view, 
inconsistent.  The  use  of the  green  rate  to  determine 
national  price  levels  has  introduced  an  element  of 
renationalization  and  arbitrariness.  The  existence  of 
different  green  rates for different Member States and 
sectors  has  become  the  general  rule  and  plays  an 
important role in  the annual decisions on prices. 
6.  MCAs  and  their  dismantlement  have  become  a 
constant problem. From the outset, they were regarded 
as  a necessary  evil  because,  by  their  very  character-
istics, they represent an obstacle to trade; nevertheless, 
they  are  necessary  because  of the  existence of price 
guarantee mechanisms and compensation for different 
price levels. 
7.  In fact, the problem arises not from the introduction 
of MCAs  but  from  the  existence  of the  guarantee 
mechanisms  and  discrepancies  between  agricultural 
prices, of which the green rates are  no  more than the 
expre~sion  and  the  MCAs  the  consequence.  Their 
raison  d'etre  lies  in the  fact that monetary  develop-
ments produce very different effects in the agricultural 
sector  from  those  experienced . in  non-agricultural 
·sectors.  In  the  latter,  the  impact of a realignment  of 
parities essentially takes the form of a change of price 
in the imported factors of production. In the absence of 
institutionalized  prices,  the  market  price  of a  non-
agricultural product reflects,  as  a matter of economic 
reality, the effect of the monetary realignment in so far 
as it is influenced by the prices of the imported factors 
of production after the readjustment. Consequently, the 
market  price  does  not  reflect  either  completely  or 
immediately  the  consequences  of  the  monetary 
development  and,  in  any  event,  those  consequences 
fade out after a certain time. In agriculture, the position 
is  reversed.  Where  there  is  no  green  rate,  the 
guaranteed  prices  which influence market prices  and 
guide them towards the desired level are immediately 
affected for the duration of the effects of the monetary 
event in question. 
8.  Hence  there  is  a  political  will  to  moderate  the 
impact of monetary events and  defer their effects  by 
cr:eating green rates, which move away from economic 
re~lity. In any event, the problem is not resolved in this 
way  but merely  deferred  and the  monetary  gap  thus 
created persists at a time wpen evolution of the market 
would  have  caused  it  to  disappear  sooner  or  later. 
Thus, the problem tends to become worse and prompts 
the need to find rules to deprive cumulative monetary 
gaps  of their  effects.  The  initial  approach  was,  and 
continues to be, to adjust the green rates. In any case, 
because  of  the  impact  on  prices  and  incomes,  the 
procedures for  calculating MCAs have been changed 
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so  that  it is  now  easier than  in  the  past  to  dismantle 
them by  applying the switch-over mechanism. 
9.  Thus, since 1984, the method of calculating MCAs 
has been based on the strongest currency, which means 
that the consequences of any realignment in monetary 
parities  affects  only  negative  MCAs.  However,  the 
dismantlement of negative MCAs, which in  1984 was 
regarded as more feasible since it leads to  an increase 
in prices in national currency, is exposed to  increasing 
uncertainty  because  the  Community,  faced  with  the 
ever greater problem of surpluses, must take account of 
the risk of encouraging production which accompanies 
any increase in prices. Furthermore, it is important not 
to  underestimate  the  inflationary  impact of a  signif-
icant increase in  consumer prices of food  products in 
the  economy  of certam  Member  States  with  weak 
currencies.  For  that  reason,  the  Commission  is 
reluctant  to  propose  price  increases  in  national 
currency which exceed the rate of inflation. 
10.  Nevertheless,  producers  in  Member  States  with 
weak  currencies  are  aware  that  the  maintenance  of 
negative MCAs and  overvalued  green rates  seriously 
detracts from  their income.  Consequently, the greater 
the increase in negative MCAs, the greater the pressure 
for  them  to  be  eliminated  and  for  prices  to  be 
increased. 
11.  This problem was not overlooked in 1984. For that 
reason,  in  the  switch-over  mechanism  introduced  m 
1984, a choice had to be made between maintenance of 
price levels  and of MCAs, on  the one hand,  and  the 
elimination of MCAs and an increase in prices, on the 
other: In  view of the situation in the various Member 
States  concerning  production  and  agricultural  pro-
fitability,  the  solution  adopted  was  to  determine 
different  green  rates  for  each  sector  within  each  of 
the Member States. 
12.  The  situation  was  rendered  complicated  by  a 
substantial  depreciation  of sterling  and  the  drachma 
which,  in  the recent past, experienced monetary  gap~ 
exceeding 20 and 40 points respectively. The monetary 
evolution  of those  two  currencies,  in  opposite direc-
tions,  led  to  a  drop  in  the  UK  MCAs  and  a 
considera,ble increase in  the Greek MCAs. 
13.  Those margins led not only to  very high negative 
MCAs (see Annex VII) but also to difficulties in trade 
m certain  products  for  which  there  were  no  MCAs. 
Those  difficulties,  according  to  sector,  manifest 
themselves  in  different  ways  depending  on  whether 
they affect trade between Member States or trade with 
third countries, or both at the same time. 
14.  This situation is largely attributable to the fact that 
the agricultural guaranteed price system is overlaid by 
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a  monetary  phenomenon  unconnected  with  the 
agricultural  system.  Monetary  decisions  are  justified 
by  the  divergent  development  of  economies  and 
consequently of the currencies of the Member States. 
Until it is possible to achieve convergence of economic 
policy  among  the  Member  States,  realignments  of 
monetary parities will continue to occur. 
15.  The agrimonetary problem is,  therefore, a reflec-
tion  of the  economic  and  monetary  situation  in  the 
Community.  Until  such  time  as  there  is  a  common 
economic land  monetary policy,  embodied in  a single 
Community currency generally applied, problems will 
continue to  arise in  the agricultural sector. 
16.  The  time  has  come  to  consider  the  question  in 
depth.  Account  must  be  taken  of the  Community's 
political objectives, in particular the attainment of the 
large internal market in  1992, together with economic 
and social cohesion. 
17.  There  is  no  doubt  that  a  solution  to  the 
agrimonetary  problem can  be  found  by  a number of 
different approaches. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to 
activate the decision-making process taking particular 
account  of the  approaching  horizon  of  1992.  It  is 
hardly imaginable that MCAs - which, in the eyes of 
the public, are the symbol of differing price levels and 
obstacles  to  trade  - should  continue  to  be  applied 
after  1992  between  the  various  Member  States. 
Accordingly,  dismantlement of monetary  compensat-
ory  amounts  is  an  objective  which  the  Community 
authorities  have  pursued tenaciously  since  they  were 
introduced; this is a laudable effort, but is reminiscent 
of the task of Sisyphus, since monetary developments 
re-create them incessantly. 
18.  The  European  Parliament,  wishing  to  make 
progress in  that direction, asked the  Commission and 
the Council - in  its report on  agricultural prices and 
related measures for the 1988/89 marketing year- to 
fix a precise timetable for the progressive elimination 
of all  MCAs  between  1989  and  1992,  together  with 
appropriate accompanying measures. 
19.  The  recent decisions adopted by  the  Council  are 
moving  in  that  direction.  The  most  noteworthy 
measure  within  the  arsenal  of innovations  available 
is  the  automatic  system of dismantling  new  negative 
MCAs,  which  had  never  been  taken  into  account 
previously. The system is necessarily accompanied by 
an  adjustment of prices  in  national  currency.  Conse-
quently,  the agrimonetary  problem is  no  less  contro-
versial  than  it ever  was.  MCAs  could  be  eliminated 
using one of the formulas advocated by  the Commis-
sion, but the risk of price inflation or proliferation of 
national aids continues to exist below the surface. 20.  From  the  linguistic  point of view,  'dismantling' 
means  demolishing  walls.  It  has  already  been 
emphasized in  various parts of this paper that MCAs, 
seen  as  obstacles  to  trade,  are  walls.  They  can  be 
totally  or  partially  dismantled.  In  order  to  do  this, 
essentially, measures are required which focus  on the 
monetary gap or on prices,  these being the  two  main 
factors in the calculation of MCAs. 
21. The monetary gap reflects a different evolution of 
central  rates  as  against  green  rates,  which  are  those 
used to convert into national currency prices and other 
amounts  fixed  in  ecus  under  the  CAP,  and  which, 
therefore,  have  a  direct  impact  both  on  the  prices 
received by  the producers and  on  the  prices paid by 
consumers. Since central rates for currencies are fixed 
with  only  scant regard  to  agricultural  problems,  the 
adjustment of green rates constitutes the only approach 
from the agrimonetary point of view to the elimination 
of MCAs.  The  disadvantages  of this  approach  have 
been dealt with in Chapter XVIII, SectiOn D - 5 (the 
first  scenario  for  the  dismantlement  of MCAs).  The 
other  possible  option  - i.e.  compensation  for  the 
dismantlement  of  MCAs  by  adjusting  agricultural 
Conclusions 
prices expressed in  national currency - goes against 
the principles of market unity and  price stability  (the 
prices being fixed by the Council once each marketing 
year)  and,  therefore,  has  not  been  explored  by  the 
Commission. 
22.  The  fact  is  that  MCAs  cannot  be  eliminated 
without  adverse  repercussions  for  farmers  in  the 
Community  until  it  1s  no  longer  necessary  to 
compensate  for  the  negative  effects  of the  common 
market  organizations,  which  in  turn  derive  from  the 
lack of a true common monetary and economic policy. 
The  achievement  of a  common  monetary  policy  is 
clearly dependent on the progress achieved in securing 
convergence of the  economies of the  Member States 
and,  in  particular, of the outcome of the intergovern-
mental conferences under way.  In the absence of such 
progress, all the possible scenarios for the elimination 
of MCAs will m all probability represent no more than 
illusory intellectual  efforts which will merely exacer-
bate  the  existing  difficult  situation  of many  small 
Community family holdings, which have been affected 
the most by  'CAP reform'. 
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:  Figure 1- 'Traditional' system (applied before the 1984/85 marketing year)-
'  Dismantlement of positive and negative MCAs 
Before 
(1)--- - ---------------------- I 
Positive MCAs 
i  (2)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 
Negative MCAs I 
1 
(3)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I 
NB:  (1)  Price in German marks, defined by the green rate. 
(2)  Community price in ecus, defined by: 
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real central rate according to original method A 
green central rate according to new method of calculation B 
(3)  Price in French francs,  defined by the green rate. 
After Figure 2- 'Green ecu' system (applied since the 1984/85 marketing year)-




MCA  MCA1 
B 
New method of 
calculating MCAs 
~--------,-------, 
I  I 
c 




.  :::::::  ~~:r--_[::: ,_---- ~~~------- _,  _-_-________________ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ 
Levies  Levies  Levies 
:~~----------------~-----------------r---------- ---------
1  I 
j 
NB:  (1)  Price in German marks, defined by the green rate. 
(2)  Community price in ecus, defined by: 
real central rate according to original method A 
green central rate according to new method of calculation B. 
(3)  Price in French francs, defined by the green rate. 
(4)  World market price, defined by: 
real exchange rate according to original method A; 







Point of departure 
r 
ECU1 =  DM 2.5147 
=  FF 6.49211 
Figure 3 - Implementation of the switch-over mechanism 
Situation 2  Situation 3  Situation 4 
Realignment:  Introduction of  Dismantlement 
Revaluation of DM  switch-over 
Devaluation of FF  Correcting factor  marketing year 





Green rate  Green rate  I 
DM 2.51457  DM 2.51457  I 
i  i 
I 
I 
MCA  I  MCA  I  + 10.8%  + 7.8%  Green rate  I 
i 
I 
ECU  I (g) = DM 2.317281 
DM 2.38516  I 
MCA  I 









MCA  I 
ECU 1 =  DM 2.24184  -3.5%  1-------------~-- =  FF 6.87456j  Green rate  ~ 
MCA  MCA  FF 6.86866 
-5.9%  -9.5% 
Green rate  ~  Green rate  ~ 
FF 6.49211  FF 6.49211 
Situation 5 




DM 2.38516  !MCA +  1.9% 





1.137782 Green rate 
FF 7.45826 




Source:  Special report No  1189 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system, accompanied by the replies of the Commission, OJ C 128, 
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:  I• Source:.' Special report N  0  1/89 of the' CoQlt of Auditor~ on tlie ,agrimonetiuy syst~m.  -accpmpapied by the replies I 
' . o£ the Comrni~sion~ OJ C  128, 24.5.1989, p.  1.  .  ·  ·  · · 
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Annex I 
Regulatory framework - agrimonetary system 
1 
Institution  No  Date  OJ reference 
Council  1676/85  11  6 1985  L  164, 24 6 1985 
Council  1677/85  11 6 1985  L  164, 24 6 1985 
Council  1678/85  11  6 1985  L  164, 24 6 1985 
Comm1sswn  3152/85  11  11  1985  L 310, 21  11.1985 
CommiSSion  3153/85  11  11  1985  L 310, 21  11  1985 
CommiSSIOn  3154/85  11  11.1985  L 310, 21  111985 
Comrmsswn  3155/85  11  11  1985  L 310, 21.111985 
CommisSion  3156/85  11  11.1985  L 310, 21  11  1985 
CommiSSion  3578/88  17 11  1988  L 312, 18  11  1988 
1  In force until the end of 1988 
Title  Comment 
The  value  of  the  umt  of  Concerns  the  fixmg  of  green 
account  and  the  conversiOn  rates 
rates  to  be  apphed  for  the 
purposes of the common agn-
cultural pohcy 
Monetary  compensatory 
amounts m agnculture 
F1xmg  the conversiOn rates to 
be  apphed  m  the  agncultural 
sector 
Laymg down detailed rules for 
the  apphcauon of Regulation 
(EEC)  No  1676/85  on  the 
value  of the  umt  of account 
and the conversiOn rates to be 
apphed for the purposes of the 
common agncultural pohcy 
F1xmg  the  methods  for  the 
calculatiOn  of monetary com-
pensatory amounts 
Laymg down detailed rules for 
the  admm1strauve  apphcatwn 
of  monetary  compensatory 
amounts 
Prov1dmg  for  the  advance 
fixmg  of monetary  compen-
satory amounts 
Transitional measuresconcern-
mg the apphcatwn of  monetary 
compensatory amounts 
Laymg down detailed rules for 
the  apphcauon of the  system 
for  the  automatic  dismantle-
ment  of  negative  monetary 
compensatory amounts 
Defines the  rules  for  the mtro-
ductwn of MCAs for the calcu-
latiOn  of  real  and  applied 
monetary  gaps  Provides  for 
the  correctmg  factor  (switch-
over), and automatic dismantle-
ment  Includes general rules on 
accounting for MCAs 
Sets out the actual green rates to 
be  apphed  Amended each time 
a green rate 1s  changed 
(Self-explanatory) 
Detailed calculation rules based 
on pnnc1ples set our m Regula-
tion (EEC) No  1677/85 
Detailed  rules  for  admimstra-
uve application of MCAs when 
goods  Imported  and  exported 
between  Member  States,  and 
w1th  th1rd  countnes 
(Self-explanatory) 
Measures to prevent speculation 
at  the  time  of  changes  to 
monetary gaps 
Rules for puttmg mto effect the 
deciSions  on  dismantlement 
agreed m June 1987 and 1988 
Source: Special report no 1189 ofthe Court of Auditors on the agnmonetary system, accompamed by the rephes 
of the Commission, OJ C 128, 24.5.1989, p.  1. 
L-------------------------·-----------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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1  LIT  0.105943 
2  UKL  228.65837 
3  ESC  0.970460 
4  PTA  1.145018 
5  BFR  3.684174 
6  DKR  19.891806 
7  DM  76.449544 
8  FF  22.926738 
9  HFL  67.922228 
10  IRL  205 166672 
Average: 
ConversiOn rate in force: 
Applicable as from 30.9.1987: 
No change. 
2  3 
24.9,87  25.9.87 
0.106096  0.105919 
227.743672  227.910751 
0.969978  0.969436 
1.146562  1.146486 
3 689726  3.683002 
19.919907  19.861668 
76.586671  76.438852 
22.963419  22.927867 
68.059767  67  916130 
205.115597  204.827022 
DR 100 =  ECU 0.635639 
DR 100 = ECU 0.639991 
DR 100 = ECU 0.635639 
ECU  1 =  DR-157.322 
:j  I Source: CofOffilssion of the European Communities. 
(One umt of  natwnal currency = (NC) DR ... ) I 
I 
I 
4  5  6  7  8 
Reference  Conversion 
rate  rate 
28.9.87  29.9.87  Average  NC =  ECU  DRIECU 
0.106016  0.106109  0.106017 
228.815805  229.141603  228.454074 
0.970599  0.973335  0.970762 
1.1477963  1.154286  1.148063 
3 685178  3.688446  3.686105  0.0235526  0.638956 
19.900207  19.913779  19.897473  0.1273540  0.640051 
76.482795  76.552926  76 502158  0.4857840  0.634994 
22.940398  22.982073  22.948099  0.1448430  0.631176 
67.952826  68.041550  67.978500  0.4311400  0.634230 
205.145225  205.389106  205.128724  1.3013900  0.634426 
>  =  ~ 
;>< 
"'  "' ~  Annex III 
Calculation of market exchange rates for the drachma (from 17.1.1990 to  23.1.1990) 
Currencies 
17.1.1990  18.1.1990 
UKL  260.918746  260.787261 
ESC  1.059636  1.059441 
PTA  1..446613  1.444448 
BFR  4.450788  4.454953 
DKR  24.095433  24.093226 
DM  93.241617  93.229220 
FF  27.418167  27 425628 
HFL  82.719600  82 731781 
IRL  246.574898  246.542537 
LIT  0.125159  0125206 
-----
Average.  DR 100 = ECU 0.528514 
In force  DR 100 =  ECU 0.527961 
Average·  ECU 1 = DR 189.210 
In force·  ECU 1 =  DR 189.408 
19.1.1990  22.1.1990  23.1.1990 
262.173226  262.380255  261.351419 
1 060196  1.059317  1.058613 
I 437912  1.439160  1.435477 
I 
4 452466  4.450244  4.456753 
24.073830  24.058944  24.085743 
93.155162  93.112093  93.240907 
27.410074  27.395255  27.427195 
82.679350  82 633192  82.735164 
247.221419  247.123885  247.084515 
0.125175  0.125167  0.125305 
Source:  Commission of the European Communities. 
------------------------------
(One unlt of  natwnal currency (NC) = DR ... ) 
Reference  Conversion 
rate  rate 




4.453041  0.023714700  0.532551  ! 
24.081435  0.128231000  0.532489 
93.195800  0.489127000  0.524838 
27.415264  0.145840000  0.531966 
82.699817  0 434107000  0.524919 
246.909451  1.310340000  0.530697 
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G 
Calculation of market exchange rates for the US  dollar (from 30.9.1987 to 6.10.1987) 
Currencies  -
30 9.1987  1 10.1987  2.10 1987 
LIT  1 327.003939  1 330 097518  1 329.000222 
UKL  0 614252  0 616142  0.616445 
DR  140 590448  141 080064  140.909776 
ESC  144.840437  145.140510  145.021503 
FTA  122.050193  122.299618  122 299268 
BFR  38.176338  38.262420  38 233917 
DKR  7.068517  7.085486  7.078484 
DM  1.839508  1.843501  1.841898 
FF  6.123012  6.137989  6.132485 
HFL  2.069907  2.074199  2.072596 
IRL  0.685262  0.687521  0.686387 
--------
A - Average:  USD 1 =::  ECU 0.894479 
B -ConversiOn rate in force·  USD 1 =  ECU 0 888418 
A 
Dtfference (%) B : 0.68 
Applicable as from 7.  10.  1987.  USD 1 =  ECU 0.888418 
No change  ECU 1 =::  USD 1.125596 
\C5  I Source: Commission of the European Communities. 
(USD 1 = . units of  natwnal currency (NC)) 
Reference  ConversiOn 
rate  rate 
5 10.1987  6.10.1987  Average  NC = ECU  USD/ECU 
1 329 504736  I  322.599144  1 327.641112 
0.615764  0.611622  0.614845 
141.210487  140 629935  140.884142 
145 000355  144.585116  144.917584 
122.199950  121.700119  122.109830 
38 257530  38.072610  38.200563  0.0235526  0.899723 
7.089004  7.048516  7.074001  0.1273540  0 900902 
1.842702  1.833208  1.840163  0.4857840  0.893922 
6.134007  6.104513  6.126401  0.1448430  0.887366 
2.073305  2.062605  2.070522  0.4311400  0.892685 
0.686154  0 682829  0.685631  1.3013900  0.892273 
I 
"' 00 
0  Annex V 
Calculation of market exchange rates for the US  dollar (from 17.1.1990 to 23.1.1990) 
(USD 1 =  ...  units of  natwnal currency (NC)) 
Reference  ConversiOn 
'  rate  rate 
i 
17.1.1990  18.1.1990  19.1.1990  22.1.1990  23.1.1990  Average  NC =  ECU  USD/ECU 
UKL  0.605438  0.608271  0.609940  0.609498  0.608571  0.608344 
DR  157.970110  158 629276  159.910031  159.920117  159.050850  159.096077 
ESC  149.079668  149.729265  I50.830610  150.965257  150.244618  150.169884 
I 
PTA  109.199993  109.8200I1  111.209859  111.120474  110.800034  110.430074 
BFR  35 492619  35.607400  35.914934  35.935133  35.687610  35.727539  0.023714700  0.847268 
I 
DKR  6.556019  6.583978  6.642484  6.647013  6.603527  6.606604  0.128231000  0.847171 
DM  1.694202  1.701497  1.716599  1.717501  1.705805  1.707121  0489127000  0.834999 
FF  5.761512  5.783980  5.833988  5.837511  5.799020  5.803202  0.145840000  0.846339 
HFL  1.909706  1.917392  1.934099  1 935301  1.922409  1.923781  0.434107000  0.835127 
IRL  0.640658  0.643415  0.646829  0.647125  0.643710  0.644347  1.310340000  0.8443I4 
LIT  1 262.153211  I 266 950215  1 277.496041  I 277.653721  1 269.30552I  I 270.711742  0.000653723  0.830693 
A - Average:  USD  1 = ECU 0.840844 
B - In force  : USD 1 = ECU 0.829675 
A 
Dtfference (%) B  . - 1.34618 
Change:  ECU 0 840844 
Average:  ECU 1 = USD 1.18928 
In force·  ECU 1 = USD 1.20529 
I  -- -----------
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Annex VI 
Calculation of monetary gaps for the drachma (from 23.9.1987 to 29.9.1987) 
~ 
Cereals  Pigmeat  Beef  Eggs and 
and veal  poultry- s  meat 
1  World market rate (WMR)  0.635639  0.635639  0.635639  0 635639 
2  Reverse WMR  157.322  157.322  157.322  157.322 
3  Corrected reverse WMR 
1  178.919  177.097  178.919  178.919 
4  Green rate  134.174  119.008  124.840  128.340 
5  Real monetary gap  -33.348  -48.811  -43.319  -39.410 
6  Neutral margin ('Franchise')  1.5  1.5  1.5  5 
7  Art. 5 (3)(a), Reg. (EEC) No 1677/ 
85  (non-cumulatiOn rule)  -31.848  -47.311  -41.819  -34.410 
8  Real  monetary  gap  in  force  from 
26.8.1987 to  1.9.1987  -32.445  -47.798  -42.348  -38.466 
9  Art. 9 (2), Reg.  (EEC) No  1677/85 
(de minimls rule)  -0.903  -1.013  -0.971  -0.944 
9a  Change on 5.10.1987 
10  Real monetary gap adopted  -33.348  -47.798  -43.319  -39.410 
11  Neutral margm ('Franchise')  1.5  1.5  1.5  5 
12  Gap to be applied from 5.10.1987  -31.8  -46.3  ::_41.8  -28 3 
13  Monetary coefficient  I 318  1.463  1.418  1.344 
14  Art. 6(a) (2), Reg. (EEC) No 1677/ 
85  (new green rate)  119.824 
-- ------- -- - - - -
1  Switch-over coefficient  I 137282 (pigmeat and ohve 01!  I 125696) 
Source: Commission of the European Commumues  . 
Milk  Wme  Sugar  Ohve oil 
and milk 
products 
0.635639  0.635639  0.635639  0.635639 
157.322  157.322  157.322  157.322 
178.919  178.919  178.919  177.097 
124.840  134.174  134.174  116.673 
-43.319  -33.348  -33.348'  -51.789 
1.5  5  1.5  10 
-41.819  -28.348  -31.848  -41789 
-42.348  -32.445  -32.445  -50.780 
-0.971  -0.903  -0.903  -1.009 
-43.319  -33.348  -33.348  -51.789 
1.5  5  1.5  10 
-41.8  -28.3  -31.8  -41.8 
1.418  1.283  1.318  1.418 
---··- - -
f 
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Beef and veal  I  0.0  0.0  0.0  -48 0  0.0  -1.0  -2.0  -5.5  0.0  - -2.5 
I  II 
I  Milk and rmlk products  0.0  0.0  0.0  -48.0  00  -3.5  -3.5  -5.5  00  - -9.5 
P1gmeat  0.0  0.0  00  -37.5  00  0.0  -2 1  -1.6  00  - -4.9 
Sugar  0.0  00  0.0  -37 6  0.0  -3.5  -3.6  -5.5  00  -9.4  -11.1 
Cereals  0.0  0.0  1.0  -37 6  0.0  -3.5  -3.6  -6.5  1 0  - -111 
Eggs and poultrymeat 
Monetary gap  00  00  0.0  -40.5  00  0.0  0.0  -2.0  0.0  - -6.0 
MCA  0.0  0.0  0.0  -34.1  0.0  00  0.0  -3.0  00  - -76 
Monetary coefficient  0.0  00  00  -40.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.0  0.0  - -60 
Wme  - - 0.0  -34 1  0.0  -1.0  - -2.6 
Ohve 011  0.0  0.0  0.0  -29.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  001  0.0  I  -1 o  I  -26 
Source: Comrmssion of the European Commurutles. Annex VIII 
Calculation of monetary gaps for the drachma (from 19.12.90 to  25.12.90) 
~ 
Cereals  P1gmeat  Beef  Eggs and  Milk  I  Wme  I  Sugar  I  Ohve oll 
and veal  poultry- and milk  Sta 
meat  products 
Average market rate: ORA 100 =  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784  0.468784 
Exchange value:  ECU 1 =  213.318  213 318  213.318  213 318  213.318  213.318  213.318  213.318 
Corrected exchange value
1  244.272  244 272  244.272  244.272  244.272  244.272  244.272  244.272 
Green rate  230.472  240.052  204 710  212.503  204.710  230.472  230.472  232.153 
Real monetary gap  -5.988  -1.758  -19.326  -14 950  -19.326  -5.988  -5.988  -5.220 
Neutral margm ('Franchise')  1.5  1.5  1.5  5.0  1.5  5.0  1.5  10.0 
Art. 5 (3)(a), Reg (EEC) No 1677/85 
non-cumulation rule  I -4  488  I -0  258  1-17.826  I  -9.950  1-17 826  I -0  988  I -4.488  I  0000 
Real  monetary  gap  m  force  from 
12.12 1990 to  18.12.1990 
(vahd from 24.12.1990)  I -5.719  I -t.soo  1-19.023  1-14.659  1-19.023  I -s 719  I -5.7t9  I -4.954 
Art  9 (2), Reg (EEC) No 
1677/85 (de mtmmts rule)  I -o  269  I -o  258  1  -o.3o3  1  -o  291  1  -o.3o3  I  -0.269  I  -0.269  I -0.266 
t.  l  I 
No change 
Real monetary gap adopted  -5.719  -1.500  -19.023  -14.659  -19 023  -5.719  -5 719  -4.954 
Neutral margm ('Franchise')  1.5  I 5  1.5  50  1.5  5.0  1.5  10.0 
Gap to be apphed from 1.1  1991  -4.2  0.0  -17 5  -9.7
2  -17.5  -1.0  -4.2  0.0 
' 
Monetary coefficient  1.042  1.000  1.175  1.097  1.175  1.010  1.042  1.000 
Art. 6 (a) (2), Reg (EEC) No 1677/85 
(new green rate for p1gmeat) 
1 Correctmg factor  l 145109 
I  If 
2  Apphed MCA Gap  -1 0 
00  I Source.  Comffil;swn of the European Commumhes.  1..;.} ~  I Annex IX 
Sectors  BLEU  DA  D  GR 
Beef and veal  0.0  0.0  0.0  -17.5 
Milk and rrulk products  0.0  0.0  0.0  -17.5 
Pigmeat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sugar  0.0  0.0  0.0  -4.2 
Cereals  0.0  0.0  0.0  -4.2 
Eggs and poultrymeat 
Monetary gap  0.0  0.0  0.0  -9.7 
Monetary MCA  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.0 
Monetary coefficient  0.0  0.0  0.0  -9.7 
Wme  - - 0.0  -1.0 
Olive Oil  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
-
-- '-
Source: Commission of the European Communities. 
E  F  IRL  I 
2.7  00  0.0  00 
2 1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0  00 
0.0  0.0  0.0  00 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  - 0.0 












(Rates  zn  %) 
p  UK 
00  -1.0 
Change 
00  -5.7 
Change 
0.0  0.0 
Change 
0.0  -2.7 
Change 
0.0  -2.7 
Change 
0.0  -2.2 
Change 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  2.2 
00  -
Change 
0.0  0.0 
Change 
~ 














Monetary compensatory amounts- Monetary coefficients (valid from  1.1.1991) 
Sectors  BLEU  DA  D  GR  E  F 
Beef and veal  - - - 1.175  0.973  -
Milk and milk products  - - - 1.175  0.979  -
Pigmeat  - - - - - -
Sugar  - - - 1.042  0987  -
Cereals  - - - 1.042  0.983  -
Eggs and poultrymeat  - - - 1.097  - -
Wme  - 1010  - -
Olive otl  - - - - -
Preserves and Jams 
(Reg. (EEC) NO 426/86)  - - - - - -
Transf. prod  (Reg. (EEC) No 3033/80) 
To be applied to import levies  - - - 1.175  0.979  -
To be applied to refunds 
Cereals  - - - 1.042  0.983  -
Milk  - - - 1.175  0.979  -
Sugar  - - - 1.042  0987  -
Source: CommiSSion of the European Commuruties. 
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Annex XI 
Market conversion rate to be  applied for certain amounts under the common agricultural 
policy (valid from 1.1.1991). 
ECU 1  LIT 100  UKL 1  IRL 1 
BFR  48 5563  2 75661  59 7595  55.2545 
DKR  8 97989  0.509801  11.0518  10.2186 
DM  2.35418  0 133650  2.89735  2.67893 
DR  243.653  13.8325  299.870  277.264 
ESC  207.836  11 7991  255 789  236.506 
FF  7.89563  0.448246  9.71736  8.98480 
HFL  2 65256  0 150590  3 26458  3 01847 
IRL  0.878776  0.0498894  1.08153 
LIT  1 761 45  2 167.86  2 004.44 
PTA  149.222  8.47154  183.652  169.807 
UKL  0.812528  0.0461284  0.924613 
NB  Based on current rates from  19.12 1990 to  25.12.1990 




Index of increases in intervention prices in ecus and in national currencies,  1982/83 to  1988/89: all agricultural products 
. 
(1982/83 =  100) 
1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89 















Belgmm  100.0  100.0  104.4  107.7  103.8  110.6  104.0  110.4  103 9  112.3  103.9  114.2  103.9  114.6 
Denmark  100.0  100.0  104.0  104.7  103.3  106.3  103.4  1064  102.7  107.8  102.6  110.6  102 6  111.4 
FR of Germany  100.0  100.0  104 1  102.0  103.5  101.4  103.8  101.7  103.6  101  5  103.6  101 5  103 6  101 5 
Greece
3  100.0  100.0  105.6  125.8  106.0  147.9  1064  168.1  105.9  190.7  105.5  216 1  104 8  246.8 
France  1000  100.0  104.0  109.4  103 4  114.9  103.3  116.8  103.0  1192  1028  124.0  102.8  125.4 
Ireland  100.0  100.0  104.2  109.0  103~6  111.9  104.0  112.4  1037  115.2  103.7  125 0  103.7  127.6 
Italy  100.0  100.0  104.5  108.7  104.1  115.7  103.9  119.5  103 3  124 5  102 8  126.5  102.5  128.9 
Luxembourg  100.0  1000  103.9  107.2  103.4  110.2  104.0  110.9  103.9  112 7  103.9  1145  103.9  114.9 
Netherlands  100.0  100.0  104.0  102.6  103.5  102.1  104.0  102.6  104 0  102.6  104.0  1026  104.0  102.4 
Umted Kmgdom  1000  1000  104.2  104.4  103.6  103 8  103.8  104 0  1033  105.0  103.2  112.6  103.2  115.3 
-
EURIO  100.0  1000  1042  106.9  103.6  110.3  103.7  112.3  103 4  114.8  103.2  1186  103.1  120.5 
1 Common pnces m ecus (mterventiOn or eqmvalent) we1ghted  by  agncultural productwn 
2  Common pnces m ecus converted mto natwnal currencies (NC) at green rates resultmg from the annual pnce dec1swns, takmg mto account the mcidence on  pnce~  expre~sed m natwnal 
currencies of adJustments m green rates smce the previous pnce deciMOns 
3  Includmg mcidence of the  adJu~tment of natwnal  pnce~ on common pnce~ followmg measures connected with adhesiOn 
Source: Spec1al  report No  1189 of the Court of Auditors on the agrimonetary system, accompamed by the replies of the Comrmss10n, OJ C 128, 








00  Annex XIII 
Agrimonetary decisions - 1987/88 
Green central rates 
Member State/Sector 
Old  I  New 
BLEU
4 
Sheepmeat  47 7950  48 2869 
Other hvestock products  47 7950  48 2869 




1  8 83910  8.93007 
Sheepmeat  8 83910  8 93007 
Other hvestock products  8 83910  8 93007 
Crop products  8 83910  8 93007 
FR of Germanl 
M1lk  2 31728  2 34113 
Cereals  2 31728  2 34113 
Wme  2 31728  2 34113 




1  174251  176 044 
Sheepmeat  174 251  176 044 
Tobacco  174251  176 044 
Wme  174 251  176044 
Eggs and poultrymeat3 
Other crop products  174251  176 044 
Other products  174 251  176044 




1  160520  162172 
Sheepmeat  160520  162 172 
Other hvestock products  160520  162 172 
Wine  160 520  162 172 
Crop products  160520  162 172 
France
4 
Milk  7 77184  7 85183 
P1gmeat
1  7 77184  7 85183 
Cattle  7 77184  7 85183 
Sheepmeat  7 77184  7.85183 
Other hvestock products  7 77184  7.85183 
Wme  7 77184  7 85183 
Crop products  7 77184  7 85183 
·--- --
Green  rates 
Old  I  New 
47 3310  47 3310 
47 3310  48 0467 
46 8712  48 0658 
8 70847  8 88697 
8 58163  8 58163 
8 58163  8 75497 
8 54064  8 75497 
2 41047  2 41047 
2 39792  2 39792 
2 38516  2 38516 
2 38516  2 38516 
117.901  129 691 
130674  150.275 
116 673  134 174 
116 673  134 174 
116 673  128 340 
116 673  124 840 
116673  137 262 
149 272  158 087 
151 806  151  806 
147 208  155 786 
145 796  154 213 
145 796  154 213 
7 31248  7 47587 
7 65699  7 69621 
7 54539  7 69553 
7 54539  7 54539 
7 20131  7 45826 
7 20771  7 43671 
7 09967  7 47587 
------
Old monetruy gaps  New monetruy gaps 
Real  I Apphed  '  Real  T  Applied 
-0980  - -2020  -
0980  00  -0500  00 
-1 971  00  0460  00 
-I 500  1 0  0485  00 
-3 000  - -4060  -
-3 000  -15  -2000  00 
-3 495  -20  -2000  00 
3 866  29  2 877  14 
3 363  24  2 368  10 
2 846  00  I 846  00 
2 846  I 8  1 846  00 
-47 798  -46 3  -35 741  -342 
-33 348  - -17 148  -
-49 349  -47 8  -31 210  -297 
-49 349 °  -443  -31 206  -262 
-49 349  -47 8  -37 174  -35 7 
-49 349  -47.8  -41 019  -395 
-49 349  - -28 254  -
-7 450  -60  -2584  -1 1 
-5 740  - -4101  -
-9043  -7 5  -4101  -26 
-10 052  -51  -5 163  00 
-10 052  -86  -5 163  -37 
-6 282  -4 8  -5029  -35 
-I 500  00  -2022  -10 
-3 001  -15  -2  031  -10 
-3 001  - -4061  -
-7923  - -5 277  -
-7 827  -2 8  -5 582  -10 
-9 468  -8.0  -5 029  -3 5 
Difference  Impact on 
m  monetary  pnces 
gaps 
1040  -
-0480  1 51 
-1 511  255 
-I 015  205 
1060  -
-1000  202 
-I 495  2 51 
-12057  1000 
-16200  15 00 
-18 139  15 00 
-18 143  15 00 
-12175  1000 
-8 330  700 
21  095  17 65 
-4 866  5 91 
-1 639  000 
-4942  5 83 
-4 889  577 
-4889  5 77 
-1 253  2 23 
0522  051 
-0970  1 99 
1060  -
-2646  3 57 
-2 245  3 18 
-4439  5 30 
Revaluation or 



































n  c 
~ 





Green central rates  Green  rates  Old monetary gaps  New monetary gaps  Difference  Impact on  RevaluatiOn  or 
Member State/Sector 
I  J  I  Applied  I  Apphed 
m monetary  pnces  devaluauon of 




Cattle  0 864997  0 873900  0 817756  0 844177  -5 777  -43  -3 521  -20  -2 256  3 23  -313 
Ptgmeat
1  0 864997  0 873900  0 829519  0 843427  -4277  -2 8  -3 613  -21  -0664  168  -165 
Sheepmeat  0 864997  0 873900  0 817756  0 817756  -5 777  - -6 866  - 1089  000  000 
Other livestock products  0 864997  0873900  0 817756  0 832119  -5 777  -43  -5021  -35  -0756  176  -173 
Crop products  0 864997  0 873900  0 782478  0 831375  -10 546  -90  -5 115  -36  -5 431  6 25  -5 88 
ltalys  ' 
Cattle  1681 05  1698.35  1554  1613  -8 178  -67  -5 293  -38  -2 885  3 80  -3 66 
Ptgmeat
1  1681 05  1698 35  1577  1638  -6600  -5.1  -3 684  -2 2  -2916  3 87  -3 72 
Sheepmeat  1681 05  1698 35  1554  1554  0 8178  - -5 293  - -2  885  - -
Cereals, mlseeds  1681 05  1698 35  1539  1597  -9 230  -7 7  -6 348  -48  -2  882  377  -3 63 
Frutt &  veg , tobacco  1681 05  1698 35  1554  1629  -8 178  - -4257  - -3 921  4 83  -4.60 
Wme  1681 05  1698 35  1554  1603  -8 178  -3 2  -5 948  -10  -2230  3 15  -306 
Other products  1681 05  1698 35  1554  1613  - -8178  -6 7  -5 293  -3 8  -2  885  3 80  -3 66 
N  ether1ands 
4 
Milk  2 61097  263785  2 71620  2 70230  3 874  29  2385  14  1489  -051  051 
Cereals  2 61097  2 63785  2 70178  2 68801  3 361  24  1 866  10  1495  -051  0 51 
Sheepmeat  2 61097  2 63785  2 68749  2 68749  2 847  - 1 847  - 1000  - -
Other products  2 61097  2 63785  2 68749  2 67387  2 847  1 8  1 847  00  1500  -051  0 51 
Portugais  ' 
Sugar  181 423  183 290  151 812  171 725  -19 505  -180  -6 740  -52  -12 765  13 12  -1160 
Sheepmeat  181 423  183 290  162 102  181 888  -11919  - 0381  - -12 300  -12 21  -10 88 
Ftshery products  181423  183 290  !53 283  173 609  -18 358  - -4 358  - -14 000  13 26  -1171 
United Kingdoms 
Ptgmeat
2  0 788336  0796450  0 661898  0 694266  -19102  -17 6  -14 718  -13 2  -4384  4 89  -466 
Cattle  0 788336  0796450  0 668197  0 710546  -17 980  -16 5  -12 092  -106  -5 888  6 34  -5 96 
Sheepmeat  0 788336  0 796450  0 652575  0652575  -20 804  - -19 669  - -1135  - -
Other livestock products  0 788336  0796450  0635626  0 665547  -24 025  -22 5  -19 669  -18 2  -4356  - 471  -450 
Crop products  0 788336  0796450  0626994  0656148  -25 733  -244  -21385  -199  -4348  465  -444 
1  Ptgmeat- entry mto force  of old green rate on 1 7 1987, new gap not takmg account of Arttcle 6a of regulation (EEC) No 1677/87 
2  Ptgmeat- Umted Kingdom  green rate m force on 1.7 1987  0 664702 wtth an  apphed gap of -171 pursuant to  Article 6bts of Regulation (EEC) No  1677/87 
3  Eggs and poultrymeat  MCAs calculated on the basts of cereals nun  us a margm of 5 pomts, monetary coefficients calculated on the basts of  the green rate for eggs and poultry  meat nun  us a 
margm of 5 pomts 
Floating currenctes  the calculations are earned out on the basts of the rates for the week 24 6 1987 to  30 6 1987 
4  Ftxed MCAs 
5  Vanable MCAs 
NB  New coeffiCient  1 137282. 
Old coefficient  1 125696 
Entry mto force:  1 7 1987 for products the marketing years for which begm before that date, begmnmg of the marketing year for the other products 
Source  Comrmsswn of the European Commuruties,  'Notes raptdes de !'Europe verte', No 41  (1988)  f 
------\0 
0  Annex XIV 
Agrirnonetary decisions, 1987/88 
Green central rates  Green  rates  Old monetary  gaps  New  monetary  gaps 
Member State/Sector 
Old  I  New  Old  I  New  Real  I Apphed  Real  I Apphed 
FR of Germany 
Milk  2 05853  2 34113  2 41047  2 38591  2 877  14  1 877  00 
Cereals  2 05853  2 34113  2 39792  2 37360  2 368  I 0  1 368  00 
Wme  2 05853  2 34113  2 38516  2 36110  I 846  00  0 846  00 
Other products  2 05853  2 34113  2 38516  2 36110  1 846  00  0 846  00 
Netherlands 
Milk  2 31943  2 63785  2 70230  2 67490  2 385  14  1 385  00 
Cereals  2 31943  2 63785  2 68801  2.66089  I 866  10  0 866  00 
Other products  2 31943  2 63785  2 67387  2 64704  1 347  00  0 347  00 
NB  Coefficient  1 13728 
Entry mto  force  begmmng of 1988/89 marketing year 
Source.  CommissiOn of the European Commumties, Notes raptdes de l'Europe verte, No 41  (1988). 
Dtfference  Impact on 
m  monetary  pnces 
gaps 
1000  -102 
1000  -101 
I 000  -1 01 
1000  -101 
1000  -101 
1000  -1 01 

























;;l Annex XV 
Agrimonetary Decisions, 1988/89
1 
Member State/Sector  Previous situation 
Green  Real  Applied  Dismantlement 
rate  monetary  monetary 
gap  gap 
BLEU
3 
Sheepmeat  47.3310  -2.020  0  2 
Other 
livestock products
2  48.0467  -0.500  0  0.5 
Crop products  48.0658  -0.460  0  05 
Denmark
3 
Pigmeat  8.88697  -0.485  0  0.5 
Sheepmeat  8.58163  -4.060  - 1.0 
Other 
hvestock products
2  8.75497  -2.000  0  1.0 
Crop products  8 75497  -2.000  0  1.0 
FR of Germany
3 
M1lk  - 2.38591  + 1.877  0  0 
Cereals  2.37360  + 1.368  0  0 
Other products  2.36110  +0.846  0  0 
Greece
4 
Pigmeat  134.328  -38 977  -37 5  15 
Sheepmeat  150.275  -24.229  - 15 
Wme I olive ml  134.174  -39.136  -37 6  20 
tobacco I cereals I 
sugar 
Pou1trymeat  128 340  -45.461  15 
Other crops  128.340  -45.461  - 20 




Green  Real  Applied 
rate  monetary  monetary 
gap  gap 
48.2869  0.000  -
48.2869  0.000  0 
48.2869  0.000  0 
8.93007  0.000  0 
8.66492  -3.060  -
8.84165  -l.ilOO  0 
8.84165  -1.000  0 
150.580  -24.109  -22.6 
170.912  -9.345  -
156.699  -19.262  -17.8 
143.096  -30.600 
148.799  -25.594  -
138.759  -34 682  -33.2 
Consequences 
Revaluation  Impact 
, or  on 
devaluation  prices 
-1.980  +2.020 
-0.497  +0.500 
-0.458  +0.460 
-0483  +0.485 
-0.961  +0.971 
-0.980  +0.990 
-0.980  +0.990 
10 8  12.1 
12.1  13.7 
14.4  16.8 
10.3  ll.5 
13.7  15.9 

























Beef I veal 








Cereals I 01lseeds 






Green  Real 
rate  monetary 
gap 
155.643  +0.892 
151.806  -1.663 
155.786  +0.983 
154.213  -0.027 
7.47587  -5 029 
7.73579  -1.500 
7.69553  -2.031 
7.54539  -4.061 
7.45826  -5.277 
7.43671  -5.582 
7.47587  -5.029 
0.843427  -3 613 
0 844177  -3.521 
0.817756  -6.866 
0.832119  -5.021 
0.831375  -5.115 
1 674.00  -3.053 
1 554.00  -11.010 
1 597.00  -8.021 
1 629.00  -5.899 
1 603.00  -7 617 
1 613.00  -6.950 
Applied  Dismantlement 
monetary 
gap 
0  0 
- 1.0 
0  0 
0  0 
-3.5  1.5 
0  1.5 
-1.0  0 
- 1.5 
1.5 
-10  1.5 
-3.5  1.5 
-21  155 
-20  0 
- 1.55 
-3.5  1.55 
-3.6  1.55 
-1.6  2.5 
- 6.6 
-6.5  2.5 
- 2.5 
-26  2.5 
2.5 
New Situation 
Green  Real  Apphed 
rate  monetary  monetary 
gap  gap 
153.315  -0.663  -
7.58418  -3.529  -2.0 
7.85183  0.000  0 
-1.0 
7.65577  -2.561  -
7.56606  -3.777 
7.54389  -4.082  0 
7 58418  -3.529  -20 
0.856236  -2.063  -1.0 
-2.0 
0.829788  -5.316  -
0.844585  -3 471  -2.0 
0.843818  -3.565  -2.1 
1 716.00  -0.530  0 
1 652.00  -4.425  -
1 635.00  -5 511  -4.0 
1 668.00  -3.423  -
1 641.00  -5.125  0 
1 652.00  -4.425  -2.9 
Consequences 
Revaluation  Impact 
or  on 
devaluation  prices 
-0.984  +0.994 
-1.428  + 1.449 
-1.478  + 1.500 
-1.442  + 1.463 
-1.425  + 1.445 
-1.421  +1.441 
-1.428  + 1.449 
-1.496  + 1.519 
-1.450  + 1.471 
-1.476  + 1.498 
-1.475  + 1.497 
-2.448  +2.509 
-5.932  +6.306 
-2.324  +2.379 
-2.338  +2.394 
-2.316  +2.371 
-2.361  +2.418 
~ 







n  c: 
~ 
0  g 
§ 
"0 
~ 1.0  w 
Member State/Sector  I  Previous situation  New situation 
Green  Real  Applied  Dismantlement  Green  Real  Apphed 
rate  monetary  monetary  rate  monetary  monetary 
gap  gap  gap  gap 
I  I 
Netherlands
3 
Milk  2.67490  + 1 385  0  0.5  I  2.66089  1  +0.866  I  0  I 
Cereals  2.66089  +0.866  0  0 
Other  2.64704  +0.347  0  0 
Portugal
4 
Sheepmeat I non -
Annex ll  181.888  -4.915  - 3.4  188.007  -1.500  -
Fish products  173.609  -9.918  - 8.4  188.007  -1.500  -
Crop products  171.725  -11.123  -96  9.6  188.007  -1.500  0 
Structures  171725  -11.123  - 9.6  188.007  -1.500  -
United Kingdom
4 
Pigmeat  0.704020  -6.406  -4.9  3.2  I  0.7258491  -3.206  I  -1.7  I 
Beef I veal  0.710546  -5.429  -3.9  0 
Sheepmeat  0.652575  -14.794  - 3.2  I  0.6712911  -11.594  I  -10.1  I 
Other 
livestock products





0.6850351  -9.355  I 
-7.9  I  Crop products  0.656148  -14.169  -12.7  3.2  0.675071  -10.969  -9.5 
1  Entry mto force of new green rates on 1 1 1989, with the exception of 
Greece and Portugal· begmmng of marketing year 1988 I 89 or 25 7 1988 for products for which the marketing year had already begun at that time, 
Netherlands  25.7 1988 for Iru!k 
2  Not mcludmg beef I veal 
3  FIXed  MCAs 
4  Vanable MCAs 
Consequences  -l 
I 
Revaluation  Impact 
or  on 
devaluation  prices 
+0.527  I  -0524 
-3.255  +3 364 
-7.658  +8.293 
-8.660  +9.481 
-8.660  +9.481 
-3.007  I  +3.101 
-2.788  I  +2 868 
-2  843  I 
+2.927 
-2.803  +2.884 
Source: Comffilsswn of the European Cornrnumties, 'Notes raRc:::.id=e:.:s:.._d=.e::....::.l'-"'E=-=u=rc:::.o.cpe.::._:v_::::e;;:;;rt=e!....,  .::..N:...:o:.._44...:....:..~<.::..19:::...8=9=.,)c:.. --------------------'  i 
~ \0 
~  Annex XVI 

































Other livestock products 
Wine 
Olive 01! 
Rice, m1seeds,  fresh fru1t 
Dned fodder, flax,  hemp, silk 






Beef and veal 
Sheepmeat 
Green 
central rate 1 








Green  Real  Applied 
rate  monetary  monetary 
gap  gap 
ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt 
48 2869  0  0 
8 93007  0  0 
8 66492  -3 060  -
8 84165  -1000.  0 
2 38591  1877  0 
2 36110  0 846  0 
2 37360  1 368  0 
236110  0 846  0 
167 523  -17 967  -16 5 
180 508  -9481  -
149 762  -31 957  -15 0 
164 729  -19 968  -18 5 
164 729  -19 968  -15 0 
164 729  -19 968  -100 
164 729  -19 968  -
156020  -26 665  -
190 827  -3 561  -
145 018  -36 274  -34 8 
146 854  I 750  00 
153 315  5 890  -
155 786  7 383  14 
155 786  7 383  59 
154 213  6438  1 4 
154 213  6438  00 
154 213  6438  -
154 213  6438  49 
154 213  6438  49 
155 786  7 383  -
7 58418  -3 529  -20 
7 85183  0  0 
7 81036  -0531  0 
7 65577  -2561  -
----
New  SituatJon 
Dlsmantlemen  Green  Real 
rate  monetary 
gap 
pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt 
0000  48 2869  0000 
0000  8 93007  0000 
-3 060  8 93007  0000 
-I 000  8 93007  0000 
1477  2 35053  0400 
0446  2 35053  0400 
0000  2 37360  I 368 
0000  2 36110  0 846 
-16500  194 765  -1467 
9481  197 622  0000 
-16 500  171  165  -15 457 
-16500  190998  -3 468 
-16 500  190998  -3 468 
-16 500  190998  -3 468 
-16 500  190998  -3 468 
-16 500  179 387  -10165 
-3 561  197 622  0000 
-16500  164996  -19 774 
0000  146 854  I 750 
0000  153 315  5 890 
0000  155 786  7 383 
0000  155 786  7 383 
0 805  152 896  5 633 
0 805  152 896  5 633 
0 805  152 896  5 633 
0805  154 213  5 833 
0000  - 6438 
8000  155 786  7 383 
-1529  7 69787  -2000 
0000  7 85183  0000 
-0531  7 85183  0000 








































RevaluatiOn  Impact 
or  on 
devaluatiOn  pnces 
%  % 
0000  0000 
0000  0000 
2969  3 060 
0990  I 000 
1505  -1483 
0450  -0448 
0000  0000 
0.000  0000 
-13 987  16262 
-8660  9481 
-12 504  14 291 
-13 754  15 947 
-13 754  15 947 
-13 754  15 947 
-13 754  15 947 
-13 068  14 977 
-3438  3 561 
-12 108  13 776 
0000  0000 
0000  0000 
0000  0000 
0000  0000 
0 861  -0 854 
0 861  -0854 
0 861  -0 854 
0000  0854 
- 0 
0000  0000 
-1477  I 499 
0000  0000 
-0528  0 531 
-0547  0550 
~ 
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V1 
Member State/Sector  PreviOus  SituatiOn 
Green  Green  Real 
central rate 
1  rate  monetary 
gap 
ECUb  NC  ECU  I=  NC  pomt 
Other hvestock products  7 56606  -3 777 
Wme  7 54389  -4082 
Olive ml  7 58418  -3 529 
Cereals, sugar  7 58418  -3 529 
Other products  7 58418  -3 529 
lreland
2  08739 
Sheepmeat  0 829788  -5 136 
Beef and veal  0 856765  -2000 
Plgmeat  0 856765  -2000 
Poultrymeat  0 844585  -3 471 
Crop products  0 843818  -3 565 
Other products  0 844585  -3 471 
Jtaly
3  1 703 67 
Plgmeat  1 716 00  0 719 
Poultrymeat  1 652 00  -3128 
Cereals, mlseeds, dned fodder  1 635 00  -4200 
Fresh frmt, vegetables, tobacco  1 668 00  -2138 
Wme  1 641  00  -3 819 
Ohve OJ!  1 652 00  -3 128 
Other products  1 652 00  -3 128 
Netherlands3  2 63785 
Cereals  2 66089  0866 
Mtlk  2 66089  0 866 
Others  2 64704  0 347 
Portugal
3  192002 
Ohve OJ!  188 007  -2125 
Other products  188.007  -2125 
Umted Kmgdom
3  0 729831 
P1gmeat  0 723693  -0  848 
Sheep  meat  0 671291  -8 721 
Beef and veal  0 710546  -2 714 
Poultrymeat  0 683050  -6 539 
Ohve OJ!  0 675071  -8 112 
Other vegetable products  0 675071  -8 112 
Others  0 685035  -6 539 
8B  DeCISIOn of 22 4 1989 
Applicable from  1 6 1989 or the start of the  1989/90 marketmg year followmg that date 
1 Coefficient  1 137282 (0 879289), reference week  12 4 1989- 18 4 1989. 
2  Ftxed MCAs 
3  Vanab1e MCAs 
NC = Umts of nauonal currency 




































Dismantlement  Green  Real 
rate  monetary 
gap 
pomt  ECU 1=  NC  pomt 
-1 777  7 69787  -2000 
-2082  7 69787  -2000 
-I 529  7 69787  -2000 
-I 529  7 69787  -2 000 
-I 529  7 69787  -2000 
-3 316  0 856765  -2000 
-2000  0 873900  0000 
0000  0 856765  -2000 
-1471  0 856765  -2000 
-1 565  0 856765  -2000 
-1 471  0 856765  -2000 
0 116  I 714 00  0603 
-1 840  1 682 00  -1288 
-2 367  1 673 00  -1 833 
-1 329  I 690 00  -0 809 
-2168  I 676 00  -1 651 
-1 840  1 682 00  -1288 
-I 840  1 682 00  -1288 
0000  2 66089  0 866 
0 866  2 63785  0000 
0 347  2 63785  0000 
-2 125  192 002  0000 
-2125  192 002  0000 
-0424  0 726750  -0424 
-4361  0 699340  -4 360 
-2 714  0 729831  0.000 
-3 270  0 706728  -3.269 
-4056  0 701383  -4056 
-4056  0 701383  -4056 




































Revaluation  Impact 
or  on 
devaluation  pnces 
%  % 
1 712  1 742 
-2000  2 041 
-1477  1499 
-1477  1499 
-1477  1 499 
-3149  3 261 
-1961  2000 
0000  0000 
-1422  1442 
-1511  1 534 
-1422  1442 
0117  -0117 
-1 784  I 816 
-2  271  2.324 
-1302  1 319 
-2088  2 133 
-1784  1 816 
-1 784  I 816 
0873  0.866 
0348  -0347 
-2081  2 125 
-2081  2125 
-0421  0422 
-4011  4178 
-2 642  2 714 
-3069  3 167 
-3 751  3 898 
-3 751  3 898 
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Agrimonetary decisions 1990/91 
Member StateJSector  Prevtous sttuanon  Consequences of 
automanc dtsmantlement 
Green  Real  Apphed  Green  Real 
rate  monetaJy  monetary  rate  monetaly 
gap  gap  gap 
ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt 
BLEU3  Green central rate
1 =  48.2868 
All products  48 2869  0000  00 
Denmark
3  Green central rate
1 =  8.93008 
All products  8 93007  0000  00 
FR of Germany
3  Green central rate
1 =  2.34113 
Livestock products  2 35053  0400  00 
Cereals  2 37360  1 368  00 
Other products
2  2 36110  0846  00 
Greece
4  Green market rate
1 =  227.625 
Plgmeat  220 221  -3 362  1 9  220 221  -3 362 
Sheepmeat and structures  211  490  -7 629  - 216 600  -5 090 
Poultrymeat  183 177  -24 265  -64  199 911  -13 863 
Cereals, sugar  204401  -11 362  -99  216 600  -5 090 
Wme  204 401  -11 362  -64  216 600  -5 090 
Olive otl  204401  -11362  -14  216 600  -5 090 
Tobacco  204401  -11362  - 216 600  -5 090 
Other crop products  191  975  -18 570  - 209 512  -8 645 
Other products  176 576  -28 910  -27 4  192 706  -18 120 
Spain
4  Green market rate
1 = 150.023 
Plgmeat  149 026  --0 669  00  149 026  -0669 
Sheepmeat  153 315  2147  - 153 315  2 147 
Beef and veal  155 786  3 699  22  155 786  3 699 
Pou1trymeat  155 786  3 699  00  155 786  3 699 
Other hvestock products  155 786  3 699  22  155 786  '  3 699 
Wme  152 896  I 879  00  152 896  I 879 
Ohve 01!  152 896  I 879  00  152.896  1 879 
Dned fodder, flax, hemp, stlk  152 896  1 879  - 152 896  1 879 
Rtce, otlseeds, fresh  fruit  !52 896  1 879  - 152 896,  1 879 
Cereals and cotton  154 213  2 717  1 2  !54 213  2 717 
Other crop products
2  154 213  2 717  1 2  154 213  2 717 
Other products  155 786  3 699  - 155 786  3 699 
-
New sttuanon 
Dismantlement  Green  Real 
rate  monetary 
gap 
pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt 
0000  48 2869  0000 
0000  8 93007  0000 
0400  234113  0000 
0000  2 37360  1 368 
0846  2 34113  0000 
-I 862  224 261  -1500 
-3 738  224 589  -1 352 
-4006  207 201  -9  857 
-3 798  224 722  -I 292 
-3 798  224 722  -1292 
-3 798  224 722  -1292 
-3 798  224 722  -I 292 
-3 914  217 343  -4  731 
-4081  199 603  -14039 
-0 112  149 192  -0557 
0358  152 756  1 789 
0000  155 786  3 699 
0617  154 794  3 082 
0 617  154 794  3.082 
0626  151 927  1 253 
0626  151 927  1 253 
0626  151927  I 253 
0000  152 896  1 879 
0000  154 213  2 717 
0453  !53 498  2 264 
0617  154 794  3082 
--·- ----- -- ---
Consequences 
Applied  Revaluauon  Impact 
monetaJy  or  on 
gap  devaluauon  pnces 
pomt  %  % 
00  0000  0000 
00  0000  0000 
00  0402  -0400 
00  0000  0000 
00  0853  -0846 
00  -1802  I 835 
- -3 557  3 688 
00  -3 518  3 647 
00  -3 614  3 750 
00  -3 614  3 750 
00  -3 614  3 750 
- -3 614  3 750 
- -3 603  3 738 
-12 5  -3455  3 579 
00  -0 Ill  0 Ill 
- 0366  -0365 
22  0000  0000 
00  0641  -0637 
16  0641  -0637 
00  0638  -0634 
00  0638  -0634 
- 0638  -0634 
- 0000  0000 
1 2  0000  0000 
I 0  0466  -0464 
- 0641  -0637 
-------- --------
~ 
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(1) 
;;! Member State/Sector  Prev1ous situatwn  Consequences of  New sttuatJOn  Consequences 
automallc dtsmantlement 
Green  Real  Apphed  Green  Real  Dismantlement  Green  Real  Apphed  RevaluatiOn  Impact 
rate  monetary  monetary  rate  monetary  rate  monetary  monetary  or  on 
gap  gap  gap  gap  gap  devaluation  pnces 
ECU I=  NC  pomt  potnt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt  %  % 
---- -··  -- -- --- -- -
France
3  Green central rate 
1 =  7 85183 
Plgmeat, beef and veal  7 85183  0000  00  0000  7 85183  0000  00  0000  0000 
Other products  7 69787  -2000  00  -2.000  7 85183  0000  00  -1 961  2 000 
Ireland
3  Green central rate
1 =  0.873900 
Beef and  veal  0 873900  0000  00  0.000  0 873900  0000  00  0000  0000 
Other products  0 856765  -2000  00  -2000  0 873900  0000  00  -1 961  2000 
Italy
3  Green central rate
1 = 1751.67 
Plgmeat  172600  -1487  00  1751 67  0000  0000  1751 67  0000  00  0000  0000 
Pou1trymeat  1709 00  -2497  00  1751 67  0000  0000  1751 67  0000  00  0000  0000 
Dned fodder, cereals, mlseeds  170000  -3.039  -15  1736 00  -0903  -0903  1751 67  0000  00  -0  895  0903 
Fresh frutt,  tobacco  171700  -2019  1751 67  0000  0.000  1751 67  0000  - 0000  0000 
Wme  1703 00  -2 858  00  173900  -0729  -0729  1751 67  0000  00  -0723  0729 
Olive otl  170900  -2497  00  1751 67  0.000  0000  1751 67  0000  00  0000  0000 
Other products  1709 00  -2497  -10  1751 67  0000  0000  1751 67  0000  00  0000  0000 
Netherlands
3  Green central rate
1 =  2.63785 
Cereals  2 66089  0866  00  0000  2 66089  0 866  00  0000  0000 
Others
2  2 63785  0000  0.0  0000  2 63785  0000  00  0000  0000 
Portugal
4  Green market rate
1 =  206.902 
Ohve ml  199 761  -3 575  00  206 902  0000  0000  206 902  0000  00  0000  0000 
Others  199 761  -3 575  -21  206 902  0000  0000  206 902  0000  0.0  0000  0000 
Umted Kingdom
4  Green market rate
1 =  0.853610 
Plgmeat  0 756267  -12 872  -114  0 761571  -12 085  -10 31Q,  0 838723  -1 775  00  -9199  10 131 
Sheepmeat  0 702276  -21 549  - 0 707776  -20 605  -11 105  0 779553  -9500  - -9 207  10141 
Beef and veal  0 733029  -16450  -15 0  0 738632  -15 566  -8 225  0 795232  -7 341  -58  -7117  7 663 
Poultrymeat  0 709729  -20 273  -162  0 715249  -19 344  -6.758  0 758185  -12 586  -45  -5 663  6003 
Mtlk  0 709729  -20 273  -18 8  0 715249  -19 344  -6758  0.758185  -12 586  -11 1  -5 663  6003 
Ohve otl  0 704335  -21 194  -112  0 709837  -20 254'  -10.754  0 779553  -9500  00  -8 943  9 821 
Other crop products  0 704335  -21 194  -19 7  0 709837  -20 254  -10 754  0 779553  -9 500  -80  -8 943  9 821 
Others  0 709729  -20 273  0 715249  -19.344  -6 758  0 758185  -12 586  - -5 663  6003 
1  Coefficient  I I45109, reference week  1141990-18 4 1990 (MCAs applicable from  23.41990) 
2  Dismantlement applicable to sugar from  I 10 I990 
3  Ftxed·MCAs 
I  II 
4  Vanable MCAs 
\0  NC =  umts of natiOnal currency 
--.]  I Source: CommissiOn of the European Commumtie_s~~urope verte', No 4/90 \0 
00  Annex XVIII 
Agrimonetary Decisions, 1991192 
Member StateJSector  PreVIOUS  Situai!On  Consequences of 
automatic dismantlement 
Green  Real  Apphed  Green  Real 
rate  monetary  monetary  rate  monetary 
gap  gap  gap 
ECU l =  NC  pornt  pomt  ECU  l =  NC  pomt 
---- -- ,  __  -------------
BLEU
5  Green central rate
1 =  48.5563 
All products  48.5563  0000  00  0000 
Denmark
5  Green central rate
1 =  8.97989 
All products  8 97989  0000  00  0000 
FR of Germany
5  Green central rate
1 =  2.35418 
'
1  Cereals  2 37360  0818  00  0818 
Other products  2 35418  0000  00  0000 
Greece
6  Green market rate
1 =  257.895 
Plgmeat  246 319  -4700  -3 2 
Sheepmeat  231 754  -11 280  - 236 250  -9162 
Poultry meat  212 503  -21 361  -69  232 541  -10 903 
FIsh products  206 395  -24952  - 229 864  -12 195 
Cereals, sugar,  wme, tobacco  230472  -11 899  -104  236 250  -9162 
Ohve oil  232 153  -11088  -1 1  236 250  -9162 
Gram legumes  204 710  -25 981  - 228 862  -12 686 
Particular products
4  231968  -11177  -
3  3 
Other crop products  222 905  -15 697  - 231 968  -11 177 
Structures  230.337  -11964  - 236 250  -9162 
Other products  204 710  -25 981  -245  228 862  -12 686 
Spam
6  Green market rate
1 = 145.756 
Pigmeat  145 756  0000  00 
Sheepmeat  152 756  4582  -
Beef and  veal  155 786  6438  49 
Milk  154 794  5 839  43 
Sugar  153 498  5 044  3.5 
Cereals  154 213  5 484  40 
Tobacco, seeds, peas  153 498  5 044  -
Rice, mlseeds, fruit and  vegetables  152 896  4670  -
Cotton  154 213  5 484  -
Gram legumes  154 794  5 839  -
New Situation 
Dismantlemen  Green  Real 
rate  monetary 
gap 
porn!  ECU l =  NC  pomt 
----- -------- -------
48 5563  0000 
8.97989  0000 
2 35418  0000 
2 35418  0000 
-4700  257 895  0000 
-6 872  252121  -2 290 
-8613  252 121  -2 290 
-9905  252 121  -2 290 
-6 872  252 121  -2 290 
-6 872  252 121  -2 290 
-10 396  252 121  -2290 
-8 887  252121  -2 290 
8 887  252 121  -2 290 
-6 872  252 121  -2290 
-10 396  252  121  -2290 
0000  145 756  0000 
1 219  150 828  3 363 
I 000  154 138  5 438 
0401  154 138  5 438 
0000  153 498  5 044 
0440  153 498  5044 
1681  150 828  3 363 
1307  150 828  3 363 
1591  151 660  3 893 































Revaluation  Impact 
or  on 
devaluation  pnces 
%  % 
0000  0000 
0000  0000 
0825  -0818 
0000  0000 
-4489  4700 
-6 295  6718 
-7 766  8420 
-8 828  9 683 
-6295  6718 
-6295  6718 
-9225  10163 
-7 993  8 688 
-7 993  8 688 
-6295  6 718 
-9225  10163 
0000  0000 
1278  -1262 
I 069  -1058 
0426  -0424 
0000  0000 
0466  -0464 
1 770  -1.739 
1 371  -1 353 
I 683  -1656 















;;! Member State/Sector  I  PreviOus sltuauon  I  Consequences of  New sttuauon  Consequences 
automauc dtsmantlement 
Green  I 
Real  Apphed  Green  Real  Dtsmantlement  Green  Real  Apphed  RevaluatiOn  Impact 
rate  monetary  monetary  rate  monetary  rate  monetary  monetary  or  on 
gap  gap  gap  gap  gap  devaluauon  pnces 
ECU  I=  NCI  pomt  pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt  ECU  I=  NC  pomt  pomt  %  % 
Other crop products  151 927  4062  00  1 354  149 813  2 708  00  1411  -1 391 
Other products  154 794  5 839  43  1 946  151 660  3 893  24  2.066  -2 025 
France5  Green central rate 
1 =  7.89563 
All products  7 89563  0000  00  0000  7 89563  0000  00  0000  0.000 
Ireland5  Green central rate
1 =  0.878776 
All products  0 878776  0000  00  0000  0 878776  0000  00  0000  0000 
Italy
5  Green central rate
1 = 1 761 45 
All products  1 761  45  0000  00  0000  1 761  45  0000  00  0000  0.000 
Netherlands5  Green central rate
1 =  2.65256 
Cereals  2 66089  0313  00  0 313  2 65256  0000  00  0314  -0313 
Other products  2 65256  0000  00  0000  2 65256  '0000  0.0  0000  0000 
Portugal6  Green market rate 
1 =  205.190 
Ptgmeat  205 190  0000  00  0000  205 190  0000  00  0000  0000 
Other products  208 676  1 671  00  0000  208.676  1 671  00  0000  0000 
United Kingdom6  Green market rate
1 =  0.795423 
Plgmeat  0 796802  0173  00  0173  0 795423  0000  00  0173  -0173 
Sheepmeat  0 779553  -2036  - -2036  0 795423  0000  - -1995  2036 
Beef and veal  0795232  -0024  00  -0024  0 795423  0.000  00  -0024  0024 
Crop products  0 779553  -2.036  -10  -2036  0 795423  0000  00  -1 995  2036 
Other products  0 758185  -4911  -34  -4911  0 795423  0000  00  -4682  4.911 
NB  Dectston of 25 5 1991 
Applicable from 17 6 1991  or start of the  1991/92 marketmg year 
1  Coefficient  1 145109 (agnmonetary correctmg factor), reference week  15 5 1991  - 21  5.1991  (MCAs applicable from 27 5 1991) 
2  From the packet pnze dismantlement 
3  Applicable at start of marketmg year for mtlk, cucumbers, tomatoes, courgettes, aubergmes, Silkworms, chernes, dned fodder, cauhflowers, apncots, peaches and nectannes, chernes m 
syrup, prunes, pears, lemons, tmned pmeapples  , 
4  Products whose 1991/92 campatgn has already begun 
5  Ftxed MCAs 
I  II 
6  Vanable MCAs 
'CI  I  Source- Comrmssion of the European Communities, CAP Working Notes, Agricultural Pnces, 1991/92, DS  XI.  'CI Glossary of terms 
Glossary of agrimonetary terms 
The terms in this glossary are in alphabetical order. References are given to the chapter in which they first appear 

























The  conversion fate  of the  currencies of the  Member States 
against the  real  ecu  published in the Official Journal of the 
European  Communities for  each  day  on  which  the  currency 
markets operate. 
The  conversion  rate  fixed  by  the  Council  to  convert 
institutional  prices  fixed  in  ecus  into  national  currencies  in 
the Member States. It is called 'green' because it applies only 
to  agricultural products. 
The real monetary gap less the neutral margin, rounded to one 
decimal  place.  It  is  the  percentage  applied  in  calculating 
monetary compensatory amounts. 
The part of a positive RMG resulting from a revaluation of the 
central rate of the strongest currency (German mark) which, by 
application of the correcting factor, becomes a negative RMG. 
The conversion rate fixed by each Member State participating 
in  the  EMS  for  its  national  currency  against  the  ecu.  The 
central rates are fairly stable. 
The real monetary gap less the neutral margin. 
This factor is determined by revaluation against the ecu of the 
strongest currency (German mark) used to multiply the central 
rates and 'switch' the positive MCAs into negative MCAs. 
Bilateral exchange rate used in calculating the variable MCAs 
and the real conversion rates. 
Under  this  rule  the  AMG  will  only  be  changed  when  the 
difference  between  the  new  AMG  and  the  current  AMG  is 
equal to or more than 1 point. 
Coefficients  used  for  the  calculation  of MCAs  for  derived 
products,  without  an  intervention  price,  on  the  basis  of the 
MCAs in force for the basic products; they are determined ad 
hoc. 
These are applied to the aids granted in the oilseed and high-
protein plant sectors; they are regarded as equivalent to MCAs 
and are treated in the same manner. 
The coefficient that results from the fact that when payments 
are made from the budget, the ecu amounts are converted into 
national  currency  using  the  green  rate,  but  when  they  are 
recorded  in  the  accounts  of  the  Community,  they  are 
reconverted into ecus using market exchange rates. The dual-
rate coefficient is defined as the equivalent of ECU 1 in national 
currency, converted at the green rate, divided by the equivalent 
of ECU 1 in national currency, converted at the market rate. 
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Currencies  of  the  Member  States  which  keep  within  a 
maximum  spread  at  any  time  of +/- 2.25%  by  reference  to 
their central rates. 
The  exchange-rate  stabilization  system  of  the  European 
Community established in  1979.  The ecu  forms  the basis  of 
the system: 
MCAs calculated for the EMS currencies: these MCAs change 
only  if the  green  or  central  rates  change,  which  happens 
infrequently 
Currencies  of  the  Member  States  which  comply  with  a 
maximum spread at any time of +1- 6% by reference to their 
central rates  (Italian lira until 4.1.1990 and Spanish peseta as 
from  21.9.1989)  or  do  not  comply  with  any  margin  of 
fluctuation. 
The central rate  multiplied by  the correcting factor,  used for 
calculation of the RMGs under the  'green ecu' system. 
The equivalence of the green  central rates  against the ecu  is 
obtained by  multiplying the real ecu by the correcting factor. 
The  market  rates  of exchange  multiplied  by  the  correcting 
factor;  used for the calculation of the variable MCAs. 
Agricultural support prices and other amounts decided by the 
Council  as  part  of the  operation  of the common agricultural 
market organizations. 
The actual rates of exchange of one national currency against 
another, as fixed in  the currency markets. 
Limit on  the  exchange value of the MCA expressed in  ecus/ 
unit of weight, under which the latter does not apply. It is used 
for products not included in Annex II to the Treaty and certain 
processed fruits and vegetables. 
The monetary  coefficient is  applied to  levies  and  refunds  in 
trade with third countries.  Its  purpose is  to  adjust levies and 
refunds,  which  have  been  converted  from  their  ecu  amount 
into national currency using the green rate, so that they are all 
worth about the same at market rates. The MCA is then added 
to/subtracted from the adjusted levy/refund. 
The monetary coefficient is calculated in accordance with the 
following formula: 
MC = (100- AMG) 
100 
An  amount  applied  in  trade  between  Member  States  or 
between  Member  States  and  third  countries  to  cover  the 
AMG. The objective is for the MCA to fill the gap created by 
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A  change  in  the  centraL  rates  of  the  Member  States 
participating  in  the  EMS,  as  a  result  of which  the  central 
rates and, consequently, the market exchange rates are altered. 
I 
The part of the negative RMG resulting from a devaluation of . 
the central rate for the currency of'a Member State. 
MCAs applied by Member States with weak currencies (e.g. the 
United Kingdom, Italy and Greece), i.e. their agricultural prices 
in natiomil currency are below the common price level. Negative 
MCAs are applied as a subsidy on imports and a levy on exports, 
in principle restoring the final price to the common price level: 
A flat-rate reduction made to the real monetary gap to give the 
applied monetary gap. 
If  the RMG less the neutral margin is equal to or less than 0.50, 
the  percentage  MCA  to  be  applied  will  be  zero;  if  this 
difference is equal to or less than 1, but above 0.50, an MCA of 
1%  will be applied.  · 
MCAs applied by Member States with strong currencies (e.g. 
Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Netherlands  and  Spain),  i.e. 
their  agricultural  prices  in  national  currency  are  above  the 
common price level.  Positive MCAs are applied as  a levy on 
imports  and  a  subsidy  on  exports,  in  principle  restoring  the 
final price to the common price level. 
Rates  used  for  the purposes of the  CAP in recording  world 
market data. 
The  value  of the  ecu  and  the  conversion  rates  for  the  ecu 
published  daily  in  the  Official  Journal  of the  European 
Communities. 
The  percentage  difference  between  the  green  rate  and  the 
central rate, according to the formula: 
(a) EMS currencies: 
RMG = (  1 - g~ )  x 100 
(b)  Floating currencies: 
RMG = (  1 x ~:  ) x 100 
Since the introduction of the  switch-over mechanism (1984), 
the central rate has been multiplied by the correcting factor, so 
that: 
(a) EMS currencies: 
RMG = (1- ~~R  )x 100 
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(b)  Floating currencies: 
RMG = (  1 - G~R)  x 100 
Within the  switch-over arrangements,  the  RMG  for  Member 
States with weak currencies (i.e. the RMG is negative) divides 
into two  parts, the  'artificial' RMG and the  'natural' RMG. 
The  arrangements  whereby,  since  1984,  existing  positive 
MCAs  have  been  dismantled  and  the  creation  of new  ones 
avoided.  This  is  done by  multiplying  each  central  rate  by  a 
correcting factor, thus creating the green central rate. The real 
monetary gap between the green rate and the green central rate 
is reduced for strong-currency countries (with a corresponding 
reduction in positive MCAs) and increased for weak-currency 
countries (with a corresponding increase in  negative MCAs). 
The purpose of the switch-over mechanism is, thus, to convert 
positive MCAs into negative MCAs. 
MCAs calculated for the floating currencies. These MCAs are 
reviewed weekly. 
Chapter III and 
Figures 2 and 3 
Chapter IV, Figures 
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